



IMES

Instituut voor Migratie- en Etnische Studies

MPMC Project

Multicultural Policies and Modes of
Citizenship in European Cities

Working Paper

3A

**Ethnic associations, political trust and
Political participation**

3B

Creating Networks within the Turkish Community

Amsterdam, Athens, Antwerp, Barcelona, Birmingham, Brussels,
Cologne, Liege, Marseilles, Milan, Oeiras (Lisboa), Paris, Rome,
Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Turin, Zurich



Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture

UNESCO - MOST PROJECT

Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC)

3A

Ethnic associations, political trust and
political participation

3B

Creating Networks within the Turkish Community

3A

By

Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie

3B

By

Jean Tillie, Meindert Fennema and Karen Kraal

Foreword

The Amsterdam team has played a key role in the development and success of the MPMC project since the preparation of the first workshop held in 1997 in Amsterdam. Besides administrative and organizational leadership provided by IMES, the crucial theoretical and methodological insights of the Amsterdam research need to be underscored. This is well illustrated by the working paper by Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie on the importance of interlocking directorates among Amsterdam ethnic associations for building up political trust within ethnic communities and for explaining their political participation.

The Amsterdam research elegantly combines theoretical insights from political science and governance theory on the one hand, with insights from migration and ethnic studies on the other hand. It is also based on a sophisticated methodology combining qualitative and quantitative research.

In paper 3B Jean Tillie, Meindert Fennema and Karen Kraal focus on the creation of networks within the Turkish community of Amsterdam. They assess the importance of personal and organizational strategies in explaining the formation of Turkish associational networks. This paper is largely empirical.

Clearly, the Amsterdam team contributes to the construction of better instruments of analysis of the Amsterdam context that certainly also have a relevance for other cities included in the MPMC project.

The Steering Committee of the MPMC project

Dr. Marco Martiniello

Prof. dr. Rinus Penninx

Dr. Steven Vertovec

3A WHY DO INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONS CREATE POLITICAL TRUST AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?¹

1. The paradox of democratic governance.

Ever since the Greeks invented democratic governance the competence of citizens has been a central theme of democratic theory. This competence was from its inception framed in terms of economic and social status, in terms of education and in terms of civic virtues. It was not until Alexis de Tocqueville's acute observations about Democracy in America that civic virtues were seen to be related to the existence of voluntary associations. Tocqueville suggested a connection between voluntary associations of citizens and the functioning of a democratic system. "Thus the most democratic country in the world now is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires...". Tocqueville then asked himself: "Is that just an accident, or is there really some necessary connection between associations and equality?" (Tocqueville, (1840) 1990: 275) His answer is affirmative, because contrary to aristocratic societies, where "[e]very rich and powerful citizen is in practice the head of a permanent and enforced association composed of all those whom he makes help in the execution of his designs", in democratic societies "all the citizens are independent and weak". "They would all therefore find themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily." (Idem: 275/276)

The innocent reader might ask whether the government is not the appropriate agent to pursue the objects of common desire. But Tocqueville is clearly not in favour of this solution. Would the citizens leave the task of pursuing the common goals or common interests to the government this would force the government to "spread its net ever wider. The more government takes the place of associations, the more will individuals lose the idea of forming associations and need the government to come to their help." Tocqueville calls this 'a vicious circle', leaving no doubt about his opinion about such democratic Leviathan.

It took more than a century before Tocqueville's observations were put to a scientific test. In 1963 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published their path-breaking study about civic culture in five nations. They demonstrated a clear correlation between active engagement in voluntary associations and subjective political competence (Almond and Verba, 1965: 265). The Tocquevillean argument was corroborated: "If the citizen is a member of some voluntary organization, he is involved in the

¹ This Paper was also prepared for the Workshop 'Voluntary Associations, Social Capital and Interest Mediation: Forging the Link' ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen 14-19 april 2000-02-15

broader social world but is less dependent upon and less controlled by his political system. The association of which he is a member can represent his needs and demands before the government. It would make the government more chary of engaging in activities that would harm the individual.” (Almond and Verba, 1965: 245)

There is clearly a paradox working in democratic governance. On the one hand, a democratic government is appointed by the people and should therefore act as its agent. However to make the government act as its agent the citizens apparently need more than just a vote. They need to have associations that provide governance independent of the democratically elected government. These associations make citizens more competent to handle their own affairs and to control the government. This was demonstrated by Almond and Verba at the macro-level as well as on the micro-level. Membership of voluntary associations was more frequent in the well-established democracies, like the US and the UK than in new democracies like Germany, Italy and Mexico. Members of such organizations considered themselves more competent citizens than non-members, while active members considered themselves more competent than passive members. There appeared to be a relation between subjective civic competence and actual political participation. The authors suggest that voluntary associations are a hotbed for civic competence. What they do not show is how far civic engagement and political participation also leads to *better* government. We are indebted to Robert Putnam for his demonstration that good governance in Italian regions is related to the number of voluntary associations, to electoral and political participation and to political trust (Putnam, 1993). Putnam’s thesis looks like the last element in the corroboration of Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic governance. It relates the structure of civic community to political participation and political trust and sees good governance as the dependent variable. Civic engagement is crucial in the explanation of governmental performance. Governance prospers by the monitoring of its citizens.

Is this also true for multi-ethnic polities, that is, for societies where ethnic minorities add to the heterogeneity of political culture and sometimes to deep cultural cleavages? Classical democratic theory assumes that religious or ethnic divisions were antagonistic to democratic governance. The Jacobin strand of democratic theory also denies the viability of multicultural democracy. The nation should be one and indivisible, cultural differences are considered irrelevant, they are denied or suppressed. There should be only one loyalty to the nation, a single and uniform patriotism. Jacobin versions of democracy assume shared values among the members of a democratic polity. It is a communitarian vision of democracy. Even today, the French government finds it very hard to recognize cultural differences in the public sphere, as the headscarf discussion has shown.

English liberals also have denied the possibility of multicultural democracy, but they emphasized not so much the aspect of loyalty to the nation but rather the need of unrestricted communication within the political community. According to John Stuart Mill, “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political acts are different in the different sections of the country. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of another. (*sic, MF/JT*) The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them.” (Mill (1861) 1990, 425) Note that the emphasis is on the need for cohesive networks of communication rather than on shared values.

The American democrats were somewhat more lenient towards cultural division of the polity but they did not design the checks and balances to cope with ethnic divisions and certainly not with divisions that are created by linguistic diversity. Today, many American democrats fear the spectre of multicultural society and have severe doubts about the prospects of multicultural democracy. Governmental authorities in Scandinavian countries seem most positive about the feasibility multicultural democracy. They have intuitively favoured some kind of civic engagement and political participation of ethnic minorities. Some autochthonous political elites have welcomed political participation of foreign residents, for reasons of political integration as well as to get better information about the policy preferences of ethnic groups. In some European countries, foreign residents have been granted local level voting rights even though there were no popular movements demanding such voting rights (Jacobs, 1998). Ireland did so in 1963, Sweden in 1976, Denmark in 1981, Norway in 1982 and The Netherlands in 1985. In other countries, advisory councils have been established in which representatives of various ethnic minorities participate and in which an attempt is made to register the preferences of ethnic groups. *Multicultural democracy then is a democracy where ethnic minorities participate in the democratic process, thus providing the political elite with reliable information about the political preferences of the migrant population and the democratic institutions with popular legitimacy among the minority groups.*

But how does such legitimacy come about if not through shared values or a unified public opinion? Our answer will be that the existence of *political trust* will allow the multicultural democracy to function properly. Such political trust does not necessarily stem from shared values. It can also stem from social trust (see Weinstock, 1999: 292). Social trust is something that may still exist where shared values are lacking because it is a very thin form of commitment. It has an intrinsic value rather

than a substantive value. It allows the truster and the trustee to engage in a cooperative relationship that enables them to pursue a common goal. As such it may lead, as we will show below, to trust in political institutions. If there are no shared values the role of communication networks becomes more important. And since these communication networks in a multicultural society tend to be fragmented, the role of interlocking directorates that form bridges between the different subnetworks become crucial for the building of social trust.

In Amsterdam, ethnic citizens have a relative high level of political participation. Yet, ethnic groups vary in their degree of political participation and political trust.

Turks show a higher voter turnout at municipal elections, they participate more in other forms of politics, they have a greater trust in political parties and governmental institutions and they are more interested in local news and in local politics. All these indicators show a stable rank-order. Turks score highest, followed by Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans.

Table 1 – Voting turnout at municipal elections in Amsterdam, 1994 and 1998

<i>Ethnic group</i>	<i>Municipal elections</i>	
	1994	1998
Turks	67%	39
Moroccans	49	23
Surinamese/Antilleans	30	21
<i>Municipal turnout</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>46</i>

SOURCE: Tillie, 1994; Tillie and Van Heelsum, 1999; refer also to Tillie, 1998.

From table 1 it is clear that voting turnout varies enormously between 1994 and 1998 but also among different groups. Yet the rank order remains the same: Turks vote more often than Moroccans and Moroccans vote more often than Surinamese and Antilleans. In 1994 the Turkish voters even had a higher turnout than average. In 1998 there is a spectacular drop in voting turnout, especially among the ethnic groups. Turnout among Moroccans more than halves, Turkish voting decreases nearly 40 percent and the Surinamese and Antillean vote decreases with 30 percent. This drop is substantially more than the overall decrease in voters’ turnout. Yet, even in 1998 the turnout of the Turkish voters is nearly average (39 as against 46). We have no explanation for this excessive drop in ethnic voting, yet the rank order among the ethnic groups remains stable. We find the same rank order when we look at other forms of political participation and also when we look at political

trust (table 2).

Table 2 – Degree of political distrust in Amsterdam

<i>Ethnic group</i>	<i>High distrust score</i>	<i>N (100%)</i>
Turks	36%	109
Moroccans	60	208
Surinamese	61	297
Antilleans	75	51
[Dutch]	41	1595

Source: Fennema and Tillie, 1999

Turks show the lowest degree of distrust (compared to the other ethnic groups a remarkable low score). Only 36% of the Turkish population demonstrate high degrees of distrust (compared to 41% of the Dutch citizens). The Turks are followed by the Moroccans and Surinamese. Antilleans have the highest degree of political distrust. For more details we refer to Fennema and Tillie (1999).

We will assume that the more the different ethnic groups vote and the more they trust the local political institutions the higher the quality of multicultural democracy. Our results suggest that in Amsterdam multicultural democracy works better for Turks than for the other ethnic groups.² And the other way around: Turks contribute more to local democracy than other ethnic groups. In this article we will present the theoretical argument why this is so.

2. Social trust and the structure of civic community

In our study of ethnic groups in Amsterdam the concept of *civic community* is invoked to explain political participation and trust in political institutions. The concept refers to voluntary associations of free citizens that are set up to pursue a common goal or a common interest.

What then makes these associations so crucial for democracy? In the first place, so it seems, it is the *voluntary* co-operation among citizens to enhance a common goal. Forced co-operation can do the same trick, as is shown in aristocratic societies. But in such societies citizens are not free and independent. An elected government can also enforce co-operation for a common goal, but that

² Similar conclusions can be drawn for the Turks in Sweden. Turkish voter turnout has been consistently higher than ethnic voter turnout in general, since 1976. Only the Chilean and the German residents in Sweden show a higher voter turnout (Molina, 1999: 24). Research by Lise Togeby (1999) on electoral results in the two largest Danish cities has shown that in the local elections of 1998 in Århus Turks also had the highest voter turnout among ethnic minorities, but this was not the case in Copenhagen. In Århus, the voter turnout among Turks with (only) Turkish citizenship is higher than among Turks with Danish citizenship. In Copenhagen the voter turnout is highest among Turks with Danish citizenship. This seems to indicate

would easily lead to democratic despotism. In both cases - in aristocratic societies and in centralised state-oriented democracies - vertical relations predominate, whereas in a society made of voluntary associations horizontal relations predominate. This brings us to the second aspect of voluntary associations: the importance of horizontal relations. A voluntary association somehow has to treat their members as free and autonomous subjects. Since each member can withdraw from it, the free will of the associates is the bottom line of the organization. Their support can never be taken for granted; the potential members must be 'seduced' to join. As an alternative to loyalty, members of voluntary organizations have always the option of exit and that gives their voice a natural strength. Thus, voluntary associations are a hotbed of civic engagement and mobilization. The membership of voluntary associations breeds the capacities that citizens need to do something about bad governance by engaging in a process of political mobilization.

In vertical networks the trust that is needed to collaborate for a common endeavour is often enforced and loyalties are narrowly focused on the principal, be it the 'lord', the 'godfather' or the 'government'. Also an elected government is, once in power, 'sovereign' which means that it can enforce its will upon the citizens. Even the relationship between democratic government and its 'subjects' is essentially vertical. Such vertical relationships are based on dependency rather than on equality. Once again, such vertical relationships may very well be based on trust, but trust in vertical relations is not based on self-reliance and it is not generalized, as we will see below. In a civic society citizens comply with collective rules out of conviction rather than out of personal loyalty or fear and free riders are sanctioned by all citizens rather than only by the principal.

In our argument so far there is one missing link. Why should trust that has been built up in one voluntary association spill over to other organizations and to the public space. There are two answers to this question. The first is that trust is related to civic virtue and becomes a generalized attitude that is not restricted to the association where it originally developed. This argument stresses the cultural side of trust. The other argument is that in a civic community voluntary associations communicate amongst each other through informal contacts and because their membership and boards overlap. Here the structural side of trust is emphasized. Interlocking directorates among voluntary associations play a crucial role in the formation of civil society because they create permanent communication channels between different civic organizations. We would therefore expect a strong civic community to have many voluntary associations that are horizontally connected through interlocking directorates.

that ethnic identity has a positive effect on political participation in Århus but not in Copenhagen. Ethnic culture *as such* – although apparently important - cannot fully explain the differences in voter turnout among ethnic groups.

Vertical relations also exist – because governance without vertical power relations is practically impossible – but these vertical relations do not predominate, as is the case in feudal communities, in Communist Parties or in Mafia organizations, where horizontal linkages are discouraged.

But why should individuals embedded in a network of voluntary associations more readily collaborate in a common endeavour which is not part of the mission of the association of which they are members and why should they be more likely to trust the government? In other words, why should dedicated members of a church choir or a bowling club be good citizens? The culturalist answer is that these individuals share the norms and values of the well-integrated community. They have civic virtues that prevent them from defecting from the community and to go it alone. Without denying the importance of civic culture we would like to stress the structural aspects of civil society. The organizations that carry civic virtues seem to us paramount to the building and maintenance of social trust. Indeed, the probability that each man – or woman – returns the favours that have been done to him in an indeterminate future will increase if he knows that he is being monitored and that he can be sanctioned if he does not return the favours in due time. This goes for all organizations, including feudal communities, Communist Parties or the Mafia. In fact social trust in the latter organizations is often very high because personal loyalties are strong and because the penalties for defection are extremely heavy. In a civic community the sanctions seem less severe and certainly less spectacular, partly because social trust is not vertically organized and not oriented towards a principal. One does not have to return the favour one has received from A back to A, one may also return it to B, C, D or E, on the condition that B, C, D, and E do the same thing. The wider the circle of actors that one can repay the favours received from one of them, the more social capital is invested in the group. The structural difference between a Mafia organization and a civic community is that in a civic community obligations are not personalized and the norms that guide behaviour tend to be universalistic rather than particularistic. Yet, there is a limit to the range of trust. As Flap (1999) says, there will be a discount rate to the present value of future help. If the chances for ego to be repaid for his present investment in B, C or E become lower, ego will be less inclined to help B, C, or E. Increasing the size of the group decreases the chances that ego will be repaid if communication within the group does not increase with the same speed. We know from network theory that the number of possible links among the members of a group increases by $\frac{1}{2}n(n-1)$. Thus, other things being equal, it seems more difficult to maintain trust in a large group than in a small one. But other factors tend to increase the maintenance of social capital. If the distance between the group and the rest of society is great, members are strongly dependent on the group because they cannot defect. Social trust, then, is dependent on the closure of social groups. The more the individual is dependent

on the group, the more important for ego is the reputation (s)he holds within the group and the higher the group's social control.

In connected networks norms and values can be maintained through the circulation of information that builds and destroys reputations of its members. In this sense gossip builds social capital. Not just the power holders can collect evaluative information about each of the members but everybody can, because evaluative information circulates through newspapers and other mass media. The larger the amount of horizontal linkages, the more egalitarian is the community structure. The denser these horizontally connected networks are, the more effective the mechanism of reputation formation. These two assumptions taken together lead us to the hypothesis that egalitarian networks are more effective to build and destroy reputations than are hierarchical ones. This does not mean, of course, that egalitarian networks are more efficient in all respects. What it means is that they are better equipped to maintain social norms and social cohesion. If the social norms are focused upon co-operation then the community that is formed by a fully connected network with many horizontal ties has a lot of social capital. At the group level social capital refers to the capacity of a group to produce collective goods and pursue common goals. (Coleman, 1990, Putnam, 1993, Fukuyama, 1995 and 1999).

An 'old boys network' is a good example of a strong civic community, where ties are predominantly horizontal. The old boys do not necessarily know each other personally. It is sufficient if each of them is connected to all others. That is, if there exists a communication *path* between each of them. Such a fully connected network implies that each of the members of the network can reach another member through a friend of a friend of a friend, through a business associate of a business associate, through a family connection or because they belong to the same golf club. Most communication paths run through combination of such potential liaisons. Even relatively weak ties may, as Granovetter (1995), De Graaf & Flap (1988) and others have demonstrated, be of great help to find a job or to obtain other socio-economic goals in ego's life. And in particular ties that connect separate clusters ('bridges') seem of particular value to mobilize resources that are embedded in the network. Here we encounter the concept of individual social capital that was once termed ego's 'second order resources' by Jeremy Boissevain (1974). Elite networks like that of Dutch student fraternities (studentencorpora) or the alumni of the French 'grandes ecoles' are examples of egalitarian (though highly elitist) communities with a high degree of social capital for its members. (Hillege and Fennema, 1992; Dronkers and Hillege, 1995)

These elite networks function primarily because of the ability to track references in the process of elite recruitment. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, such references may also lead to the decision *not* to help a friend of a friend...The old boys network is not always as friendly as one would assume. We would like, therefore, to amend the popular saying “It is more important who you know than what you know”. *We would rather say that is important who you can reach and who you can trust.* Through the monitoring of reputations civic communities make individuals comply to the social norms of the group. Gossip is an important means for the subordinate members of a community to have influence. In fact, the capability for gossip is quite often more evenly distributed than property, power and income (Scott cited in Wittek and Wielers, 1998). Even long distance network connections seem quite effective to pass on information and gossip that will allow the community to sanction members that fall out of line. For a group to function as an old boys network it is more important that all members are included in a connected network than that members know each other personally. A well-connected network is a resource to its members in the sense that it promotes the willingness to collaborate. We find here a missing link between the neo-marxist notion of social capital, elaborated by Bourdieu (1977) and the Durkheimian notion of social capital elaborated by Coleman (1990). In the neo-marxist notion the emphasis is on the importance of collective social capital for the elite’s privileges in society, in the Durkheimian notion of social capital the emphasis is on the role of social capital in the solution of the Olsonian collective action dilemma. (see Lin, 1999) In our view the two are interrelated. An elite will cash in on its capacity to overcome the collective action dilemma of a community. It is our contention that no elite can maintain its privileges for a long time if it does not, in return, provide the group they ‘exploit’ with means to overcome the collective action dilemma. In short, the members of that elite provide society with governance and in return they claim certain privileges. It would be an illusion to assume that in a democratic society the political elite does not claim privileges. The legitimacy of the privileges that the governing elite claims can be expressed in the degree of citizens’ trust in political institutions.

In a democratic society both the amount of privileges *and* the quality of governance is monitored by the voters. The core of our argument is that citizens are better equipped to monitor and require good governance, the more they are able to provide collective goods themselves by means of voluntary associations. The less citizens depend on the government for overcoming the collective action dilemma, the more they are in a position to demand good governance of the governing elite. We found this expected outcome when we studied the civic community of the different groups in Amsterdam. Turks in Amsterdam have many voluntary associations and these associations are well connected through a network of interlocking directorates (Table 3).

Table 3 – Summary of network indicators of civic community expressed in rank order

<i>Ethnic group</i>	Relative number of voluntary organizations	Number of organizations in network analysis	No. of isolated organizations	No. of interlocks in total network	Civic community index
Turkish	2	1	2	1	9
Moroccan	3	3	1	2	12
Surinamese	4	3	3	3	19
Antillean	1	2	4	4	19

(Source: Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

To calculate a civic community index we have weighted the network indicators which refer to the relative number of organizations as ‘1’ (the first two) and the (remaining) indicators which refer to their interlocks as ‘2’. This was done to emphasize the importance of the interlocks in our civic community perspective. These scores are summarized in the last column of table 3. From these scores we can conclude that the Turkish community in Amsterdam is, according to the network indicators, the most ‘civic’, followed by the Moroccans. The Antillean and Surinamese communities show *ex aequo* the smallest degree of civic community. The differences in the strength of civic community only become more impressive when we also look at the use of ethnic newspapers and television. (see table 4)

Table 4 – Frequency reading ‘ethnic newspapers’

<i>Ethnic group</i>	<i>Percentage regular readers</i>	<i>N (100%)</i>
Turks	51%	109
Moroccans	15	209
Surinamese	4	297
Antilleans	-	-

(source: Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

Our findings support the paradoxical conclusion that the less citizens are in need of a central government, the better the government will (have to) fulfil their demands. Turks have the best

organizational means to solve their own problems, and are less in need for government support. Yet, their trust in local political is much higher than that of the other ethnic groups, because they are better able to get what they want.

3. Relations between social capital of the group and individual social capital.

Even though there is a clear conceptual distinction between social capital of the group and individual capital of its members, there exists a theoretical relation between these two concepts. Individual social capital is partly derived from the social capital of the group and vice versa: the group's social capital is a specific aggregation of the social capital of its members. If only we were able to show some empirical relations between social capital of the group and the social capital of its individual members we would have made an important contribution to the solution of the dilemma of collective action. Here we can do no more than present four clusters of ideas that seem promising.

First, the ties that establish social capital at the individual level are part of the social capital of the group as well. If a collection of actors has no social ties whatsoever, there is no social capital at the individual level, nor at level of the collection of actors. Therefore, doing some 'networking' to advance one's personal career is quite often also to the benefit of the social capital of the group. Decrease and increase of individual and collective social capital, however, are not necessarily parallel processes. If this were so, life would be much easier for all of us. As Burt (1992) has demonstrated, an individual has a comparative advantage in competitive situations if those actors that are connected to him do *not* have ties amongst each other. In such situation *ego* will most likely try to prevent horizontal ties and thus hinder the development of social capital of the group. This is the case in clientelist networks. In networks of civic associations individual and collective social capital tend to reinforce each other more often than they run counter to each other. The main problem, however, is that this is not necessarily the case for those individuals that hold a privileged position in the community. This, among other things, makes it so difficult to build social capital at the group level in communities with a highly privileged elite.

Secondly, an individual that undermines the social capital of the group is likely to lose part of his (or her) own social capital. Defection or other forms of deviant behaviour that threaten the social capital of the group can seriously damage one's individual reputation and hence one's position in the reputation hierarchy. Reputation thus seems a linking pin between the social capital of the group and that of the individual. Reputation indicates the actual power position, or the future power position of a group member. Elite recruitment in a connected network – such as an academic discipline – largely depends on reputation. In turn, a civic community's ability to monitor its members largely depends on

the weight that individual members of the group attach to reputation and on the consistency of the reputation hierarchy throughout the whole community. The studies of the power structure of local communities that were conducted in the US during the 40s and 50s have shown the persistence and the stability of reputations. (Lynd and Lynd, 1929, Warner and Lunt, 1941, Hunter, 1953, Wildavski, 1964) It was assumed in these community power studies that the local elite formed a fully connected network and that this network did not fall apart in different components. The reputation method would have been useless if the power network had been highly fragmented.

Thirdly, power brokers that, looking for new second order resources (Boissevain, 1974), extend their personal network by making connections with new persons or organizations also add to the social capital of the community as a whole. We will give an example from a completely different field of research to illustrate this point. During the seventies commercial banks, in rivalry with their national competitors, rushed to organize international consortia based on the idea that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and by doing so unintendedly created a well-connected international financial community (Fennema, 1982). Horizontal linkages among business organizations make that trust that has been built in one business organization can flow to other associations more quickly by transporting information from one organization to another. The network of interlocking directorates contributes greatly to the formation of a business community. Likewise, interlocking directorates among voluntary associations forge a collection of voluntary organizations into one civic community. Social capital at the community level finds its expression in the organization of organizations.

Fourthly, the amount of individual social capital of *ego* not only depends on the social capital of the group but also on the power the group can exercise in a wider context of society. Each of the alumni of the Parisian ‘grandes ecoles’ has a large amount of individual social capital not only within the group of alumni, but also in French society as a whole, because the community of alumni is very influential. Turks that have a lot of social capital within the Turkish community in Amsterdam on the other hand do not necessarily have a lot of social capital in Amsterdam because the Turkish community in Amsterdam is not very powerful. It is therefore easier to create social capital in an elite group than it is in a marginalized group, because the benefits for the individual member tend to be higher in the first case than in the latter.

So far, we have considered the possible relationship between individual social capital within the group and the social capital of the group. We must also consider the individual social capital that is created by relations outside the ethnic community. We will focus to the external relations of the *leaders* of an ethnic community in relation to the social capital of that community. We assume that

the political impact of the social capital of the ethnic community is largely dependent on the social contacts of these leaders with the power structure of the multi-ethnic society. If the leaders of an ethnic group have many contacts with the dominant group this indicates a high level of social integration, if they have hardly any such contacts, the ethnic group is not integrated. Tabel 5 presents the results of a survey among the political elites of the ethnic groups in four big cities in Holland. The figures are based on three questions where we asked to name five persons the respondent would consult in case of an important career decision (1), the choice of school for their children (2) and when looking for a new house (3). In each case we asked to indicate the ethnicity of the five advisors.

Tabel 5. Personal advisors of ethnic politicians within their own group, from the Dutch community and from within other ethnic groups

	Surinamese	Turks	Moroccans
% personal advisors within own group	35	30	25
% Dutch advisors	30	45	33
% personal advisors from other ethnic groups	35	25	42

Source: Fennema et.al.2000

Contrary to what many would expect the Turks that have the strongest ethnic community also have leaders that are best integrated in the Dutch elite structure. Turkish leaders have substantially more strong contacts with Dutch local leaders. Surinamese politicians have the smallest number of Dutch advisors. These results run counter to the general idea among experts in Holland, who assume that Surinamese, because they share the language and some history with the Dutch, are better integrated in Dutch society.

4. Multicultural democracy

An important but missing link of our theoretical model is the relation between the ethnic community and the local polity. How is social capital allocated, created or destroyed in a multi-ethnic society? We assume that social trust in ethnic communities will spill over into trust in local political institutions if community leaders are integrated in the political system. This may work bottom up as well as top

down. Bottom up the political trust will increase when members of the ethnic community can monitor their ethnic leaders by way of the reputation ladder of these leaders in the community. We have not yet collected information on the trust that the rank and file of different ethnic groups in Amsterdam has in their own ethnic leaders. We would expect from our theoretical model that the trust in their own ethnic leaders is highest among the Turks and lowest among the Antilleans.

Top down, political trust will increase if the leaders are able to 'spread' their trust in and their commitment to the political institutions through the network of ethnic associations. This is only the case, of course, if political institutions are considered as efficient and fair. Good governance itself creates political trust among citizens. (Levi, 1998, Rothstein, 1998) If the government has an open ear for the demands of ethnic groups this will also increase the political commitment of ethnic leaders to the political institutions. The political opportunity structure thus has a direct impact upon the citizens' political confidence. It has of course also an impact upon political participation. An 'open' political structure invites political participation, whereas a closed system discourages such political behaviour. (Kriesi et al. 1995).

We assume that political participation is also related to the social capital of the group because individual members can more easily get access to the political arena through the ethnic networks and because social trust increases the self-confidence and civic virtues of the individual members of the community. Robert Putnam has argued convincingly that civic virtues and the voluntary associations in which they are imbedded are indispensable for good governance. Civic virtues teach citizens to contribute to the common good even if such contribution would be detrimental to their short-term private interest. The virtuous citizen is well aware of the fact that a free rider strategy is ultimately self destructive because if all citizens refuse to contribute to the common good, collective goods are impossible to obtain. He is therefore willing to contribute to the common good on the condition that others make the same sacrifices. Hence citizens in a civic community behave virtuous and see to it that other citizens behave virtuous as well. But how does this work? Do citizens become virtuous because they have joined voluntary associations or the other way around? The research of Dietlind Stolle suggests that the latter is more likely. She found that citizens who have a high degree of social trust are more likely to join many voluntary associations. "It is not true that the longer and the more one associates, the greater one's generalized trust" (Stolle, 1998: 521). Apparently, social trust cannot simply be 'produced' by associations and other civic institutions. According to Bo Rothstein social trust can be 'produced' by collective memories, that is by specific constructions of the past that are sometimes deliberately created to forge a cohesive community. Essential parts of these collective memories are historical sites and traditions, which are more often than not invented

traditions' (Hobsbawm, 1983, Galema et al., 1993). In the case of ethnic groups these traditions are derived from the national culture of the country of origin. Yet, many authors have pointed out that this 'ethnic culture' is quite often a remake or even a caricature of the national culture, that ethnicity can be considered 'a myth' (Steinberg, 1989). Even an ethnic myth, however, can be very helpful to create social trust among the members of the ethnic group. In our case, there is reason to believe the collective memory of Turks in Amsterdam has more elements that can bolster social trust than the collective memories of Surinamese and Antillians. Earlier research has shown that the ethnic leaders are well aware of these differences. A Turkish member of the town council stated: "Surinamese people are never sure of themselves, they lack self-confidence." And with reference to the Turkish group: "We Turks are proud, and we have been raised proudly, because we have colonized other countries. This is also true for left-wing people. I have noticed that Turkish people are very self-confident, wherever they are." (Cadat and Fennema, 1998:107) Indeed, Turkish politicians use their ethnic culture as a shield against Dutch dominance: "They (the Dutch, MF/JT) know everything about them (the Surinamese, MF/JT), thus they can more easily dominate them than they can dominate us. We say 'We are Turks' and they have not a clue about our culture and our outlook." (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 109) Surinamese do not show a lot of ethnic consciousness. A Surinamese politician expressed this by saying: "We have always been Dutch, except that we lived oversea" (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 102). This difference in ethnic consciousness and the self-confidence that goes with it may partly explain the differences in ethnic organisation between the Turks and the Surinamese. Thus importance of collective memories and the content of such collective memories shape the civic community of ethnic groups and have an impact on the amount of social trust within these ethnic communities.

But even if all ethnic groups would have a high level of civic community and social trust, multi-ethnic societies are still likely to lack good governance because of the difficulty to form a well-connected *interethnic* civic community. Ethnic communities tend to be exclusive and therefore the binary connectivity between ethnic communities tends to be low. Even if this does not lead to ethnic strife, the lack of connectivity in civil society may cause low political trust. Lijphart (1968) has suggested that the lack of social trust among different communities that make up civil society can be made up for by elite-co-operation. If a polity consists of a number of disconnected civic communities, inter-elite communication becomes all-important, as the Dutch example of consociationalism has shown. Critics of consociationalism have argued that this may lead to good governance, but not to democratic governance (Fennema, 1976; Huntington, 1981) Be it as it is, a fragmented civil society

is better than no civil society at all. In such fragmented civil society the bridges that connect the otherwise isolated parts of the network become extraordinary important because it are the only routes along which the social trust can travel. The persons that form these bridges may strategically exploit this importance.

The Netherlands is a case in point. Religious segmentation has only in the twentieth century led to a system of pillarization (*Verzuiling*), in which each religious group formed voluntary associations of its own that were heavily interlocked through interlocking directorates at the elite level. The denominational civic communities thus formed were called 'pillars'. Subsequently, a system of denominational elite collaboration was established around 1917. The 1917 political compromise led up to state policies that favoured the creation of even more denominational associations. Arend Lijphart (1968) has coined the concept consociational democracy for such political accommodation through elite collaboration. Even though Lijphart himself has suggested that consociational democracy requires a certain passivity and deference of the rank and files, one might also argue that there cannot be a properly functioning consociational democracy without strong a civic community within each of the pillars. Indeed, the Dutch 'polder model', which is based on consensus by consultation, may well depend heavily on strong civic tradition that have been built up in the old consociational democracy. If such interpretation of the Dutch political system holds true, Putnam's sombre conclusions may be somewhat amended. Of course, the Low Countries have had a long history of civic traditions (Daalder, 1966), but the specific mode of civic community building in the twentieth century was largely the result of a political compromise and a conscious effort of the state to support voluntary associations. The Netherlands might well be a perfect example of what progressive scholars nowadays call associative democracy (Hirst, 1994, Vertovec, 1999).

Policies of civil society building have also been systematically applied to the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands after WWII. Ethnic organizations have been subsidized from the 1960's onward and the maintenance of ethnic culture has not only been tolerated, but also actively promoted. This has never been done to bolster local democracy. Rather, the government was accustomed to farm out subsidies to organizations that could maintain local community structure and organize social welfare among minority groups. Even voting rights for foreign residents, granted in 1985, were not given because of any democratic impulse. Rather it was an – quite successful - attempt to integrate the different ethnic group into Dutch political arenas and to obtain a certain loyalty of these groups towards the political institutions at the local level. The development of ethnic communities was at least partly an unintended result of political opportunity structures and government policies that

prevailed in The Netherlands until 1990. After 1990 the Dutch minority policies came heavily under attack (see Fermin, 1997)

The – largely unintended - results of these minority policies seem positive for local democracy. Until 1994 voter turnout of the minority groups was surprisingly high. In the case of the Turks it was even substantially higher than the turnout of the autochthonous Amsterdam population. We see the same result when we look at political participation. Political participation of the Turkish population is substantially higher than average, whereas the Moroccans score average at the political participation index. Even the trust in the local political institutions is higher among the Turkish population than average. Yet, the positive impact of minority policies on political participation and political trust among migrant groups in Amsterdam does not account for the large differences among the different ethnic groups. The stable hierarchy among the different groups in terms of civic community, political participation and political trust in which Turks have the lead followed by Moroccans, then Surinamese and finally Antilleans, point in the direction of a culturalist explanation. It is very likely that at least part of the social capital of the different ethnic groups derives from the country of origin. The fact that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are largely patterned along the lines of political and religious cleavages that exist in Turkey points in this direction. But there are other indications as well. Former research has shown that many migrant politicians come from families that were already involved in politics in the country of origin. Many of them even had been active themselves in political youth organizations. Before entering Amsterdam politics they have been active in ethnic organizations. (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 101) Civic virtue and social capital has migrated together with the ethnic groups. Furthermore, the migrant politicians themselves acknowledge the importance of political culture. As we have seen above, even Turkish politicians from left wing parties maintain that they were able to cope better than immigrants from the colonies with ethnic discrimination and with the fact that they were newcomers in the political arena because they considered themselves on par with the Dutch. They especially stressed the fact that Turkey had never been colonized. This shows that ethnic consciousness is not just a project of ‘invented traditions’, it is anchored in all too real historical experience.

This argument would explain why Surinamese and Antilleans score consistently lower at the civic community index, why they participate less in Amsterdam politics and why they have lower trust in the political institutions. We find comparable patterns of electoral turnout in Great Britain, where Indian voters have a higher turnout than white voters, while voters from Caribbean countries have a substantially lower turnout. (Anwar, 1998; Saggar, 1998: 55) Here, the explanation may also be

found in the history of colonisation and slavery. It is striking to see how little attention is paid to these ethnic differences in voting behaviour. In a recent issue of the *Revue Européenne de Migration Internationales*, two contributions note these differences but refuse to reflect upon it. Andrew Geddes' conclusion is typical: "African-Caribbean people are less likely to be found in formal, elected political institutions, but as already noted the utilisation of ethnic categories to explain this in terms of 'integration' and 'alienation' may neglect other socio-economic factors(...)" (Geddes, 1998: 45). A 'culturalist' explanation of political participation is within the realm of ethnic studies still 'not done'.

Explicit reference to the importance of civic culture and the role of historical experience is less suspect among scholars who are interested in social capital. Robert Putnam has suggested that it takes a very long time to build social capital. Civic communities in Italy, so Putnam argues, have its roots in medieval times. Those regions that were able to build guild associations and where people took part in determining, largely by persuasion, the laws and decisions governing their lives, have, five centuries later still a strong civic community. Those regions in the South that eclipsed into agrarian feudalism never managed to build a strong civic society. "In the North the crucial social, political, and even religious allegiances and alignments were horizontal, while those in the South were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and even trust – not universal, of course, but extending further beyond the limits of kinship than anywhere else in Europe in this era – were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue in the South, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy." (Putnam, 1993: 130) The author shows that the northern region five hundred years later still has a very well developed civil society whereas the South is still lacking civic community. The conclusion that the building of civic society is a very slow process and that social trust takes ages to develop seems inevitable.

Such conclusion is, of course, difficult to digest for activist readers who are unwilling to wait for ages to see any improvement in democratic governance. Yet Putnam's conclusion is supported by our findings. Also in a multicultural society there are large differences in civic organization, political organization and political trust among ethnic groups that may well be explained by the history of the country of origin.

We are sure that many anti-racist activists and even some colleagues would not hesitate to suggest that such a conclusion is 'blaming the victim'. It is certainly a conclusion that suits a more contemplative if not conservative view on human progress. But is the conclusion inevitable? Is there

no way to improve the quality of civil society by policy measures? Would it not be possible that government-policy props up the horizontal structures of civil society thus increasing social trust and the development of civic virtues? Tocqueville would, most likely, have rejected such a possibility, because it would increase the power of government. We, however, are willing to consider the potential of (local) government to create civic community. But to do that we first have to discuss a new variable in the theoretical model we are trying to develop.

5. Explaining civic community: political opportunity structure and organizational strategy.

Recently some political scientists have argued that the political opportunity structure rather than cultural characteristics of migrants determine the possibilities for ethnic minorities to participate in political decision making. To make their argument plausible both Soysal (1994) and Ireland (1994) rely on international comparison. Their conclusions are, however, not very convincing. First because they rely on rather descriptive case studies (in the case of Soysal taken from secondary sources) which does not allow for very rigorous comparison. Secondly, because the international comparison has to take account of so many variables that even a more rigorous empirical approach would encounter serious methodological problems. In Amsterdam, we have the opportunity to engage in a comparative analysis of political opportunity structures because a major part of the policy regarding the multicultural society is being shaped at the level of city districts. Within a general policy framework each district is able to elaborate and implement its own minority policy (Wolff and Tillie, 1995). By comparing the structure and development of the ethnic communities in these districts one might gain insight in the impact different minority policies have on the development of civic communities.³

For quite some time, (local) government policy consisted of subsidizing ethnic organizations with the specific purpose that these organizations would maintain the cultural values of the ethnic community and, at the same time, fulfil some welfare functions. Initially, that is during the sixties and the seventies, this policy was aimed at keeping the ethnic communities intact so as to facilitate the remigration of the 'guest-workers' to their country of origin. When, at the beginning of the eighties, it became clear that remigration was not an option for most of these guest workers, the policy of subsidizing ethnic organizations was nevertheless continued, but with a somewhat different policy goal. Now ethnic organizations were supposed to be helpful to further integration of migrants into Dutch society. The different 'minority groups' to be supported were explicitly mentioned in the

³ This section is based on interviews with politicians, civil servants, managers of welfare institutions and board members of ethnic organizations.

government reports and 'minority policy' focused on ethnic organizations as the main target.

At the end of the eighties, however, group-specific minority policy lost its popularity at the Ministry of Welfare in The Hague, a tendency that was reflected in Amsterdam. Civil servants and politicians were overwhelmingly of the opinion that group-specific minority policy had to be replaced by a general policy for the destitute which focuses on making up for arrears in the field of education and employment. This general policy was aimed at all inhabitants who are in need of welfare and support, not just the migrants. Within all Amsterdam districts, there now is a tendency to question minority policy as a whole. But that does not mean that no policy is being formulated regarding the minorities. For the districts, participation is the central theme in their policy toward minorities. This means that minorities are induced to participate in all sorts of areas in society, both on the individual- and on the group level. Migrant participation is subdivided into two separate policy goals: integration in Amsterdam civil society and making up for arrears.

Integration is generally perceived as a process by which people from another culture can find their way in Dutch society. This doesn't mean they have to give up their own culture, their own norms and values, but that they learn how to make use of Dutch institutions. Making up for arrears is another policy goal. The means at the disposal of the districts in order to accomplish these policy goals are, on the one hand, consultation and co-ordination, and on the other hand supplying government grants. The latter is considered an important instrument for the implementation of policies. Implementation of local government policies is often carried out by semi-independent welfare institutions and by the organizations of the migrants themselves. In turn, these organizations and institutions are largely dependent on the money provided by the city district. This financial dependence creates the possibility for the districts to make demands as to the activities of these organizations and institutions. Ethnic organizations are important to districts, because they can contribute to the implementation of policies. Most city districts do not consider a flourishing ethnic organization as a goal in itself, even though the horizontal linkages among ethnic organizations are stimulated by some city-districts. The districts use ethnic organizations instrumentally to implement their own policy goals. Ethnic organizations have a low threshold for members of ethnic groups, whereas in general institutions this threshold appears to be very high. Ethnic organizations can be used to enhance the ethnic minority groups' accessibility. The low threshold can serve several policy goals. First, ethnic organizations can support emancipation of the ethnic group. They can enforce the position of the members of ethnic minority groups by organizing activities such as job-interview courses, management training, homework classes, and etceteras. A second function is related to the first. Ethnic organizations can contribute to social integration. With the help of their organization,

individual members can participate better in Amsterdam society. Integration, however, can also take place at a group level. At this level ethnic organizations even play a crucial role. Finally, because of their low threshold, ethnic organizations can have an intermediary function. The district can thus use ethnic organizations to transmit information to its members. Ethnic organizations receive money to inform their rank and file about 'institutional' aspects of The Netherlands, like, for instance, the educational system, health-care, welfare or the political system. In turn, the rank and file can express wants and demands towards the city-district through the ethnic organization, in which case ethnic organizations can act as agents for collective action. In the latter case the network of ethnic organizations obtains special significance. Alink and Berger (1999) have shown that the district's policy towards ethnic organizations does influence the degree of openness of these organizations towards governmental institutions.

Yet here we find the Tocquevillean paradox that has haunted the history of ethnic organizations in Amsterdam. The more these organizations need governmental support, and the more they receive governmental grants, the more they tend to become instruments for local policies. Ethnic organizations thus become professionalized and verticalized. Their members tend to be seen by the organizational elite as clients or customers rather than associates. A weak civic community tends to create dependent organizations and inactive members.

3.B. CREATING TURKISH NETWORKS IN AMSTERDAM: PERSONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES?⁴

Introduction

In the MPMC Working Paper 3A Fennema and Tillie present their research on social capital of ethnic groups in Amsterdam and the correlation between political participation, interest in local politics and political trust on the one hand and the network of voluntary associations on the other. They argue that voluntary associations create social trust, which in turn can spill into political trust. Through the interlocking directorates social trust can travel from one association to an other and may increase. At the same time political trust can be spread within the ethnic community.⁵

This paper shall present part of the fieldwork that has been done in the context of mentioned research. Where Paper 3A does focus on the theoretical assumptions this paper is largely empirical. Here we focus on the nature of the network of interlocking directorates of the Turkish community in Amsterdam. Is the network structure the result of organizational strategies or personal initiatives (or both)? What organizational strategies can be identified with respect to (non) cooperation with other organizations? What are the reasons to cooperate? Furthermore, we study the role of the elite of the Turkish community, defined as those persons that are members of the governing board of at least two Turkish organizations. We argue that through the elite political trust ‘travels’ through the (organizational network of the) community. On the basis of semi-structured interviews we will find out how these Turkish leaders are integrated in Dutch society. This will provide an answer to the question whether ethnic engagement and integration are complementary or competing forms of civic engagement.

1. The civic community of ethnic groups⁶.

In our study of ethnic groups in Amsterdam the concept of *civic community* is invoked to explain political participation and trust in political institutions. The concept refers to voluntary associations of free citizens that are set up to pursue a common goal or a common interest. To measure civic community of ethnic groups we study ethnic organizations in Amsterdam and the interlocks between them. Ethnic organizations can be studied as such (intra-organizational analysis), but also in

⁴ This Working Paper is based on a paper prepared for the Workshop ‘Associational Engagement and Democracy in Cities’, ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen 14-19 April 2000

⁵ For more information and clarification on the theoretical assumptions of Fennema and Tillie refer to the MPMC Working Paper 3A.

⁶ This section is a summary of Fennema and Tillie, 1999.

connection with each other (inter-organizational analysis). By way of inter-organizational network analysis it is possible to develop an insight into the relations between ethnic organizations. How many and which organizations maintain relations with each other? Which organizations are central in the network of organizations? Are many organizations isolated from the network of ethnic organizations?

In this paper we will analyze the interlocking directorates, that is, we will consider persons as links between organizations. Interlocking directorates will primarily be interpreted as channels of communication and coordination rather than as channels of domination and control. We assume the ethnic organizations to have very little potential for direct positive or negative sanctions against other organizations since they do not, as the local authorities do, distribute scarce resources that are unavailable from alternative suppliers. This assumption is based on the fact that most ethnic organizations are not, by themselves, able to mobilize large amounts of financial resources. This may, in some cases, be an unwarranted assumption because some organizations may be able to raise substantial amounts of money from their members or clientele. This can be the case with highly ideological organizations. It is often said that the Kurdish PKK is able to raise substantial amounts of money, sometimes even by extortion ('revolutionary taxes'). Religious organizations are sometimes able to raise substantial sums of money from their congregation. Our assumption about the financial strength of the voluntary organizations may therefore not hold true for some revolutionary and religious organizations in the network, especially if they are internationally organized.

In general, however, we assume that ethnic non-profit organizations do not raise huge amounts of money. We also assume that few financial resources are channeled from outside to the ethnic community organizations. This assumption is also questioned. Braam and Ülger (1997), for example, suggest that political organizations in Turkey give logistic and ideological support to some Turkish organizations in The Netherlands. Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz (1998) suggest that drugs organizations play a central role in the organization of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. So far, however, little evidence has been produced as to the direct links between political organizations in Turkey and the Turkish community in The Netherlands, while the role of organized crime is still unclear. In future we plan to extend our network analysis to this area.

2. Interpreting the network of interlocking directorates: Turkish organizations in Amsterdam.

We will first present the main data on organizations and interlocks in table 1.

Table 1 - Ethnic organizations and their interlocking directorates

<i>Ethnic group</i>	Number of organizations in network analysis (% of total number)	No. of interlocks in total network (% of network number)
Turkish	89 (84%)	62 (70%)
Moroccan	82 (77)	45 (55)
Surinamese	70 (77)	12 (17)
Antillean	35 (81)	5 (14)

Table 1 gives a very rough indication of the structure of community organization. Of the 106 Turkish organizations which we found through various sources, 89 were registered in the Chamber of Commerce which enabled us to get information on the board members (84% of the total number of organizations). The similar numbers for the other ethnic groups are 77% (Moroccan); 77% (Surinamese) and 81% (Antillean). The lack of information about the directors of certain organizations is, of course, partly due to inadequacies in our research. Yet it is also an expression of the stability and visibility of the organizations themselves. Registration at the Chamber of Commerce implies a minimal degree of professionalisation and makes the organization by definition public⁷. Thus the percentage of organizations we had to drop because the members of the board of administration could not be found is in itself an indicator of organizational robustness of the ethnic community. On this indicator the Turkish community scored best while the Moroccan and Surinamese community scored lowest.

If ethnic organizations, and especially the interlocking directorates between them, create social and political trust, at least two questions can be asked with respect to these networks of ethnic organizations. The first relates to the nature of the network. Are the interlocking directorates the result of organizational strategies or are they merely the result of personal initiatives of members of the governing board? In the latter case, social capital at the group level depends heavily on idiosyncrasies, which would make the network very sensitive to personal changes in the managerial

⁷ Data of the Chamber of Commerce are public and are accessible through the Internet.

elite. In the first case it are organizations who create civic community. The network of interlocking directorates is the result of conscious organizational strategies. We assume these organizational strategies to be longer lasting and therefore the (in this case Turkish) civic community to be more stable.

The second question relates to the relation between political trust and the network of interlocking directorates. If it is true that by way of interlocking directorates political trust ‘travels’ through the ethnic community, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition should be that central organizations in the network are focused towards the host (Dutch) society. If these organizations are not cooperating with Dutch (political) institutions, it is, from a structural perspective, hard to see how trust in these same institutions can ‘enter’ the ethnic community. Furthermore, we expect the elite on a personal level to relate to Dutch friends, colleague’s and so forth. Through these personal networks political trust can be distributed through the community. In more general terms, as well as on the organizational as on the individual level, ethnic civic engagement and integration should not be contradictory⁸.

To answer these two questions we study here the Turkish community in Amsterdam. We interviewed 13 representatives of various Turkish organizations. These organizations were chosen as to their position in the network of interlocking directorates (central organizations, ‘cutpoints’ etc.). By comparing the answers to the questionnaire to the network of interlocking directorates we are able to answer the first set of questions. If the network and organizational strategies overlap, we conclude that the network is the result of organizational strategies. If they do not overlap we conclude that the network is the result of personal strategies. Furthermore, the questionnaire allowed us to answer the second question. Are organizations (and persons) focused towards Dutch society?

⁸ Note that also distrust can ‘travel’ through the same networks.

academic organizations (*Research center Iraqi-Turkmenian Culture, Dutch-Turkish Academic Society* and *Turkish Student Association*). Furthermore, the *Amsterdam Centrum Buitenlanders* (ACB: a heavily subsidized facilitation organization) appears to be integrated into this component as well. We consider this component as Islamic/social-cultural. The component consists of four interconnected clusters. The first cluster is grouped around *Hilal* (religious, extreme nationalist), the second cluster around the *TDM* (the Turkish advisory council, established by the municipality), the third cluster around *TINOS* (goal: the orientation of Turks toward the agricultural sector) and the fourth cluster around the *Turkse Raad Nederland* -the Turkish Council of The Netherlands- (extreme nationalist). Regarding the connectivity of the network, especially the cutpoints are of interest¹⁰. These are: *Fatih* and *STNO* (cutpoints between the *TINOS* cluster and the *TDM* cluster); *HTDB* and *ACVA* and the *Ned. Turks Academisch* (Dutch Turkish Academic Society, cutpoint between *TDM* cluster and the *Turkish Council of The Netherlands* cluster).

The representatives of the 13 organizations were asked which organizations they cooperated with. The answers to this question can be seen as a ‘cooperation structure’ indicated by the organizations themselves. The question whether the network of interlocking directorates is a result of organizational strategies or personal initiatives, can be addressed by comparing the network structure to the cooperation structure. If network structure and cooperation structure match, we conclude that the network is a result of conscious organizational strategies. If network structure and cooperation structure do not match, we conclude that the network structure is a result of personal initiatives by the managerial elite. Table 2 reports the results with respect to the cooperation structure.

¹⁰If a cutpoint is removed the network falls apart in two or more components or isolated points.

Table 2. Organisations they already cooperate with.

	Organisation	Mosques Rel.org.	Left wing	Cultura l	Right wing	Curds	Commercia l	TDM	Org. of other migrants	Dutch inst.
Mosques/ rel.org.	Haci Bayram	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	Ulu Cammi	2	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	1
	Mescid i Aksa	3	2	0	6	0	0	1	0	1
Left wing oriented	ACVA	0	5	3	4	0	0	0	0	1
	ATKB	0	4	2	0	0	0	1	1	2
	HTIB	0	6	5	0	0	0	1	2	3
	DIDF/DVA	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	4	1
Cultural	Turks Platform	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
	Alternatif	0	5	2	0	0	0	1	0	1
	NTAG	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
Right wing TDM	Papyrus	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TFN	2	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	1
	TDM	3	3	2	3	0	0		5	2

Table 2 shows that:

- religious organizations cooperate with religious organizations. Two mosques cooperate with right-wing organizations. One of them (ACVA) with left wing, cultural and right wing organizations. Only one of the mosques cooperates with the Turkish Advisory Council (TDM).
- left-wing organizations predominantly cooperate with other left-wing organizations and with cultural organizations. Most of them cooperate with TDM. Left-wing organizations are also the only organizations (except for the TDM) which cooperate with organizations of other migrants.
- cultural organizations predominantly cooperate with left-wing and other cultural organizations.
- right-wing organizations cooperate with other right-wing organizations and with mosques

- The Turkish advisory council (*TDM*) cooperates with almost all segments in the Turkish community (except with Kurds and commercial organizations). *TDM* also cooperates with organizations of other migrants.
- *All* organizations work together with at least one Dutch organization (political party, welfare organizations etc.)¹¹. If asked whether they were able to work with Dutch institutions (not reported here), all organizations indicate that they are.

Table 3 reports the reasons Turkish organizations cooperate with other organizations.

Table 3. Reasons to co-operate

	Organization	To stimulate the own culture	To abolish arrear position	To fight against racism	Being part of the same foundation	Total
Mosques/religious	Haci Bayram	5	63%	3	38%	8
	Ulu Cammi	17	33	15	29	52
	Mescid i Aksa	4	17	7	30	24
	ACVA	2	14	2	14	14
Left wing oriented	ATKB	3	13	13	54	24
	HTIB			28	50	56
	DIDF/DVA	2	8	9	36	25
	Turks platform			8	100	8
Cultural	Alternatif	16	48	17	52	33
	NTAG	2	25	5	62	8
	Papyrus	4	100			4
Right wing oriented Turkish Advisory Board	TFN	12	28	12	28	43
	TDM	2	4	24	48	50

From this table we can conclude that:

¹¹ *Papyrus* indicated to work together with Dutch institutions which were not on our initial list.

- reasons to cooperate can be classified into four categories: to stimulate the own culture; to abolish arrears; to fight racism or being part of the same foundation;
- left-wing organizations predominantly work together to abolish arrears or to fight racism;
- cultural organizations mention mainly ‘stimulate own culture’ and abolishing arrears;
- the right wing oriented *TFN* equally mentions all four categories;
- the Turkish Advisory Council mainly focuses on abolishing arrears or fighting racism;

Asked for reasons why organizations do *not* cooperate with other organizations, they all mention ‘political/ideological differences’ (not reported here).

Comparing the cooperation structure and network structure leads to the conclusion that the network of interlocking directorates is the result of organizational strategies (with one exception that of the *Haçi bayram* mosque). We will illustrate this conclusion focusing on two organizations: the previously mentioned *Haçi Bayram* mosque (where network structure and cooperation structure do not match) and *Alternatif* (representing the remaining organizations where network structure and cooperation structure do match).

In the network *Haçi Bayram* is connected to *ACB*, *TDM* and *Volkshuis Osdorp*. The chairman of *Haçi Bayram* however indicated that his organizations did not cooperate with *ACB* and *TDM*. *Volkshuis Osdorp* he considered to be the same organization as *Haçi Bayram*. In this case we conclude that the interlocking directorates found are the result of personal initiatives from members of the *Haçi Bayram* mosque and not the result of organizational strategies.

This is different with the case of *Alternatif*. *Alternatif* is linked to *TDM* and *HTIB* (a leftist organization). These personal links are reflected in the cooperation structure. The chairman of *Alternatif* indicated that his organization cooperated with leftist organizations and the *TDM*. Here we conclude that network structure and cooperation structure match.

From these findings we deduce that the network of interlocking directorates is the result of (conscious) organizational strategies. Turkish organizations not only reflect (Turkish) civic community they also build it by creating permanent institutionalized communication channels among organizations.

4. Ethnic civic engagement and integration.

The last question we will address is whether ethnic civic engagement and integration are contradictory or complementary forms of civic engagement. From table 3 we already concluded that all Turkish organizations do (and are willing to) cooperate with Dutch institutions. Thus on the organizational level ethnic engagement and integration are definitely complementary. This is reflected on the individual level. We asked the representatives of Turkish organizations whether they had Dutch friends, colleagues, spouses or family members which they would consult in personal decisions they had to make. We assume these contacts to be necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for trust to ‘enter’ the community. Table 4 reports the results.

Table 4 - Personal networks

	Organization	Dutch friends	Dutch colleagues	Married to a Dutch person	Family members with a Dutch partner	Total (Max. 4)	
Mosque/ Religions	Haci Bayram	0	1	0	0	1	25%
	Ulu Cammi	0	1	0	0	1	25%
	Mescid I Aksa	1	1	0	0	2	50%
	ACVA	1	1	0	0	2	50%
left wing oriented	ATKB	1	1	0	1	3	75%
	HTIB	1	1	0	1	3	75%
	DIDE/DVA	0	1	0	0	1	25%
	Turks platform	1	1	0	0	2	50%
Cultural	Alternatif	1	1	1	1	4	100%
	NTAG	1	1	0	0	2	50%
	Papyrus	1	1	0	0	2	50%
Right wing oriented Turkish	TFN	1	1	1	0	3	75%
	TDM	1	1	0	0	2	50%
Advisor							

1= yes, I do have or am

0=no, I do not have or am not

From table 4 we can conclude that all respondents indicate that they would consult Dutch persons. Only 3 respondents mention ‘only’ Dutch colleagues. The remaining 10 respondents consult at least

a Dutch friend or a Dutch colleague. We conclude therefore that also on the individual level ethnic engagement and integration are complementary forms of civic engagement.

5. Conclusion.

Our conclusions can be summarized as follows:

- In Amsterdam political participation and trust varies between ethnic groups. Turks participate more and trust the local political institutions more. In this they are followed by Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans.
- The varying degrees of political participation and trust can be explained from the degree of civic community of the four ethnic groups, as predominantly reflected in the number of ethnic organizations and the networks between them.
- The network of interlocking directorates of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam is the result of organizational strategies and not of personal initiatives.
- Ethnic civic engagement and integration are, as well as on the organizational level, as on the individual level complementary forms of civic engagement.

LITERATURE 3A AND 3B.

- Alink, F., Maria Berger, Meindert Fennema and J. Tillie (1998) *Marokkaanse organisaties in Amsterdam. Een Netwerkanalyse*, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis
- Alink, F. and M. Berger 1999. Doors to another World: a research on the influence of local policy on Turkish and Moroccan organisations in two Amsterdam districts. In: *Progress Report Amsterdam: 45-57*, Paper presented at the MPMC Workshop in Liege (Belgium), 30 October-2 November 1999
- Almond, Gabriel and S. Verba 1965 *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Anwar, Muhammad, 1998. *Ethnic Minorities and the British Electoral System: A research report*, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick.
- Berger, M and A. van Heelsum, M. Fennema, J. Tillie and A. Feenstra (1998a) *Ghanese organisaties in Amsterdam: een netwerkanalyse*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis
(1998b) *Surinaamse en Antilliaanse/Arubaanse organisaties in Amsterdam: een netwerkanalyse*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Boissevain, Jeremy, 1974. *Friends of friends. Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions*. Basil Blackwell: Oxford
- Bourdieu, 1977. *Time and economic reactions*, Les editions de Minuit: Paris
- Bovenkerk, F. and Y., Yesilgöç (1998) *De maffia van Turkije*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff
- Braam, S. and Mehmet Ülger (1997) *Grijze wolven. Een zoektocht naar Turks extreem rechts*. Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar.
- Burt, R. S. 1992. *Structural holes: the social structure of competition*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Cadat, Brieuc-Yves et Meindert Fennema, 1998. Les hommes politiques issus de l'immigration à Amsterdam: image de soi, image des autres. *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 1998 (14) 2: 97-121.
- Coleman, James, 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
- Daalder, Hans, 1966. The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society. In: Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*. Yale University Press, New Haven: 188-236.
- Dronkers J. and S. Hillege, 1995. Board Membership of Traditional Male Fraternities and Access to Dutch Elites: A Disappearing Avenue to Elite Positions? *European Sociological Review*, 14, 2: 191-203.
- Fennema, Meindert 1976. Professor Lijphart en de Nederlandse politiek. *Acta Politica* 11,1: 54-77.
1982. *International Networks of Banks and Industry*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston.
- Fennema, M. and J. Tillie 1999. Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 24, 4, 1999
- Fennema, M., 2000
- Fermin, Alfons, 1997. *Nederlandse politieke partijen over het minderhedenbeleid, 1977-1995*, Thesis Publishers, Amsterdam. *Beleidswetenschap* 1998/2: 189-191
- Flap, Henk, 1999. Creation and returns of social capital. *Le Revue Tocqueville*, 1999 Vol.

XX, 1: 1-22

- Fukuyama, 1995. *Trust. The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. Profile Books: London
- Fukuyama, 1999, *The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order*. Profile Books, London.
- Galema, Annemieke, Barbara Henkes and Henk te Velde (eds.), 1993. *Images of the Nation. Different Meanings of Dutchness 1870-1940*. Atlanta: Amsterdam.
- Geddes, Andrew, 1998. Race Related Political Participation and Representation in the UK. *Revue Européenne de Migrations Internationales. Vol 14, 2: 33-49*.
- Granovetter 1995. *Getting a job*. (Revised edition). Chicago University Press: Chicago.
- De Graaf & Flap 1988. With a little help from my friends". Social resources as an explanation of occupational status and income in The Netherlands, the United States and West Germany. *Social Forces* 67: 453-472.
- Hillege, S. en M. Fennema, 1992. Studentencorpora en Elitevorming. *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift. 19, 1: 96-117*.
- Hirst, Paul, 1994. *Associative Democracy*. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., 1983. Introduction. The invention of traditions. In: Hobsbawm, E.J. and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc.
- Hungtington, 1981. Reform and stability in a Modernizing, Multi-ethnic Society. *Politikon* 8, 2: 8-26.
- Hunter, F., 1953. *Community Power Structure: a study of decision-makers*. University of North Carolina. Chapel Hill.
- Inglehart, Ronal, 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 countries*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Ireland, Patrick 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass.
- Jacobs, Dirk, 1998. *Nieuwkomers in de Politiek. Het Parlementaire debat omtrent kiesrecht voor vreemdelingen in Nederland en België*. Academia Press: Gent.
- Kriesi H. et al. 1995. *Social Movements in Western Europe*. Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.
- Lin, Nan 1999. Building a Network Theory of Social Capital. *Connections* Vol 22 issue 1: 28-51.
- Lijphart, A., 1968. *The Politics of Accomodation*. University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Lynd, R.S. and H.M. Lynd, 1929, *Middletown*. Harcourt: New York.
- Molina, Irene, 1999. City Template Stockholm. *Paper present at the second conference of the MPMC program 31 October to 2 November 1999 in Liege*.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1993 *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Rothstein, Bo, 1999. Trust, social dilemmas, and the strategic construction of collective memories. *Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper* 142.
- Saggar, Shमित, 1998. British South Asian Eltes and Political Participation: Testing the Cultural Thesis. *Revue Européenne de Migrations Internationales. Vol 14, 2: 51-69*
- Soysal, Y.N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Steinberg, Stephen, (1981) 1989. *The Ethnic Myth. Race, ethnicity and class in America*. Beacon Press: Chicago.

- Stolle, Dietland, 1998. Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The development of Generalized Trust in Voluntary Associations. *Political Psychology* 19 (3): 497-526.
- Tillie, Jean 1994 *Kleurrijk kiezen. Opkomst en stemgedrag van migranten tijdens de Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2 maart 1994*. Utrecht: NCB
- 1998 Explaining migrant voting behaviour in the Netherlands. Combining the electoral research and ethnic studies perspective, *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 14, 2, pp 71-95.
- Tillie, J. and Meindert Fennema, (1997). *Turkse organisaties in Amsterdam: Een netwerk-analyse*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis
- Tillie, J. and Anja van Heelsum 1999 De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 1998, in: J. Tillie, *Migranten die stemmen 1986-1998*. Utrecht: Forum.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, (1840) 1990. Democracy in America. *The Great Books of the Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Vol. 44. Chicago etc.
- Togeby, L. 1999. Migrants at the polls: an analysis of immigrant and refugee participation in Danish local elections, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25, 4:665-684.
- Vertovec, Steve, 1999. Minority Associations, networks and public policies: re-assessing relationships. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol 25, 1: 21-42.
- Warner W.L. and P.S. Lunt, 1941. *The social life in a modern community*. Yale University Press: New Haven.
- Wildavski, Aaron 1964 *Leadership in a small town*. Totowa N.J.: Bedminster Press
- Wittek, R. and J. Wielers, 1998. *Gossip in organizations*.
- Wolff R. and J. Tillie, 1995. 'In principe zijn de lijnen kort...' *Een onderzoek naar het minderhedenbeleid en de minderhedenvoorlichting in de Amsterdamse stadsdelen*. IMES: Amsterdam

The MPMC Project

The Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC) project is an international comparative research programme on the participation of immigrant and minority groups in 17 large European cities: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Athens, Barcelona, Birmingham, Brussels, Cologne, Liege, Marseilles, Milan, Oeiras, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv and Turin. In 1996 the project was adopted by UNESCO's Management of Social Transformation (MOST) programme for international policy-oriented social science. In the research project social scientists from a variety of disciplines undertake research and comparative analysis within selected urban contexts characterised by a substantial presence and activity of immigrant and ethnic minority groups. Working with policy makers and members of local organisations, their task is to assess the development and interplay of both 'bottom-up' (community led) initiatives and 'top-down' (municipality created) policies aimed at better integrating immigrant and ethnic minorities in public decision making processes. The key-questions to be answered by all research teams can be summarised as follows;

- *how do local authorities activate immigrants and ethnic minorities to participate in political decision making in general and in relation to their position in particular;*
- *how do immigrants and ethnic minority members mobilise to improve their position and to influence policies relating to that position;*
- *how do activation policies of authorities and mobilisation of immigrants and ethnic minorities interact.*

In order to ensure international comparative research each research partner has detailed the socio-economic and the political structures of the city and basic data on the minority groups (composition, socio-economic position etc.) in a city-template.

The MPMC project is co-ordinated by Dr. Marco Martiniello (CEDEM, Liege), Prof. Dr. Rinus Penninx (IMES, University of Amsterdam) and Dr. Steven Vertovec (Oxford University). The secretariat of the MPMC project is founded at the IMES under co-ordination of Mrs. Karen Kraal.

Following documents can be found on the website of the IMES (www.pscw.uva.nl/imes) or UNESCO (www.unesco.org/most):

- **Working Papers:**

Nr.1 MPMC-project restatement, December 1997

Nr.2 Immigrants' Participation in Civil Society in a Suburban Context

Nr.3A/3B Ethnic associations, political trust and political participation, Creating Networks within the Turkish Community in Amsterdam

Nr.4 The MPMC Workshop in Zeist, 2000

Nr. 5 Ethnic minorities, Cities and Institutions

(Hard copies can be requested at the secretariat)

- **The city templates of the 17 cities**
- **The Newsletters of the project**
- **A flyer of the project**
- **Reports of the workshops**
- **Key notes of Prof. Dr. Rinus Penninx**

Further information on the project can be found on the website of Unesco or Imes or obtained from:

Mrs. Karen Kraal or Prof. Dr. Rinus Penninx

Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES)

Rokin 84

1012 KX AMSTERDAM, The Netherlands

Tel: + 31- (0)20-525 3627

Fax: + 31 -(0)20-525 3628

E-mail: Kraal@pscw.uva.nl