Management of Social Transformations

MOST

Discussion Paper 62

Education for Democratic Governance:
Review of Learning Programmes

by Carlos Santiso
About MOST

MOST is a research programme designed by UNESCO to promote international comparative social science research. Its primary emphasis is on supporting large-scale, long-term autonomous research and transferring the relevant findings and data to decision-makers. The programme operates in three priority research areas:

1. The management of change in multicultural and multi-ethnic societies.
2. Cities as arenas of accelerated social transformations.
3. Coping locally and regionally with economic, technological and environmental transformations.

Discussion papers currently available are listed at the end of this publication.
Executive Summary and Recommendations

The 1990s saw the gradual emergence of the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance as both an objective of and a condition for development and development assistance. At the conceptual and practical levels, the notions of democracy and good governance significantly overlap, although they originate from different perspectives. While the democracy agenda in aid policies reflects the increasing politicisation of aid programmes, the governance agenda is a prolongation of economic approaches to development, originally focusing on state modernisation and public sector reform. However, these two agendas are converging and, in a few exceptional cases, actually merge. It is being recognised that politics matter for development.

A democratic regime requires meaningful and extensive political competition, a highly inclusive level of political participation at least through regular, free and fair elections and effectively guarantees civil and political liberties. The notion of good governance is relatively new and is defined as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management a country’s affairs. It encompasses the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern. Consequently, there is a symbiotic relationship between the two concepts, not in the sense of either being necessary for the other but in the sense that neither is ultimately sustainable without the other. Ultimately, the concept of democratic governance refers not only to the institutions of government and the structure of the state but also to the modes of government and the principles framing the process of governing the polity, recasting the relations between the state and civil society.

Since the inception of development co-operation, there has been heightened debate on the intricate relations between democratisation, good governance and aid effectiveness. An important lesson learned of a decade of democracy assistance and governance assistance suggests that international efforts can have a real influence on the shape and direction of democratisation. They most often do so in subtle but significant ways, by facilitating political dialogue between polarised actors, fostering consensus and compromise, influencing the contours of the political debate, delineating the contents of the reform agenda and changing the incentive structure. Their most important effect is often intangible, indirect, and time-delayed, their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change people’s behaviour.

Thus, learning, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing programmes are of critical importance. This study reviews and assesses the educational programmes in democracy and good governance of about 120 organizations throughout the world. Its objective is to identify gaps and shortcomings and assess the potential role of Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Most organizations engaged in the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance in emergent and uncertain democracies have developed a wide variety of educational and capacity-building programmes. These programmes vary considerably in terms of their organization, content, structure and duration. Most of these programmes, however, as the study shows, have adopted the traditional technical assistance approach based on the organization of in situ executive-education programmes of short duration as well as the organization of thematically-focused conferences, seminars and workshops.

An increasing number of education programmes resort to electronic forms of distant learning. In recent years, innovative approaches have been devised, using the opportunities offered by modern information technologies to circumvent the constraints of time and space. These new educational techniques have
proved particularly effective in reaching out to a wider public, beyond middle and senior policy-makers and including civil society activists and policy researchers. E-learning (the use of internet-based instruments for education) is gradually becoming a major tool for development and virtual universities offer many opportunities for educational programmes in the areas of democracy and governance. In general, e-learning programmes are structured around a set number of thematic courses each sub-divided in several specific modules. Their cost greatly oscillates, but 50,000 USD per course is a useful approximation (excluding often the IT costs). The overall co-ordination of each course is assumed by an institutional anchor within the organization (sometimes serving as a moderator). Each module is co-ordinated by an expert (either within the organization or within a pool of pre-selected experts).

Furthermore, the study reveals an important gap in the area of training and capacity-building on democratic governance. The most developed and refined programmes are indeed focused on economic governance rather than the wider aspects of political governance and democratisation. In particular, the World Bank Institute (WBI) has progressively become the main purveyor of educational, training and capacity-building programmes. However, its economic mandate and technocratic approach, while critical to enhance the skills and knowledge of individuals in developing countries, have clear limitations as they only marginally address wider political issues. Within the United Nations system, most organizations are only beginning to address the issue of learning and capacity-building for democratic governance using modern information technologies.

The study finds that UNESCO and MOST in particular can fill an important gap in the area of education for democratic governance, especially within the UN system and given its unique educational mandate. According to its founding constitution, the main objective of UNESCO “is to contribute to peace and security in the world by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science, culture and communication in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.”

As such, this study suggests that UNESCO-MOST pursue its assessment of its potential role in the area of education for democratic governance. It recommends that:

(i) its contribution be genuinely global in nature, crossing geographic, linguistic and cultural boundaries;
(ii) it make the best use of the emerging opportunities offered by modern information technologies, especially virtual education and e-learning, on the model of “virtual universities”;
(iii) its focus be explicitly political, thus focusing on education, training, and capacity-building for deepening and extending democracy and consolidating political governance;
(iv) it target in particular civil society and political parties in developing countries.

UNESCO-MOST could consider initiating exploratory contacts with a number of organizations active in this field, in particular the International Institute on Governance (on e-learning for democratic governance) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (on capacity-building for democratic governance). It should also explore the possibility of establishing strategic partnerships within the United Nations system, in particular with the United Nations University (especially its peace and governance programme) and the United Nations Development Programme, which has adopted the promotion of democratic governance as one of its core priority in the context of its current reform (especially in the context of the democratic governance centre to be established in Oslo). The
International University on Human Development (UNIDH) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Institute on Governance constitutes a useful model.

In operational terms, the feasibility process could be sequenced in two stages, a pilot stage and an implementation stage.

A pilot exercise could be conducted on a limited basis in the first year. This stage would involve the organization of a focused on-line course on a specific theme such as, for instance, “democratic governance, civil society and political parties” targeted at democracy activities in both civil society organizations and political parties. The course could be organized on a period of four to six months and comprised of four to six teaching modules each co-ordinated by an expert in each of the sub-fields selected. It would lead to a UNESCO-homologated certificate of studies. The sub-fields for the pilot course could include, for instance: (i) democracy and good governance: challenges and opportunities; (ii) state and society: new rules of the game?; (iii) participation and representation: the role of civil society and political parties; (iv) the culture of democracy: dialogue, negotiation and compromise; and (v) democratic local governance. The course background material could be based on a special issue or successive issues of the UNESCO-MOST e-journal on democratic governance.

The pilot stage would already involve significant investment from UNESCO-MOST as the policy contents of the programme would be decided upon and the basic electronic infrastructure should be in place. An option to consider, given the technological requirements of the endeavour, would be to establish an institutional co-operation with an organization with established e-learning programmes. However, critical choices will have to be made at an early stage, including, inter alia, the selection of the curriculum in accordance to UNESCO-MOST mandate and comparative advantage as well as the choice of languages and regional coverage. In that respect, several options exist, including (i) that the project be implemented either in English with translations into at least French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian; (ii) that it be implemented in a different language on a rotating basis or (ii) that each one of the modules be in a different language. In the pilot stage, the curriculum, the resource persons (based on a roster of experts), and the basic technical infrastructure modalities should be chosen. UNESCO-MOST could in particular use the worldwide network of UNESCO national committees, partners, universities and institutions to extend the reach of its programme.

The implementation stage would entail a series of strategic decisions by UNESCO-MOST, including (i) the selection of the curriculum (according to UNESCO-MOST mandate and objectives); (ii) the choice of the structure of the programme (number of courses, number of modules for each course, duration, coverage, language, target groups); (iii) the establishment of institutional co-operation arrangements with partner organizations and UNESCO national committees. In any event, the establishment of such a programme would require a minimum commitment of two (for the pilot phase) to four years (for the full-implementation) by UNESCO-MOST and substantial human and financial resources: two to four full-time staff members, including a thematic expert on democratic governance e-learning and an IT specialist.
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I – Introduction and Scope

In the context of the Management of Social Transformations Programme (MOST) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the present study assesses current capacity-building programmes in the area of democratic governance. It reviews their premises and rationale as well as their format, contents and instruments.

The aim of the study, as indicated in the Terms of Reference, is to analyse the educational, capacity-building and awareness-raising aspects of these programmes. Its main focus is on education and learning for democratic governance, reflecting the United Nations’ broad understanding of democracy and good governance. The purpose of the review and study is to assess the potential contribution of UNESCO-MOST, considering UNESCO’s educational mandate. As such, it only marginally addresses the wide range of technical assistance programmes (including conferences, seminars and workshops of a technical nature) by bilateral aid agencies and multilateral institutions in the area of democratic governance, which has grown into an industry of its own in recent years. The study adopts the narrowest focus possible on learning, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing programmes and initiatives.

Taking into account the specific needs of UNESCO MOST, the study is organized by types of organizations, rather than, for example, by types of governance programme (public sector reform, judicial assistance, legislative strengthening, electoral assistance, anti-corruption initiatives, civil society strengthening, etc.).

The classification of organizations include three main types:

- Inter-governmental and multilateral organizations;
- Government and quasi-governmental organizations;
- Non-governmental organizations and training institutes.

The study relies mainly on secondary sources of information (especially internet-based) as well as primary sources, direct experiences and direct consultations. Direct queries were also conducted in some cases. Furthermore, the author collaborated with several institutions on e-learning programmes for democratic governance (as a contributor, instructor or co-ordinator) being reviewed in this study.

The study is composed of two main parts. The first one clarifies the concepts of democracy and governance and advances the notion of democratic governance. The second one, of a more operational nature, focuses on the various educational programmes on democracy and good governance. It reviews approximately 120 organizations and is sub-divided in three main chapters, each assesses the programme of (i) international organizations, (ii) governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, and (iii) non-governmental organizations and training institutes. The study focuses in particular on organizations with statutes comparable to that of UNESCO (international organizations).

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1 Links to relevant websites are included throughout the study.
2 In particular, informal and formal interviews were conducted with the relevant contact persons at the World Bank Institute, the United Nations University, the United Nations Development Programme, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Overseas Development Institute, the International Institute on Governance, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The names of the persons contacted are mentioned as footnotes in the relevant chapters of the study.
II – Contextual Overview

The 1990s saw the gradual emergence of the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance as both an objective of and a condition for development co-operation.\(^3\) Substantial financial resources are being invested in this expanding field. Furthermore, an increasing number and variety of actors has become involved in promoting democracy, with, in particular, the dramatic rise of non-governmental and transnational organizations as well as private foundations (Van Rooy, 1998). An international norm sanctioning the legitimacy of a state according to its democratic credentials appears to be progressively emerging.\(^4\)

Democracy and Democratisation

According to the standard definition of democracy developed by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Martin Seymour Lipset on the basis of Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, a democratic regime requires meaningful and extensive political competition, a highly inclusive level of political participation at least through regular, free and fair elections and effectively guarantees civil and political liberties. According to Larry Diamond et al (1988: xvi),\(^5\)

“democracy denotes . . . a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular, free and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.”

The recently adopted Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS)\(^6\) defines representative democracy as follows:

(i) The effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the constitutional regimes of the member states of the Organization of American States. Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and responsible participation of the citizenry within a legal framework conforming to the respective constitutional order (Article 2).

(ii) Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political

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\(^3\) See, in particular: DAC OECD, 1994, 1995, and 1998; Diamond, 1995; Whitehead, 1996; Pinto-Duschinsky, 1997; Carothers, 1999; Burnell, 2000; Cox et al, 2000; Olsen, 2000; Rose, 2000-01; Santiso, 2001c.


parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government (Article 3).

(iii) Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on the part of governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy. The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of society are equally essential to democracy (Article 4).

However, it is widely recognised that there is no single model of democracy and good governance, but a wide range of specific circumstances. The methods, procedures and institutions governing a democratic regime can vary from one country to another according to the country’s distinct historical and socio-political conditions. Furthermore, democratisation, rather than democracy, is a continuous process of political change. It can take different forms and adopt various tempos of change and implies the progressive solidification of the norms and values and the gradual consolidation of the norms, the institutional structure and the procedural framework of democratic politics.

The concept of democratisation thus focuses on the dynamic process of regime change (democratic transition and consolidation) and circumvents the controversial debate on the requirements of and conditions for democracy. Focusing on the process of democratisation rather than the model of democracy enables analysts to conceive democratisation as a gradual process of regime change going through different stages and phases in a non-linear fashion. Therefore, each particular phase of democratisation requires specific constitutional and electoral arrangements that can be moduled according to the specific circumstances of a country at a particular moment in its political history. For instance, transitional democracies may require a presidential system of government with a majoritarian electoral system and a cohesive political party system, including transitional power-sharing arrangements to smooth out the political hurdles of a transition. Consolidating democracies may require more participatory and open systems of governance, a parliamentary system, an electoral system that is more proportional and a more diverse political party system requiring more efforts at building consensus and forming coalitions.

As a general rule, this study will approach democratisation as a continuous process rather than democracy as a standard model. Therefore, the transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy are considered as successive phases of the same continuous process of political and social transformation. According to Larry Diamond (1996b:54), “consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down. It involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalise democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty (even at the point of rendering it boring).”

This incremental process is reflected in the normative (the constitution and the body of laws), institutional (institutional structures), and procedural (policy-making processes) framework of the new regime. As a result, “democratic consolidation must address the challenge of strengthening three types of political institution: the state apparatus (the bureaucracy); the institutions of democratic representation and governance (political parties, legislatures, the electoral system); and the structures that ensure horizontal accountability, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, such as the judicial system and auditing and oversight agencies” (Diamond, 1999:93). In particular, there is evidence of democratic consolidation when the legitimacy of the political regime becomes autonomous of its efficiency in terms of economic performance (Przeworski, 1995; Merkel, 1998). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996a:15) define
democratic consolidation as “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives (which) has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’.”

Ultimately, the process of democratisation is a complex and highly fluid process requiring time and which is itself about the management time pressures (O’Donnell, 1998; Schedler and Santiso, 1998; Schmitter and Santiso, 1998). However, while democracy and modernisation generate political stability, the process of democratising and modernising often breeds instability (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). The dramatic rise in the number of internal violent conflicts has led democracy activists to reconsider their original assumptions about democracy and conflict. Consequently, from an initial emphasis on the nature of and requirements for democratic transition, the policy debate has progressively shifted to the analysis of the process of democratisation and democratic consolidation, reflecting the end of the democratic transition paradigm in the study of comparative politics.  

Furthermore, it was initially assumed that democratisation processes followed a natural, orderly and irreversible sequence of events, from democratic transition to consolidation. It is now recognized that democratisation processes adopt, more often than not, irregular, unpredictable and sometimes reversible routes in highly fluid and volatile political environments. As Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert stress (1999:7), “Political liberalization in the context of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily issue in transition to democracy, and transition does not invariably lead to democratic consolidation”. These considerations raise the central “question of strategy” to support the fluctuating democratisation processes: how to devise appropriate and flexible assistance strategies in support of processes of political change?

The concept of democratisation marks the end of the democratic transition paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s by stressing the intrinsically dynamic nature of democracy. First, it stresses that democratic regimes are not all similar in nature but may vary. Larry Diamond (1996b:53) argues that “Rather than viewing democracy as merely absent or present … it is more fruitful to view democracy as a spectrum, with a range of variation in degree and form.” It is increasingly being acknowledged that there is no single model of democracy and good governance, but a wide range of specific circumstances. The methods, procedures and institutions governing a democratic regime can vary from one country to another according to the country’s distinct historical and socio-political conditions.

Second, it emphasizes that democratisation can take different forms and adopt various tempos of change. It may indeed be possible to identify phases in the democratisation process according to the commitment to democratic reform: a phase of strong commitment, a phase of moderate commitment, as well as more ambiguous situations. Genuine democratisation demands the progressive solidification of democratic values and the gradual consolidation of the societal norms, the institutional structures and the procedural framework underpinning democratic politics. This incremental process is reflected in the normative (the constitution and the body of laws), institutional (rules, regulations structures), and procedural (policy-making processes) framework of the new political regime.

The concept of democratisation allows one to focus on the dynamic process of regime change and avoid the controversies around the requirements of and conditions for democracy. It takes the debate beyond the nature of democracy and the subsequent classification of democratic regimes along a spectrum.

Indeed, the academic literature has progressively shifted from the study of democratic transition and democratic requirements (‘transitiology’) in the early 1990s to the study of the process of democratisation and democratic consolidation (‘consolidology’) in the late 1990s. For a comprehensive review of the current debates and literature see: Becker, 1999; Burnell and Calvert, 1999; Schedler, 1998a and b; Diamond, 1997, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996a and b; O’Donnell, 1996).
Indeed, as asserted by Andreas Schedler (1998a and b), democratisation is first and foremost a process, placing the different phases along a continuum. Focusing on the process of democratisation rather than the model of democracy enables analysts to conceive democratisation as a gradual process of regime change going through different phases in an unpredictable, irregular and sometimes reversible fashion.

It is, however, extremely difficult to specify when democracy has become consolidated. There can always be gradual erosion and intermittent regressions. Democratic consolidation, like democratisation itself, is a continuous process. As Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert stress (1999:18-19), “consolidation is like democratisation in as much as it refers not to the properties that either are or are not possessed, but instead denotes a continuous variable, without obvious break lines or finishing points. More difficult to call is whether consolidation should incorporate special reference to the quality of a democracy in addition to the degree to which certain basic democratic features are entrenched, and, if so, how?”

**Diminishing Expectations**

Many new and restored democracies are striving to become multiparty democracies. The challenge is to “make democracy work” (Putnam, 1993). The consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of good governance represent daunting challenges to both democratising countries and donor countries attempting to assist them through the difficult pass towards democracy. Although significant advances have been achieved in some parts of the world in the past twenty years, the much-heralded global democratic trend has fallen short of expectations of the early 1990s. Many emergent democracies have ended up, “in a grey middle zone of so many transitions of that period, having neither moved rapidly and painlessly to democracy nor fallen back into outright authoritarianism” (Carothers, 1999:14). The “third wave” of democratisation has given rise to a wide array of political regimes, in terms of both quality and depth, questioning it very future (Huntington, 1991 and 1997).

In retrospect, the initial enthusiasm with the global resurgence of democracy may have been too euphoric and somewhat naive. Stagnant transitions, the increasing fragility of democratisation processes as well as the realisation of the incomplete or imperfect nature of the new democracies have watered down initial expectations. In many parts of the world democracy is fading, eroding or failing, disillusionment about democracy has replaced the optimism that marked the early 1990s as elected governments are riddled with corruption, incompetence and instability. Several scholars have argued that a stagnation and even “reversal” of the initial democracy’s “third wave” of political liberalisation has taken place, questioning the prospects for democratic consolidation in developing countries.8 O’Donnell (1992) also warns against a gradual erosion of democracy, the threat of silent regression from democracy to semi-democracy.

The nature of the political regime of many democratising states is often ambiguous, lying somewhere in between genuine democracy and overt dictatorship. Increasingly, democracy came to be used with adjectives to capture the reality of “hybrid regimes” struggling to consolidate (Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 1999).9 The emerging democracies of the 1990s have often been referred to as “restricted”, “uncertain”, “incomplete”, “illiberal” or “fragile” democracies. These countries are characterised by unstable governance, economic uncertainty, hollow institutions, fluid political processes and unconsolidated party systems. The prevalence of what Zacharia (1997) refers to “constitutional liberalism” – the sovereignty of the constitution, a bill of rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, checks and balances, an apolitical administration – remains fragile in many emergent democracies.

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9 According to Diamond et al., ‘Pseudo-democracies’ are characteristic of political regimes in which ‘the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination’ (Diamond et al., 1995:8).
While new democracies possess all the formal institutions of democracy, these institutions often remain empty shells, failing to function effectively and provide the necessary checks and balances. These regimes are marked by “an uneven acquisition of the procedural requisites of democracy” (Karl, 1995:80). The procedures that characterise a full-fledged democracy have not accompanied gains in the electoral arena. The institutional structures, when they exist, remain weak and the processes by which power is exercised are often contested. For instance, according to O’Donnell (1994), the “delegative” nature of Latin America’s new and restored democracies significantly hampers democratic consolidation: although periodic elections provide means of “vertical accountability”, “horizontal accountability” to prevent the abuse of power and the misuse of authority remains elusive (O’Donnell, 1998; Moncrieffe, 1998; Schedler et al., 1999).

Moreover, regime change and socio-economic transformation must be addressed simultaneously, adding further challenges to emerging democracies. Democracy’s credibility resides in its capacity to alleviate poverty and promote development. Riddled with widespread corruption and nepotism, fundamental democratic institutions – such as judicial systems, legislatures, political parties, even the presidency – fail to function adequately and lack legitimacy. Consequently, there is growing distrust in government institutions and political leaders across nations (Norris, 1999).

As the pace of change appears to have slowed, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish stagnation from cautious gradualism. The resurgence of democracy in the 1990s has not produced a clear-cut division between democratic and non-democratic countries, but rather a wide variety of semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes.

Challenges to Democracy Promotion

Consequently, the end of the 1990s has given rise to greater caution and modesty regarding the extent to which external actors can promote sustainable democratic reforms in developing and transitional countries – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lawson, 1999; Riddell, 1999; Gwin and Nelson, 1997; Ottaway, 1997). The initial enthusiasm within the international donor community is thus giving way to increasing scepticism and even frustration with the pace and depth of democratic transitions. “There is less pressure for political liberalisation, more scepticism about its prospects and greater concern with maintaining stability than promoting positive change” (Lawson, 1999:23). Carothers (1997b) has captured the international community’s fading enthusiasm which he coined “democracy without illusions”. After a decade of democracy assistance and considerable resources expended, the strategies pursued by international donors appear to have fallen short of their intended impact and effectiveness. The widespread disappointment with the effectiveness of democracy aid in a period of declining aid commitments and multiple pressure on aid budgets generated an increasing “donor fatigue” significantly affecting the capacity of international organizations to assume their responsibilities. If they persist, these developments could have disastrous consequences for the prospects of democracy in the new century.

The rise of low intensity democracies represents significant analytical and policy challenges for both policy-makers and scholars. First, it questions the international community’s ability to assess the nature of democracy as well as the trajectory of democratisation in specific countries. The concept of “politically fragile countries” developed by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM, 1997 and 1999) encompasses a wide variety of situations, with varying degrees of willingness and

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capacities to democratise. More fundamentally, as Olcott and Ottaway (1999) stress, assessing whether semi-authoritarianism is a stable condition resulting from a blocked transition, a temporary stage in gradual process, or a different trajectory to democracy represent tremendous challenges. Moreover, as Zacharia (1997:42) points out, “the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses – other than to its own people – is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance” and thus lead to its “slow death” (O’Donnell, 1988). Ultimately, this phenomenon questions the intellectually elegant assumption of a linear “democratisation continuum,” from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.

The policy challenges are equally great (Carothers, 2000; Dalpino, 2000). Assessing the nature of political dynamics is of critical importance for devising appropriate assistance strategies. Dealing with what the European Commission (1997:16) refers to as “dysfunctional states” requires a savant dosage of both positive incentives and negative measures. It entails assessing the extent to which leaders have the political will to democratise and are genuinely committed to democratisation. Promoting democracy in such situations often involves a difficult choice between an openly oppositional approach that runs the risk of exacerbating political instability or leading to the coming to power of an openly undemocratic regime, and accommodating strategies that might provide too much leeway to the authoritarian tendencies within the regime. The challenge for the international donor community is then to devise assistance strategies with a right mix of positive incentives and negative measures built in long-term, coherent and consistent strategies. Too often, the holding of elections are the main focus of international pressure, overlooking wider dimensions of democracy. Elections, although necessary, do not suffice to install and consolidate democratic governance. More difficult yet is how to respond to democratic erosion and decay. As Zacharia (1997:40) notes, “while it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society”. Achieving a creative balance between international interference and effective performance of national institutions has become a permanent challenge.

From the outset, the concept of “democracy assistance” may appear a contradiction in terms. Democratisation is first and foremost a domestic process, which spurs from the internal pressures to democratise. However, when a country has decided to democratise, the international community can assist it in number of ways. The contentious issue is how this should be done. The most contentious debate concerns what Carothers (1997a) refers to as “the question of strategy”: can development aid be used to promote political change and, if so, how?

Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support; indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms, ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure. The most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance can be defined narrowly as encompassing “aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999:6). Most democracy aid takes the form of “positive measures”, which add a positive dimension (reward good performance) to the negative one (denial of aid resources as a result of bad performance) often associated with political conditionality. Indeed, there exists now significant assistance available to transitional countries genuinely committed to and engaged in democratisation, but which lack resources or expertise.

11 These situations include: authoritarian governments neither committed to nor willing to engage in democratisation; conflict-ridden states; post-conflict countries where the government authority and state institutions have been destroyed (‘failed’ states); democratising states facing political instability (‘politically-fragile’ states); and democratising states endowed with weak government institutions (‘weak’ states).
The core strategy underlying democracy assistance, argues Carothers (1997a), is based on three interrelated assumptions. First, it tends to endorse implicitly a particular understanding of democracy and use the conventional western model of liberal democracy as its reference model or “template”, often unintentionally but sometimes more explicitly as an instrument of foreign policy (Robinson, 1996a and 1996b). Second, it often considers democratisation as a process of constitutional engineering and “institutional modelling” (Carothers, 1999:90) according to which aid donors attempt to reproduce the institutions of established democracies (Marks, 2000). Third, it assumes that democratisation follows an orderly, linear sequence of stages.

However, while the model of democracy (defined in terms of institutional endpoints) underlying international efforts to promote democracy assistance is quite clear, the assumed model of democratisation (which place further emphasis on the process of change) is less obvious (Carothers, 1997b). Often, a specific international actor promotes the models of democracies that are rooted in its own model of democracy.

This standardised strategy has become problematic and highly ineffective, especially in cases where democracy is stagnating, eroding or failing. Political transitions are more often than not not unpredictable and democratisation processes are highly volatile. This realisation has lead democracy strategists to revisit their original assumptions and progressively amend their traditional approaches, although only very gradually and partially. Academic research, however, has not provided many insights on how this should be done, even though in recent years there has been a shift from the study of democratic transitions to the analysis of democratic consolidation.

More fundamentally, democracy promoters are facing the fact that democracies can adopt many shapes and shades and that democratic transitions often do not follow a natural, orderly and linear sequence (Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Beetham, 1994; Held, 1998; Diamond, 1999). Democratisation is an irregular, unpredictable and sometimes reversible process taking place in highly fluid and volatile political environments. Democratisation (as opposed to democracy) is an elusive quest, a promise and an aspiration. Nevertheless, the recognition of the variety of democratic regimes and the different paces of political change raises a politically sensitive question: how far can the definition of democracy be stretched to accommodate different models or trajectories of democratisation?

**Contours of Democracy Promotion**

Democracy assistance is constituted of three main types of interventions targeting electoral processes, governing institutions and civil society.12

The first pillar of democracy aid focuses on elections and political parties, and includes electoral observation and assistance as well as support to the reform of electoral laws and the strengthening of independent electoral commission. Electoral assistance is among the most sophisticated and developed types of democracy aid and the one that has most evolved in recent years. Over the last decade, electoral assistance has progressively shifted from the international observation of elections to more refined operations over longer periods of time such as support to the domestic observation of elections, technical assistance in terms of electoral system design and assistance to the administration of elections. Political parties, especially those in the opposition, remain among the weakest components of the democratisation process and the least assisted from abroad. The reasons for such reluctance are to be found in the donors’ resistance to intrude in core dimensions of national sovereignty and thus upset the

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12 The typology used in this chapter is derived from the categories developed in Carothers, 1999.
Westphalian principles of the equal sovereignty of states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Political foundations, however, especially in Germany (the Stiftung) and in the United States, have been particularly active in political party assistance but their strategies and effectiveness have been only marginally analysed.\(^\text{13}\)

The fallacy of electoralism has increasingly been recognised (Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Elklit, 1999). Indeed, Pastor (1999) notes that of a total of 387 elections that were reported during the 1990s, 81 can be considered as “flawed”. It was originally assumed that the holding of relatively free and fair elections would naturally lead to the gradual emergence of democratic institutions and the progressive consolidation of a democratic culture. As Carothers (1997b:124) stresses, “Electoral aid does little for democratisation when the elections in question are intended to legitimate the power of an entrenched regime. Without a will to reform on the part of governmental authorities, efforts to help governmental institutions end up as wheel-spinning exercises”. Too often, and especially in post-conflict societies, elections have been conceived as a “quick fix” and an exit strategy for the international community. Although essential, elections do not equal democracy and are just the beginning of the longer and often messy process of democracy building.

The second and largest pillar of democracy assistance aims at reforming the state and strengthening governing institutions. It is based on the principle of the separation and balance of powers and the assumption that a major obstacle to democratic consolidation is an overly strong executive backed by a predominant party in parliament and an omnipresent government majority. Therefore, it targets all governing institutions and focuses on public sector management, judicial reform, legislative strengthening, oversight state agencies (such as ombudspersons and audit bureaux) and anti-corruption bodies. It includes constitutional engineering, parliamentary assistance, judicial reform and local government strengthening as well as civilian policy training. Furthermore, a particular thrust in the current efforts at reforming and modernising the state centres on the devolution of power to lower levels of government. The decentralisation of power and strengthening of countervailing powers is designed to prevent the abuse of power.

Institutionalising checks and balances, it is believed, will create a democratic polity and, as a natural consequence, will contribute to the emergence of what Schedler et al. (1999) refer to as a “self-restraining state”. “Horizontal accountability” requires the prevalence of the rule of law and entails the existence of agencies of restraint and accountability, independent institutions legally and politically empowered to restrict the powers of the executive. In particular, the fight against corruption demands for formal mechanisms of restraint anchored in autonomous state institutions. The strengthening of the rule of law and the effective independence of judiciary are now considered, especially by the multilateral development banks, as the miraculous new cure to spur development and to resolve the relative ineffectiveness of development aid (Santiso, 2000b).

Learning in the area of state reform and institutional development has been slow. It has become clear that democracy aid can only exert a limited influence and make a superficial contribution unless there is a genuine political will and commitment to democratic reform within the country’s political elite and society at large. However, the underlying distribution of power tends to resist change and neutralise external interventions. Therefore, international donors “must confront the underlying interests and power relations in the sector in which they wish to help to bring about change” (Carothers, 1999:151). In any event, external actors can, at best, influence the “rules of the game,” that is the institutional and regulatory framework in which policies and decision are made. Recognising the democracy cannot and should be imposed from the outside, but “merely” supported and assisted, requires a “cultural revolution” in the way

\(^{13}\) See: Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991; Sogge, 1996; Burnell and Ware, 1998; Scott, 1999; Phillips, 1999; Mair, 2000.
democracy promoters think about democracy promotion. In particular, it entails revisiting the modes of interventions and the intellectual models on which these are based.

The third and most rapidly expanding pillar of democracy aid concerns civil society, with particular attention to advocacy-oriented non-governmental organizations, civic education groups, policy think tanks, independent media, and trade unions. In the wake of the “third wave” of democratisation, non-governmental organizations were seen as critical agents of change (Fowler, 1993). To a certain extent, civil society assistance has arisen from the disillusionment with the limited effectiveness of traditional state-to-state co-operation. For Carothers (1999:337), “Democracy promoters’ growing emphasis on civil society is itself part of the learning curve; they are seeking to go beyond elections and state institutions, to turn democratic forms into democratic substance”.

However, the initial enthusiasm towards civil society organization appears to be receding: not all organizations of society are as civil as they appear and not all non-governmental organizations are as “non-governmental” as they claim. Their representativity, accountability and sustainability are often weak and in many instances NGOs are highly politicised. In Africa, for instance, civil society organizations have tended to replace opposition political parties as channels of dissent and discontent. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, it is often easier, safer and more profitable to do politics from an NGO than within a traditional political party. These circumventing strategies are in many ways understandable given the political climate dominating many democratising countries, characterised by systematic distrust, subtle repression and continuous harassment. But they undermine the very foundations of a genuine democratic polity and the principle according to which NGOs should be apolitical. Consequently, the international donor community is taking a harder look at pro-democracy civil society organizations in emergent democracies (Van Rooy, 1998; Carothers, 1999-2000; Carothers and Ottaway, 2000), questioning their impact, legitimacy and accountability. International donors realise the limits the strategies circumventing the state and emphasise the imperious necessity to democratise the state as a guarantor of constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{14}

This strategy is reflected, for instance, in the European Union’s democracy assistance. In 1999, the European Council adopted two regulations (975/1999 and 976/1999) outlining the main areas of intervention in the field of democracy assistance and providing the legal basis for all democratisation activities under Chapter B7-70 of the budget, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). These areas include:

(i) strengthening of the rule of law – including upholding the independence of the judiciary and support for constitutional and legislative reform;
(ii) promoting the separation of powers – including the independence of the judiciary and the legislature from the executive and support for institutional reforms;
(iii) promoting pluralism both at the political level and at the level of civil society;
(iv) promoting good governance – particularly by supporting administrative accountability and the prevention and combating of corruption;
(v) promoting the participation of the people in the decision-making process at national, regional and local levels;
(vi) supporting electoral processes;
(vii) supporting the separation of military and civilian functions; and

\textsuperscript{14} Western NGOs share also some of the blame (Wedel, 1998). In a recent study on Western NGOs in the former communist countries of East and Central Europe, Mendelson and Glenn (2000:6) argue that, while these NGOs have played “a large and important role in many formerly communist states helping to design and build institutions associated with democracy” – such as political parties, regular elections, independent media, local advocacy organizations, “they have done little as yet to affect how these institutions actually function”.

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(viii) promoting democratisation for conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building (Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of Council Regulation 975/1999).

Council Regulations 975/1999 and 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 on the development and consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of good governance became effective on 11 May 1999. These regulations provide a legal basis for all democratisation activities under Chapter B7-70 of the EU budget decided by the Council of Ministers of the European Community.

Democracy and Good Governance: A Controversial Linkage

In recent years, the international community has articulated a new, largely apolitical concept to describe the political system, government and regime change, namely governance. The most contentious aspect of the debate on good governance concerns the political dimensions of good governance, and in particular the intricate links and complex interplay between democracy and good governance.

Democracy promoters realise that many of the difficulties facing new democracies stem not so much from excessive executive power but from institutionally weak states. Indeed, the fundamental requisite for an effective democracy is a state that works. A state that is not effective significantly affects the credibility of democracy. Conversely, a democratic regime that is not efficient will hamper economic performance. As the democracy agenda is reconsidering the role of the state in development, traditional structural adjustment policies advocated by international financial institutions are being reconsidered. The emerging “governance agenda” rehabilitates the state, rediscovers institutions and brings politics back in the development paradigm.

Although the concept of good governance is increasingly being used, its contours remain uncertain. Aid practitioners have not yet been able to articulate an unambiguous and operational definition of the concept. A variety of definitions, greatly differing in scope, rationale and objectives, have been advanced. This multitude of definitions has generated an increasing confusion regarding the boundaries of the concept.

The notion of good governance is relatively new. It surfaced in 1989 in the World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa, which characterised the crisis in the region as a “crisis of governance” (World Bank 1989). It then represented an important departure from previous policy, largely prompted by the experience in Africa. The main thrust behind its introduction in the Bank’s corporate policies resides in the continuing lack of effectiveness of aid, the feeble commitment to reform of recipient governments and the persistence of endemic corruption in developing countries. In addressing governance, the Bank calls into question the ability, capacity and willingness of political authorities to govern effectively in the common interest. There is heightened awareness that the quality of a country’s governance system is a key determinant of the ability to pursue sustainable economic and social development.

According to the Bank’s own definition, governance encompasses:

(i) the form of political regime;
(ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and
(iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank 1991, 1992, 1994, 2000a).
However, while recognising the importance of the political dimensions of governance, the Bank interprets the concept restrictively, arguing that the first aspect – whether a government is democratic or not – falls outside its mandate. As a result, it focuses on the economic dimensions of good governance, which has been equated with “sound development management”. Consequently, the main thrust of governance-related activities has been public sector management, financial management, the modernisation of public administration, and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has remained largely inactive in the governance debate, despite some recent developments. It mainly follows the approach of the World Bank.

Other multilateral development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction (EBRD) and Development and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), have also been at the forefront of the governance debate. Facing growing public concern with corruption, misuse of funds and poor policy, international development finance organizations have been increasingly urged to give governance a higher priority on the reform agenda. The Asian Development Bank (AsDB) was the first of the multilateral development banks to adopt an official governance policy in 1995 (AsDB, 1995). The approach of the AsDB is similar to that of the World Bank, restricting itself to the economic dimensions of governance, while recognising that there are political dimensions as well but outside its original mandate. Essentially, good governance is defined as “sound development management” based on four “pillars”: accountability, transparency, predictability and participation (AsDB, 1999; Streeten, 1996).

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is concerned with both economic and political aspects of governance. It is the first multilateral financial organization whose charter incorporates political goals, as it is mandated to assist only countries “committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics” (EBRD, 1990). Adherence to these principles is closely monitored and the political situation is regularly reviewed for the Bank’s country strategies. To implement the political aspects of its mandate, in 1991 the Board of Directors proposed to assess annually economic and political progress in member countries (EBRD, 1992). This monitoring mechanism would inform the respective Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). If political orientations in a particular country are not believed to be appropriate, the EBRD could postpone, alter, restrict or even suspend lending operations. However, the EBRD has appeared to adopt a more prudent and restrictive approach the political dimensions of its mandate. It has not interpreted its mandate in a proactive way, but rather in a conservative manner.

However, the shift from the notion of governance to good governance introduces a normative dimension addressing the quality of governance. A good governance system puts further requirements on the process of decision-making and public policy formulation. It extends beyond the capacity of the public sector to the rules that create a legitimate, effective and efficient framework for the conduct of public policy. It implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory and equitable manner. It entails effective participation in public policy-making, the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, and effective oversight agencies. Researchers at the World Bank Institute have distinguished six main dimensions of good governance:

(i) Voice and accountability, which includes civil liberties and political stability;
(ii) Government effectiveness, which includes the quality of policy-making and public service delivery;
(iii) The lack of regulatory burden;
(iv) The rule of law, which includes protection of property rights;
(v) Independence of the judiciary; and
(vi) control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999a and b).

There are understandable justifications for such a restraint. The pressure by donor governments to address endemic corruption, bureaucratic ineptness and economic mismanagement had to be accommodated by the Bank. Framing governance as a technical question has permitted the Bank to justify its involvement in governance issues while remaining within the boundaries of its mandate. Conceptualising governance in functional terms has enabled the Bank to address governance failures in developing countries and smooth resistance from its varied constituency. Nevertheless, this compromise has been fragile and constantly questioned in the course of the 1990s, either as inadequate or unacceptable.

**Limits of the Technocratic Consensus**

There are limits to what Morten Bøås calls the “technocratic consensus”: “Governance is a difficult concept for the multilateral development banks that do not want to be seen as political and have since their establishment advocated a doctrine of political neutrality. They have embraced the functionalist logic that technical and economic questions can be separated from politics” (Bøås 2001, 2). The functionalist approach of technocratic policy-making gives the illusion that technical solutions can solve political problems: “Politics is treated as a negative input into policy decision-making” (Grindle 2001, 370), as the politics of self-interest and rent-seeking negatively distort policy choice. This approach echoes the consensus on rational choice theory according to which policy is created in a fairly orderly sequence of stages. However, this model fails to capture “The essence of policy-making in political communities: the struggle over ideas” (Stone 1989, 7) and the process framing public policy-making. It circumvents politics by negating it (UNRISD, 2000).

For economists who dominate the World Bank’s ethos, policy is essentially a sphere of rational analysis, whereas politics is the sphere of irrationality. Their approach to governance is thus aimed at extricating policy from politics, assuming that analysis and politics can be separated in the process of public policy-making. This continues to guide the Bank’s approach to governance reform. Political contexts offer both constraints and opportunities for change. Indeed, the shortcomings of the market-oriented economic reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s reside in their insufficient consideration of the political economy of policy reform.

Despite its legal limitations, the World Bank struggles to separate the economic and political aspects of good governance. This tension surfaced as early as 1991 when the Bank recognized that the reasons for underdevelopment and misgovernment are “sometimes attributable to weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal framework, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain and variable policy frameworks and a closed decision-making process which increases risks of corruption and waste” (World Bank 1991, i). These concerns do not refer only to the soundness of economic management but also to the overall quality of the political system and ultimately to the nature of the political regime. A similar tension between the economic and political dimensions of good governance can be found in the International Monetary Fund (IMF 1997; James 1998).

As Moises Naím (1994, 4) asserts, the IFIs “have to reconcile their political character with their technical vocation”. The inherent tension between the economic and political dimensions of good governance appears the most contentious conceptual issue. While democracy tends to refer to the *legitimacy* of government, good governance refers to the *effectiveness* of government. Consequently, one could in theory be strengthened and promoted independently from the other, as both have value in their own right. Nevertheless, as the legitimacy and effectiveness of government are not always congruent in reality, the
relationship between democracy and good governance is laden with controversies. There are still no clear or settled ideas about how effective governance and democratic consolidation should be suitably defined, let alone how they could be supported from abroad. Good governance, although theoretically distinct from democracy, often substantially overlaps with it in practice. Incorporating the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance in aid policies is a permanent challenge and aid agencies have difficulty in advancing these intertwined agendas (Santiso, 2001a, b and c).

**Conceptualising Democratic Governance**

Given its political mandate, the United Nations has adopted a more clearly political definition of good governance and, consequently, an openly political approach to governance reform. In its policy documents, it tends to prefer the concept term “democratic governance”. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been particularly active in that regard. It defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels . . . it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.” (UNDP 1997a and b) Consequently, governance encompasses:

(i) The form of political authority that exists in a country (parliamentary or presidential, civilian or military, and autocratic or democratic);
(ii) The means through which authority is exercised in the management of economic and social resources;
(iii) The ability of governments to discharge government functions effectively, efficiently, and equitably through the design, formulation, and implementation of sound policies.

While governance is a neutral concept (comprising the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations), good governance addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems. Characteristics of good governance include: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic vision. Good governance comprises a set of concurrent policy processes and has several dimensions:

(i) Economic governance, which includes decision-making processes affecting a country’s economic activities and relationships with other countries;
(ii) Political governance, which is the process of decision-making to formulate policy; and
(iii) Administrative governance, which is the system of policy implementation (UNDP 1997a and b).

Strengthening good governance thus entails rehabilitating and reforming the state. This dimension is emphasised in the World Bank’s World Development Report of 1997 on The State in a Changing World, which argues that “the State is central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator” (World Bank, 1997:1). According to the controversial former Chief Economist of the World bank, Joseph Stiglitz (1998a: 25-26), “The State has an important role to play in appropriate regulation, social protection, and welfare. The choice should not be whether the State should be involved, but how it gets involved. Thus the central question should not be the size of the government, but the activities and methods of government.” Therefore, beyond the quality (efficiency, effectiveness, competence) of government, the central dimension resides in the mode of governance and nature of the governance system.
Sustainable human development cannot take place without a functioning and capable state. An inefficient, incompetent, corrupt and sometimes illegitimate state can become an intractable impediment to sustainable development and aid effectiveness. A capable government, sound policies and robust democratic institutions are critical for both sustainable development and democratisation. Ultimately, the credibility of democracy hinges upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the state. Experience shows that the “rolling back” of the state linked to structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s may have gone too far, causing a dramatic reduction in public service delivery and eroding the political authority and legitimacy of states.

The mode of governance appropriate to developing countries has been redefined. Although old models of direct management through state planning, public ownership and other forms of intervention have been abandoned, the regulatory and enabling role of the state are being strengthened so as to provide developing economies with stability, predictability and reliability, that is a suitable framework for economic and political development. According to Giandomenico Magione’s analysis of the transition from a “positive to a regulatory state” in developed economies (Magione, 1997), this new “development state” has essentially a regulatory role, providing the basis “rules of the games”, including the legitimate institutions and relevant regulations.

These trends concern not only the institutional structure of state but more fundamentally the process of governing, that is, structural reforms affecting governance systems beyond the functioning of government. Structural aspects of good governance focus on the need for efficient government, transparent decision-making, participatory public policy formulation, efficient legal and judicial processes and sound legislative systems. Progressively, the Bretton Woods institutions have thus moved away from the exclusive focus on public sector reform and public administration reform, which characterised the 1970s. But their focus on the executive branch of government is still driven by efficiency concerns rather than governmental legitimacy.

Defining good governance has become a contentious issue in development co-operation circles and has led to a multiplication of conflicting concepts. Good governance is a process that, in the words of international regimes theory, represents a “persistent and connected set of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constraint activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1990:731 and 1998). A governance system denotes a governing regime – a set of institutionalised norms, rules and decision-making procedures that frame the process of government (Krasner, 1982). The notion of good governance extends beyond the capacity of public sector management to the rules and institutions which create a legitimate, inclusive, transparent and accountable framework for the formulation and conduct of public policy. It implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory and equitable manner showing due regard for democratic principles and the rule of law. It focuses on the political norms defining political action, the institutional framework in which the policy-making process takes place and the mechanisms and processes by which power is exercised.

The modality and degree of integration of democracy and good governance into a single policy concept has varied according to the institution using it, reflecting the specific constituency, agenda and policy priorities. As Table 1 shows, the definitions of good governance vary in their normative content and specifically in the extent to which they integrate a democratic dimension. The various definitions of good governance in Table 1 reflect the divergent views on this intimate connection, as well as the mandates and constituencies of the respective international organizations. In theory, governance may be about exercise of power irrespective of the political system, but in practice good governance involves enhancing accountability and transparency, strengthening the rule of law and preventing corruption. It
also entails strengthening the participation in and the responsiveness of public policies. These are precisely the working conditions of democracy. Competition for power through elections is meaningless unless those elected are accountable to those who elect them. Accountability is impossible without transparency. Formulation of laws in legislatures and constitutional guarantees of freedom would remain illusory in the absence of the rule of law. And a political system can only be said to be open if people have a possibility to participate in decision-making processes beyond periodic free and fair elections.
**TABLE 1: DEFINITIONS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE**

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>DEFINITION</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The World Bank</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The World Bank identifies the three dimensions of governance as:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) the form of political regime;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>There is a direct relationship between economic development and the quality of government. Economic reform and poverty reduction strategies will not be successful without strong institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Governability implies political stability, which is tied to domestic socio-economic conditions, the strength of democratic institutions, and citizen input into the decision-making process. Special emphasis is placed on social justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) Governability requires confidence in and predictability of the judicial, economic and political spheres, including a sound legal framework for development, gender-neutral protection of property rights, a climate conducive to the growth of private enterprise, efficient allocation of public resources, government accountability, and honest and transparent administration of the state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The IDB’s 1996 strategic policy planning identified four main areas for attention and support: executive branch; legislative branch and democratic institutions; justice system; civil society.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>European Union (EU)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at the European level. The five principles of good governance include openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is important for establishing democratic governance as they underpin democracy and the rule of law.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>European Union (EU) and ACP Group</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity-building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption (Article 9.3 of the</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management a country’s affairs at all levels.

Governance can be defined by:

(i) The form of political authority that exists in a country (parliamentary or presidential, civilian or military, and autocratic or democratic);

(ii) The means through which authority is exercised in the management of economic and social resources;

(iii) The ability of governments to discharge government functions effectively, efficiently, and equitably through the design, formulation, and implementation of sound policies.

*Governance* is a neutral concept comprising the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.

*Good governance* addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems; it is characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness and equity.

(i) Economic governance includes decision-making processes affecting a country’s economic activities and relationships with other countries;

(ii) Political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy;

(iii) Administrative governance is the system of policy implementation.

Characteristics of good governance include: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic vision

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Contours of Democratic Governance

Democracy and good governance are two intimately intertwined concepts: they cast light on the same sculpture from two different angles, describing different shapes and nuances. But the democratic facets of good governance are particularly striking.

**Accountability and Transparency.** At the core of the governance agenda is the fight against corruption and the corresponding need to enhance accountability and strengthen transparency in public policy. Corruption flourishes, it is argued, where distortions in the policy and regulatory regime provide scope for it and where institutions are weak, undermining the rule of law. Agencies of restraint such as autonomous oversight bodies, independent judiciaries and the separation of powers are now considered as vital foundations for sustainable development and anti-corruption strategies (Collier, 1991).

Strengthening accountability entails a systemic reform of the state and modes of governance (administrative, parliamentary, legislative, and justice reform). In particular, the “delegative” nature of most Latin American democracies hampers democratic consolidation in several ways. Because they are institutionally weak and democratically incomplete, “delegative democracies” are more vulnerable to alteration and even complete breakdown. These regimes are characterised both by weak effective representation and participation in the making of public policies and therefore a relative absence of “horizontal accountability” to prevent the abuse of power (O’Donnell, 1994 and 1998a; Schedler et al, 1999). Power is highly concentrated in the executive and, for various reasons, including their own deficiencies, the legislature and the judiciary provide little control or oversight. Although periodic elections provide means of “vertical accountability,” the exercise of power of elected presidents while in office is relatively unchecked. According to O’Donnell (1998a:117), horizontal accountability “depends on the existence of state agencies that are legally empowered – and factually willing and able – to take actions ranging from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to possibly unlawful actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state.” Diamond (1996b:60) asserts that “while truly representative systems also delegate authority from the people, they do so in ways that check and separate powers and establish accountability – not only vertically and at election time but horizontally and continuously, in the play between independent branches of government.” He concludes that “democracies are more likely to become consolidated the more they are representative rather than delegative”.

The notion of “horizontal accountability” includes more than the effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches; it implies the existence of checks and balances, as found in pluralist democracies. It also entails the de-politicisation of public administration and the existence of an effective opposition enabling the parliament to control the executive and enact legislation that is credible and impartial. Although the stability and predictability of the law are crucial for the prevalence of the rule of law, the normative content of the law is as fundamental. The dominance of parliaments by one party or the dependence of the judiciary on the executive represent inhibiting factors. The lack of transparency in public policy formulation and implementation as well as the prevalence of inefficiency, corruption, and public distrust in the legislative and judicial institutions are also major obstacles to effective accountability.

Furthermore, building accountability generally calls for formal mechanisms of restraint anchored in core state institutions. “Horizontal accountability” entails the existence of agencies of restraint – autonomous institutions established to prevent the abuse of power and redress the misuse of authority. These agencies, which include parliamentary committees, oversight agencies, ombudsman, accounting offices, anti-corruption offices, central banks and independent electoral commissions oversee and control state
actions, and redress and sanction deviations from established standards of government actions. Ultimately, the concept of political accountability entails the combination of representative democracy as the political system and “self-restraint” as the governance system (Schedler et al, 1999). The World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report acknowledged the political nature of accountability by stressing the central roles of an effective legislature and an efficient judiciary to provide “effective rules and restraints, greater competitive pressure and increased citizen voice and partnership” (World Bank, 1997:7). Ultimately, democratic elections and institutions are crucial for enforcing accountability.

The Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption. Judicial reform constitutes a clear point of convergence between the democracy and the good governance agendas. The existence of reliable and credible judicial institutions and consistent and predictable rule of law is essential both to the proper functioning of the market economy and the credibility of democracy. The unreliability of the judiciary and the instability of the rule of law are significant hurdles to both democratic consolidation and good governance. The legal capacity to compel the government to comply with laws is essential to effective oversight. Ultimately, a credible rule of law hinges upon an independent judiciary. Nomination, promotion and management of the career of judges are too often subordinated to the executive, hampering genuine independence. The independence of the judiciary and the effectiveness of the judicial system, characteristic of democratic regimes, are essential elements of a reliable rule of law. Conversely, the efficiency and impartiality of justice is also crucial for the credibility of democracy.

Traditionally, the fight against corruption has been conceptualised as a public sector development challenge to be addressed mainly by economic and technocratic measures. The “next stage of anti-corruption,” however, will require structural institutional and political reforms. An example is the contentious issue of term limits in Latin America. It could be argued that putting term limits on the mandates of elected politicians (such as the non re-election clause in Mexico) provides strong incentives to abuse power and misuse authority in order to extract the maximum personal financial gains while in office.

The effectiveness and legitimacy of judicial institutions influence both the credibility of the political system and the efficiency of the economic system. Economic development and political liberalisation are dependent on the effectiveness of the judiciary to enforce the rule of law. For instance, the stability and predictability of private law securing property rights and enforcing contracts are fundamental for economic development. At the same time, if the judicial authorities are not independent, the likelihood that their decisions over disputes are biased or arbitrary are high and their ability to routinely deliver fair and impartial justice considerably diminished. Recent research indicates that levels of corruption are negatively correlated to levels of civil liberties and political rights (Kaufmann et al, 1999a and b).

Participation and Decentralisation. Political accountability is inseparable from effective political representation and participation. It is an essential element of a democratic regime. Participation implies representation, either directly though elections and within a parliamentary political system or indirectly via political parties and interest groups. Effective participation and representation in public policy formulation also presuppose an efficient and legitimate parliament. Both direct and indirect participation in the formulation of public policies and representation in the parliament require a sufficient level of civil liberties and political rights (such as freedom of association) as well as a functioning multi-party system. More fundamentally, they require regular, free and fair elections and a genuine choice between alternative government policies.

15 For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of political accountability, see Moncrieffe, 1998.
Participation also occurs beyond elections. It calls for a continuous consultation in the formulation, monitoring and implementation of public policies in order to reach an agreement and consensus that will sustain them in the longer term. Greater “voice” thus entails an effective system of open governance and participatory politics. The 1997 World Development Report argues ‘The ability of people to participate in making the decisions that affect them is a key ingredient in the process of improving living standards’ and asserts that “In successful countries, policy-making has been embedded in consultative processes, which provide civil society, labour unions, and private firms opportunities for input and oversight” (World Bank, 1997:8 and 11). Furthermore, as Stiglitz (1999) argues, “participation does not refer simply to voting. Participatory processes must entail open dialogue and broadly active civic engagement, and it requires that individuals have a voice in the decisions that affect them.” Restricted participation in the policy-making process weakens the legitimacy, accountability and the quality of decision-making.

The neo-liberal tenants of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s argued that participatory processes inhibited the kind of quick decision-making and insulated policy-making required for rapid and radical economic change. Indeed, open, transparent and participatory processes may result in delay. But it is increasingly being recognised that by making change more acceptable and more accepted, genuine participation in decision-making dissipate much of the resistance to change. By anchoring a culture of negotiation and compromise, participation also helps to build coalitions of support for change and ultimately a consensus on policy reforms that will sustain policy reforms. Participation in public policy-making is central not so much to the initiation of reforms but for their sustainability. The policy process is as important as policy outcomes.

Ultimately, the efficiency of public policies is contingent on the legitimacy of the decision-making process. Its foundations are the quality of social capital and the extension of social trust and cohesion. The World Bank’s World Development Report of 2000-2001 on attacking poverty emphasises the centrality of social capital and empowerment. In recent years, the World Bank has indeed been positioning itself as a “knowledge bank”, sharing critical knowledge for development through a variety of learning instruments. As Dankwart Rustow (1968:51) has noted, “democracy arises through conflict and compromise but survives by virtue of growing consensus”.

Furthermore, decentralisation of state structures and responsibilities should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the state by bringing decision-making closer to the people and furthering the opportunities for effective participation. Decentralisation and local self-governance is especially high on the political agenda of multilateral development banks, especially in Latin America. Most Latin American democracies have federal structures. A particular thrust in the current efforts at reforming and modernising the state centres on the decentralisation and devolution of power (World Bank, 1999a and b; IDB, 1997).

Decentralisation requires changing the system of governance and establishing new political, fiscal, regulatory and administrative institutions. Like the federalism and local autonomy, decentralisation is often politically motivated and responds to calls for political pluralism, self-government and greater participation in policy formulation. It is believed that the effectiveness of public policies is increased by bringing them closer to the people and thus enhancing their relevance. Furthermore, it increases the accountability of public officials beyond elections by institutionalising mechanisms of oversight and control. It results in a redistribution of power within the country by deconcentrating power and delegating authority from the central to lower levels of government.

Decentralisation, however, raises complex institutional and policy issues that governments will face in coming decades. In particular, decentralisation is not the answer to all political ills and administrative
deficiencies. Indeed, efficient decentralisation often requires a strong, capable central state to be a source of regulation and to be responsible for the equitable redistribution of resources and the delivery of social services. Decentralising weak states may compound the problems, rather than solve them. Small island states may indeed not require decentralised states. Ultimately, a balance has to be found between decentralisation, deconcentration and devolution.

Synchronising political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation and institutionalising an adequate balance of power between the national and local levels of government represent major difficulties. The challenge is to find the right division of labour and responsibilities between the different tiers of authority. This requires rules that both protect and limit the rights of sub-national governments. A corresponding transfer of resources must match the transfer of responsibilities, as local governments often lack the administrative and financial capacities to assume their new responsibilities. At the structural level, there must be coherent and consistent rules regulating the division of responsibilities, functions and resources between the different levels of government and governing the relations between the central and sub-national governments. Indeed, while the concept of decentralisation is a sound one and can result in a more responsive and efficient local government, problems may arise in the way it is implemented and, if handled poorly, may threaten macro-economic stability. Fiscal decentralisation and its effects on public deficits are of particular concern. In many Latin American countries imperfect rules regulating fiscal policies of the federal and state governments have generated large government deficits, for example spawning the 1999 Brazil financial crisis, when the state of Minas Gerais defaulted on its debt.

**Preliminary Conclusions on an Evolving Concept**

*Ultimately, the concept of democratic governance refers not only to the institutions of government and the structure of the state but also to the principles framing the process of governing the polity, recasting the relations between the state and civil society. These include in particular the notions of inclusion and participation, accountability and transparency, responsibility and responsiveness, as well as effectiveness and efficiency. According to the Institute on Governance, governance thus comprises “the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern”.*  

Concerns over good governance in developing countries have resulted in a broadening of the understanding of the development process and have significantly influenced the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions (Santiso, 2000c). The recognition that both consolidating democracy and sustaining economic reform require improving governance systems, enhancing the rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions has led to an increasing convergence between the economic and the political approach to development.

A good governance system puts further requirements on the process of decision-making and public policy formulation. It extends beyond the capacity of public sector management to the rules and institutions that create a legitimate, effective and efficient framework for the formulation and conduct of public policy. It implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory and equitable manner showing due regard for democratic principles. It entails the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, and effective oversight agencies.

In particular, the realisation of the intricate links between economic reform and political liberalisation has led to reassessment of the role of the state and governing institutions in the development process,

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especially in the second stage of economic reforms (Naím, 1995a and 1995b). The emerging governance agenda is indeed amending the traditional neo-liberal precepts of the Washington consensus by underscoring the role of public institutions (Williamson, 1990, 1993, 1997; Burki and Perry, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998a). A state that is effective, efficient and capable is required to guarantee public security and the rule of law, necessary conditions for both economic development and democratisation. But the rehabilitation of the state does not mean a return to the tradition of arbitrary authoritarian states and strong unchecked governments. It calls for the emergence of a reformed state, governed by the rules of legitimacy, transparency, accountability and responsibility.

There are many conceptual and operational overlaps between the democracy agenda and the governance agenda within the international development community. To a large extent, democracy and good governance are two complementary and interdependent concepts. Both look at the reform of political systems, institutional structures and governing processes in developing and transitional countries, the former from the political perspective and the latter from an economic perspective. Beyond traditional approaches to the modernisation of public administration and public sector management, they address key aspects of the reform of the state, namely its capability and its legitimacy. They are concerned with reliability and predictability, openness and transparency, accountability, as well as efficiency and effectiveness of public policy. Aiding democracy and good governance differ not so much in substance, but in emphasis.

The current debate on democracy, good governance and aid effectiveness (World Bank, 1998; Santiso, 2001b and 2000b) is certainly re-focusing the attention on the necessity to reform and modernise the state and strengthen democratic institutions to achieve sustainable development. However, whether the new emphasis on democracy and good governance has facilitated or induced the emergence of a “democratic development state” in emergent democracies – as opposed to a “predatory state” – is a question open to further inquiry (Sklar, 1996, 1997; White, 1998). As Robinson and White show, there is scope for continuous political intervention in the design of democratic institutions that shape the context of state-led development initiatives (Robinson and White, 1998).

As UNESCO-MOST underscores,

“Governance can be a useful social science approach insofar as it devises new techniques for managing joint affairs. Constant innovation is needed to discover more sustainable options for future development. Partnerships and civic engagement are crucial in stimulating innovation, as part of decentralisation, devolution, participation and empowerment. Integrative strategies are required across local and central governments to create linkages between key policy areas (education, culture and science policies).”

A fundamental lesson learned of a decade of democracy assistance and governance support suggests that external efforts can have a real influence in the shape and direction of democratisation. They most often do so in subtle but significant ways, by facilitating political dialogue between polarised actors, fostering consensus and compromise, influencing the contours of the political debate, delineating the contents of the reform agenda and changing the incentive structure. It must be accepted that many of the most important results of democracy programmes are intangible, indirect, and time-delayed, “their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change people’s behaviour” (Carothers, 1999:341). Thus, learning, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing programmes are of critical importance.

17 http://www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/Governance.htm

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III - International Organizations

The United Nations System

The United Nations system is critically involved in the promotion of democratic governance and peacemaking, in particular in the context of its peace and security tasks (peace-keeping operations and electoral assistance) and economic and social development endeavours (post-conflict peacemaking as well as longer term development work).

Within the United Nations Secretariat, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the Department of Political Affairs co-ordinates electoral assistance and observation missions. Capacity-building and training are an integral part of its long-term electoral assistance efforts, especially that of national election monitors and electoral commission administrators. These forms of assistance, often but not always undertaken in the context of a larger UN peace operation, underscore the importance of building the domestic observation capacity by supporting the activities of civil society to monitor elections on a non-partisan basis. Following a government request, technical assistance (e.g. training, advisory assistance) may be provided to a national network of domestic monitoring groups sponsored by local non-partisan, civic organizations (www.un.org/ead).

The Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) co-ordinates the activities in the field of economic and social development, undertakes policy research and occasionally undertakes capacity-building and learning initiatives, especially in the field of public sector reform. In particular, the mission of its Division for Public Economics and Public Administration (DPEPA) is “to ensure that the governance systems, administrative and financial institutions, policy development processes and the human resources of the Member States function in an effective, participatory and transparent manner by fostering dialogues, promoting the sharing of information and knowledge and providing technical assistance” (http://www.unpan.org/dpepa.asp).

It provides strategic policy advice and technical assistance in its core thematic areas, which include public economics and public policies, governance systems and institutions, civil service reform, as well as public finance. In collaboration with the UN regional economic commission and international public administration institutes (such as the European Institute for Public Administration http://www.eipa.nl, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences http://www.iiasisa.be/iias/aiacc.htm, the Arab Administrative Development Organization http://www.arado.org or the Latin American Centre for Development Administration http://www.clad.org.ve), it organizes a wide range of training programmes in public sector reform.

In that regard, the mission of United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance (UNPAN) is to “promote the sharing of knowledge, experiences and best practices throughout the world in sound public policies, effective public administration and efficient civil services, through capacity-building and co-operation among Member States, with emphasis on south-south co-operation and UNPAN’s commitment to integrity and excellence” (http://www.unpan.org). Most of the services are provided “online” (such as training and advisory services), using modern information technologies, and target senior public officials. For example, in Morocco, September 2001, it organized a Regional Workshop on Capacity-Building in Electoral Administration in Africa. The United Nations Thessaloniki Centre for Public Service Professionalism supports and promotes the modernisation of administrative systems in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, including CIS, through policy advice and intensive personnel training.
The **UN regional economic commissions** principally undertake policy research and provide advisory services in the form of technical assistance. They have developed a series of training programmes in the areas of democratic governance, focusing on public sector reform and project cycle management. The commissions include the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) [http://www.escwa.org.lb](http://www.escwa.org.lb), the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) [http://www.eclac.org](http://www.eclac.org), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) [http://www.unece.org](http://www.unece.org) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) [http://www.unescap.org](http://www.unescap.org).

The **UN Economic Commission for Africa** (UNECA), [http://www.uneca.org](http://www.uneca.org), has developed a programme on Civil Society Participation in Development and Governance designed to enhance civil society participation in development and governance. The areas of focus include the establishment of the resource centre for institutional development and capacity-building for African NGOs, fostering dialogue between government and civil society, capacity-building in civil society for conflict prevention and peace-building, and promoting democratic pluralism. Mainly targeting senior civil servants and members of civil society organizations, events organized include a workshop on decentralisation (1998), a series of conferences on governance and development – with the Global Coalition for Africa and the African Union (1998) as well as the Africa Governance Forum – in co-operation with UNDP (1998).

Among the various agencies and programmes, the **United Nations Development Programme** (UNDP), and in particular the Management and Governance Network (magnet), has been particularly active in the area of democratic governance (UNDP, 1997a and b), and in particular in post-conflict situations. Democratic governance has been identified as a core component of its mandate in 1999 by the reform launched by the newly appointed administrator, Mark Malloch-Brown (UNDP, 1999; Santiso, 2001a and forthcoming). In 1994, the Executive Board of UNDP decided that the organization’s future activities should take place within the framework of the sustainable human development concept. While the alleviation of poverty remains the organization’s main mission, the landmark legislation passed by UNDP’s governing board in 1994, and 1995 identified democracy and governance assistance as a core mission of the organization (Executive Board decisions 94/14, 95/22 and subsequent amendments). In January 1997, UNDP adopted a governance policy, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development* in which it embraced a broad and openly political definition of good governance, which included the nature of the political regime.

At the operational level, the establishment of specialised administrative units accompanied the introduction of the democratic governance in UNDP’s core mission. In 1994, the Emergency Response Division (ERD) was created to serve as a focal point for the accumulation and sharing of knowledge in post-conflict reconstruction within UNDP. Building on the activities of the Management Development Programme, started in 1989, the Management Development and Governance Division (MDGD) was established in 1995 within the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) to respond to increasing demands on UNDP for technical assistance in governance and management development. In 2001-02, UNDP plans to establish a new resource facility on democratic governance in Oslo, Norway.

From 1994 until 1997 resources totalling nearly US$1.3 billion were allocated for democracy and governance and public resources management programmes, representing over one-half of the total programming resources for this period. In regional terms, approximately 70% of the funds are allocated to national-level activities, 20% to regional endeavours and 10% to global work. Latin America and the Caribbean received nearly 50% of UNDP funding for democracy and governance, 90% of which was provided through cost-sharing arrangements. International donors have indeed channelled most of their assistance to key democratic institutions through UNDP.
The Management Development and Governance Division (MDGD) thematic areas include: governing institutions (legislatures, legal and judicial systems and electoral bodies); institution building; parliamentary reform; electoral assistance; human rights; decentralised governance; public sector management, accountability and transparency; civil service reform; governance in crisis countries. They have also established a Management and Governance Network (MagNet) website (http://magnet.undp.org/). MDGD co-ordinate technical assistance programmes in those areas as well as technical conference and workshops, such as From Government to Governance: Moving into the 21st Century (Manila, the Philippines, June 1999). The UNDP Country Offices – the UNDP Resident Representatives now co-ordinate UN in-country activities since the reform of the United Nations system in July 1997 – organize a wide range of activities, technical assistance, workshops and seminars on the different aspects of democratic governance at the country level. The analysis of such activities goes beyond the scope of this study, but they are generally either standard technical assistance projects or series of conferences, seminars or workshops (although some country offices may show greater innovation).

The Regional Bureaux of UNDP have also developed regional thematic programmes in the area of democratic governance and have developed a series of innovative learning and capacity-building initiatives. For example, at the regional level, UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin American and the Caribbean has established partnerships with the Barcelona-based International Institute on Governance (see below under research and training organizations). Such an initiative has not yet been developed by other regional bureaux and might be an interesting avenue to pursue further in the context of the establishment of a UNDP-wide governance resource centre (the “Olso Centre”).

The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) http://www.unv.org, which provides volunteers for UN peace operations and development work, especially electoral observers, is currently investigating its potential contribution in the wider field of democratic governance, although it does not have a coherent democratic governance learning programme yet. Similarly, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) http://www.unops.org, the largest provider of project-management services to the United Nations, provides services for the management of multidisciplinary programmes. In the area of democratisation and governance, UNOPS is providing services valued at more than US$ 100 million for over 300 projects and programmes funded by UNDP, UN system agencies, and other multilateral and bilateral partners.

As democratic governance has become a core component of the United Nations’ mandate, one could have expected that its educational and training specialised agencies would have developed comprehensive and global programmes in the area of learning, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing for democratic governance. This is not the case, however.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has several departments in charge of democracy and governance issues, such as the Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, as well as the Towards a Culture of Peace Programme (which became in 2000 the Global Movement for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence). The Management of Social Transformations Programme (MOST) has developed a series of initiatives in the area of globalisation and governance with a focus on civil society involvement, such as a conference on NGOs

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18 UNDP Bangladesh governance programme for 1999-2002 for instance amounts to US$ 28 million and covers a wide range of activities such as democratization – strengthening democratic institutions and processes such as Parliament, electoral processes and administration; human rights; electoral assistance and observation; transparency and accountability – building change management capacity in the government to initiate and promote public administration reforms, strengthening the Office of Comptroller & Auditor General for greater financial transparency and accountability; and institution building. http://www.un-bd.org/undp/
and Governance in the Arab World (2000) or Governance and Democracy in Mexico (2001). The strategy employed relies on policy research and thematic workshops.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) is an autonomous body within the United Nations with a mandate to enhance the effectiveness of the UN through training and research. To meet this aim, UNITAR provides training and research, in collaboration with other UN agencies, governments and non-governmental organizations for the development and implementation of training and capacity-building programmes. Since 1993, in co-operation with the International Peace Academy (IPA), it organizes a Fellowship Programme in Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy with the objective of providing advanced training to staff from the United Nations, regional organizations and foreign ministries. The programme has gained a reputation for excellence by combining conceptual and operational focuses, as well as concrete case studies. In collaboration with the Centre International de Formation des Acteurs Locaux (CIFAL), it has developed an innovative programme on decentralised cooperation targeting both senior civil servants and the public at the local level. Nevertheless, UNITAR does not have a training and capacity-building programme on democratic governance per se.

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), http://www.unrisd.org, is an autonomous agency that carries out research on the social dimensions of contemporary problems affecting development. Through its research, UNRISD stimulates dialogue and contributes to policy debates on key issues of social development within and outside the United Nations system. UNRISD has developed a series of innovative and timely policy research projects in the area of democracy and good governance as well as civil society and social movements – such as the project on Technocratic Policy-making and Democratisation (since 1999), Public Sector Reform and Crisis-Ridden States (since 1998) and Urban Governance (since 1999). UNRISD, however, does not carry out training and capacity-building programmes.

The United Nations University (UNU) http://www.unu.edu is a system of organizations and programmes. It includes the Peace and Governance Programme (http://www.unu.edu/p&g) undertakes policy research and co-ordinates traditional international teaching courses on international peace and governance at its centre in Tokyo, Japan (one month every semester). UNU and UNESCO are jointly organising international courses (such as one on Biodiversity in Mangrove Ecosystems in 2002). The Institute of Advanced Studies of the United Nations University (UNU/IAS) is a research and training centre also located in Tokyo, Japan. Its programmes are directed at pressing global issues of concern to the United Nations, making use of advanced research methodologies, but do not include a focus on democratic governance. Lastly, the United Nations University Leadership Academy (UNU/LA), http://www.unu.edu/la/index.htm, organizes a series of short leadership courses in Amman, Jordan, specifically targeted at emerging leaders in developing and transitional countries (within the UN agencies, national governments, civil society organizations, academia and the armed forces), using the standard format of executive education training – such as Leadership for Post-conflict Peace-building (2000) or Civil Society and Leadership (1998).

The United Nations University of Peace (http://www.uppeace.org), with headquarters in Costa Rica, is an international institution of higher education for peace created by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 35/55, in December 1980. It offers training courses (in situ and of short-term duration) in several locations around the world – in general in collaboration with other education institutions – and higher education programmes.

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The World Bank Group and Regional Development Banks

In recent years, the World Bank has placed greater emphasis on education, learning and capacity-building, positioning itself as a knowledge bank (http://www.worldbank.org/knowledgebank/), resorting to e-learning instruments to share knowledge, build capacity and develop learning programmes.

It has established a Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) to enhance its distance and e-learning capabilities by linking decision-makers around the globe through telecommunications systems, as participants in global learning activities in 15 distance-learning centres (http://www.worldbank.org/gdln/). Centres use interactive television, the Internet, and related technologies to both originate and receive learning programs. It supports research, networking, and communities of practice through the Global Development Gateway (http://www.developmentgateway.org/), a web portal on development issues. The Global Development Network (http://www.gdnet.org/), established under the aegis of the World Bank in 1999, links research and policy and fosters collaborative work among research institutes, policy-makers, and donors to encourage capacity-building, networking, and knowledge creation in critical research areas. The Global Knowledge Partnership (http://www.globalknowledge.org) is an evolving informal partnership of public, private, and not-for-profit organizations in both developing and industrial countries. Its members are committed to sharing information, experiences, and resources to promote broad access to—and effective use of—knowledge and information as tools of sustainable development. Members co-operate in a variety of ways-through pilot projects, learning events, capacity-building, information sharing, and project co-ordination. The World Bank Group’s Knowledge Sharing Network (http://www.worldbank.org/ks) supports more than one hundred thematic communities of practice, comprising Bank staff and development partners who share a common area of expertise or interest. These groups provide advisory services, statistical databases, good practice notes, and other materials to connect people who have key development knowledge to those who need it, both inside and outside the Bank. The Development Forum (http://www.worldbank.org/devforum) is an electronic venue for dialogue and knowledge sharing on key issues and challenges facing the development community.

In that context, a particularly innovative and promising initiative, launched in 1997, is the African Virtual University (AVU), http://www.avu.org/, which uses modern information and communication technologies to implement education programmes. AVU has provided students and professionals in 15 African countries over 2,500 hours of interactive instruction in English and in French. More than 12,000 students have completed semester-long courses in engineering and in the sciences and over 2,500 professionals have attended executive and professional management seminars on topics such as Strategy and Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Global Competencies. It has thus far developed a portfolio of courses in technical areas, but not in the areas of democratisation and governance reform.

Within the World Bank Group, the Public Sector Group of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) is the main anchor for governance work throughout the World Bank’s regional departments (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector). The PREM Network is itself subdivided into four “families” or sectoral clusters (themselves subdivided in thematic groups). About 200 professionals work on governance and public sector reform in the various regional department and anchor PREM units, and in Development Research Group (DRG) and World Bank Institute (WBI), and their work is overseen by the Public Sector Board. The Public Sector Board’s areas of responsibility are:

- Governance, including the planning and implementation of the World Bank’s anticorruption agenda;
- Public finance, including the World Bank’s microeconomic work in public expenditure analysis and tax policy; and
Public sector institutional reform, including public expenditure analysis and management; tax policy and administration; civil service and administrative reform; legal and judicial reform (together with the legal department); decentralization; e-government; technical assistance and capacity-building).

In that context, most learning and capacity-building activities are conducted and co-ordinated by the Governance Team of the World Bank Institute (WBI). The WBI conducts policy research on governance issues, and in particular corruption and state capture, and compiles innovative diagnostic survey data and quantitative governance indicators. It has also developed a series of “learning products” based on “e-learning” techniques, using mainly web-based instruments such as video conferencing and virtual teaching instruments. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/.

Anti-corruption courses include (i) the anti-corruption core course and (ii) the national anti-corruption programmes. The Anti-Corruption Core Course, “Controlling Corruption: Towards an Integrated Strategy”, is aimed at mid- to senior-level policy-makers and public officials, legislators as well as representatives from the civil society (including the media) and the private sector. Its primary goal is to provide the tools for developing, preparing and implementing programmes to fight corruption and improve governance, as well as to provide a forum for the exchange of experiences of successful (and unsuccessful) practices and reforms. A variety of instructional activities, including lectures, working groups, panels, and a field visit, are used to teach the participants the methods to initiate, prepare, and implement a participatory strategy of institutional reforms.

Africa Core Course: The first pilot course comprising seven African country teams was conducted in 1999 and consisted of four phases. These included a standard executive training module in Washington (June 1998), followed by a distance-learning module (July 1998), the development of an action programme for the International Conference Against Corruption in Durban, South Africa (September – October 1999) and the implementation phase starting in November 1999. The first module included 16 sessions spanning over 5 days. The overall programme is co-ordinated by a senior official of the WBI and each session was conducted by a speaker or moderator. The faculty includes academics and practitioners involved in different facets of anti-corruption. The resource team included 20 WBI and outside experts.

These sessions focused on:

- Day 1: Impact and how corruption affects your country, including: Session 1) Introduction, Welcome and Keynote speech; Session 2) Overview of an action programme and participant expectations; Session 3) Designing anti-corruption programs: The participants’ experience; Session 4) Why combat corruption?; Session 5) Initiating a programme to fight corruption.
- Day 2: Impact and how corruption affects your country, including: Session 6) Diagnostics: Overview of survey approach; Session 7) Diagnostics: Expert assessment; and Session 8) From diagnostics to design.
- Day 3: Coalition-building, including: Session 9) Involvement processes: civil society, private sector, parliament and the media; Session 10) Anti-corruption institutions and agencies: role, impact, and who should run them; Session 11) Political will; and Session 12) Revision of the action plan.

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Day 4: Agency-specific surveys and monitoring strategies, including: Session 13) Agency-specific surveys and other tools; Session 14) Monitoring techniques; Session 15) Final integration and summary.

Day 5: Field visit and closing of the first phase, including: Session 16) Enforcement Agencies.

The second phase of the programme focused on institutional reforms. It was delivered during a four-week span, with two distance learning events each week. Four key subject areas were covered: Rule of Law, Financial Management and Procurement, Civil Service Reform and Customs Reform. The modules focused on crucial aspects of anti-corruption. Each module followed a given structure: first, a case study was presented, then small group discussions followed. The participants were then expected to incorporate new insights about causes, tools, policy actions, policy impact and expected results into the matrix they initiated in Phase I. Each country team is supported by experts who will travel to the participating countries to facilitate the action programme design. Finally, the matrices are presented and discussed. The modules are the following:

- **Module 1: Rule of Law**, including Session 1) Case study presentation; Session 2) Presentations of the matrices.
- **Module 2: Financial Management and Procurement**, including: Session 1) Financial Management; Session 2) Procurement; Session 3) Presentations of the matrices.
- **Module 3: Customs reform**, including: Session 1) Customs Reform; Session 2) Presentations of the action plans.
- **Module 4: Civil service reform**, including: Session 1) Case Study on Civil Service Reform; Session 2) Presentations of the matrices.
- **Module 5: Post-Session Modules on anti-corruption.**

Lastly, the third phase involved the organization of a workshop in which the participants had the opportunity to present and discuss the comprehensive action programme they have developed throughout the course.

In 2001, the same model was used to develop the **Latin America Core Course**, including a standard executive education module in Washington (June 2001), a distance-learning module (June – September 2001), and the development of national action programmes for the International Conference Against Corruption in Prague, Czech Republic (October 2001). Participatory workshops for Latin American countries were also used to prepare action programs. Participants, selected from their countries to represent key governmental and civil society organizations dedicated to anti-corruption, work together as teams through the process of designing an anti-corruption strategy and discussing the challenges of integrating the participatory process with concrete institutional reforms.

The WBI’s Governance Team also develops tailor-made **National Anti-Corruption Programmes** which focus on helping stakeholders diagnose institutional vulnerabilities, build consensus and enhance the executive-legislative interface, design reform action programmes to address these vulnerabilities, and form coalitions to implement and sustain these reforms. Country-specific conditions and circumstances are paramount in this program. Therefore, there is no single formula or set of instruments. This, the main purpose of these anticorruption courses is to assist countries to develop their own anti-corruption strategies by combining and blending together technical assistance, policy advise and learning instruments. The WBI has several thematic learning programmes, such as the parliamentary, journalism, justice reform or public sector reform programmes. These are primarily aimed at providing policy advise and technical assistance to middle and senior level policy-makers through e-learning instruments which to not require the physical presence of the participants.
The Parliamentary Programme, for instance, aims at enhancing the executive-legislative interface and strengthening parliamentary oversight. The programme has two main sub-programmes the Government Accountability and Parliamentary Oversight and the Parliaments, Participation and Policy Reduction (PRSP). Designed primarily for members of the public accounts and finance and budget committees and their staff, together with representatives from supreme audit institutions and other watchdog agencies, the executive and civil society, the objective of the Government Accountability and Parliamentary Oversight sub-programme is to improve government accountability through parliamentary oversight. This sub-programme is being offered in up to 12 countries worldwide, where WBI makes a 2–3 year commitment to strengthen parliamentary committees, as part of a larger World Bank commitment to improve governance. This sub-programme has multiple elements, including an in-country workshop for committee members, with a focus on policy and process issues and the development of strategic work plans; a video conferencing component; and a parallel distance-learning component (three hours per week for six weeks) for parliamentary staff. The programmes are implemented in collaboration with national and international partners, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Union (http://www.comparlhq.org.uk/), Parliamentary Centre (http://parlcent.parl.gc.ca/) or the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org).

The National and Regional Investigative Journalism Programmes aim to strengthen the capacity of the media in promoting accountability. Upcoming or ongoing in several countries, these programmes build on the face-to-face introductory and advanced workshops that have been offered over the past four years, and offer a 30-hour course that will take place once a week for 10 weeks following an integrated method using traditional distance-learning instruments such as video conferences whilst investigating the feasibility of developing an internet-based virtual learning course.

The Legal and Judicial Reform Programme is a six-week course delivered through distance-learning. The first iteration of this course in Asia involved Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, The Philippines and Thailand in and took place in 2001. It was entitled Judicial Reform: Improving Performance and Accountability in Asia and used traditional distance learning instruments such as video conferencing and internet-based instruments. The course was held between 24 April and 5 June and was offered for three hours every Tuesday. There was an expert country facilitator for each country targeted, an overall programme co-ordinator, five task managers and an IT co-ordinator. The weekly sessions focused on 1) appointment and promotion of judges; 2) discipline and removal; 3) case management and other procedural reforms; 4) independence and accountability; 5) empirical research for judicial reform; and 6) controlling corruption. Each session had a speaker and moderator.

The Corporate Responsibility and Business Ethics Course helps businesses and policy-makers develop an integrated approach to learning in the field of corporate responsibilities and business ethics. At the country level, this integrated approach assists with the design and implementation of policy measures and initiatives that support sound corporate responsibility and business ethics, and thus help to promote transparency and ethical values, and to fight poverty and corruption. From August 19 to October 10, an e-conference on “Responsible Globalization – Global Business Conduct Standards” was organized and in June 2000 a seminar on governance and business practices was also conducted.

The 2001 Financial Sector Learning Programme (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/banking/) offers 33 specialised activities that cover Banking Systems (8), Capital Markets (5), Financial Sector Policy (9),

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Housing and Finance (1), Insurance and Contractual Savings (4), Payment Systems (3), and Rural and Microfinance and SMEs (3). The programme is designed to meet the needs of senior decision-makers from Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, and regulatory agencies, as well as other practitioners. It utilises improved learning techniques that remove time and space limitations, including distance learning, e-learning, self-paced, web-based learning tools, CD-ROMs, and video libraries.

The objectives of the Municipal Governance course are to disseminate best practices in anti-corruption at the municipal level and provide a structured platform for municipal officials and citizens to learn specific anti-corruption strategies, which can be adapted and applied to their municipalities. The programme will be developed over a period of five weeks through video-conference during which time a core set of skills will be covered in 10 modules (2 modules per week). In addition to these modules the course will be supported by a fully interactive website which will provide support to the municipalities interested in applying the lessons learned during the course. A particularly innovative initiative has been designed by the Tecnológico de Monterrey (Mexico), which set up a Virtual University for distance-learning. It organizes, in collaboration with the WBI and the International Union of Local Authorities (http://www.iula.org/) a seminar on municipal public administration which is given every year during a 3-month period (http://www.ruviitesm.mx/programas/seminario/).

The Public Sector Reform Course offers training and dissemination programmes to improve the functioning of government at all levels and thus to enhance its performance. Civil service reform traditionally looks at personnel management, improved organizations and structures, and general capacity-building. Consideration is being given to commencing work in the area of managing the senior civil service. Further, WBI is aiming to develop a regional course in the area of performance management (sometimes referred to as results based management). The course would assist countries with developing performance measures and evaluation techniques, and linking them with decision-making processes of which the budget is a major vehicle.

Regional development banks have not yet developed learning instruments as refined as those of the World Bank. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) http://www.ebrd.org is essentially involved in project financing, economic research and technical assistance in East and Central Europe and the CIS. The African Development Bank (AfDB) http://www.afdb.org recently has articulated a governance policy but has not yet developed regional learning initiatives in that area. The Asian Development Bank (AsDB) http://www.adb.org adopted its governance policy in 1995 (as well as an anti-corruption policy in 1998) and has since implemented a portfolio of project in this area, mainly in the form of technical assistance (http://www.adb.org/Governance/default.asp). It has established a 70-member Governance and Public Management Learning Group to assist bank staff in designing governance operations. It is currently undergoing internal reorganization. The Asian Development Bank Institute (ASDI) was established in December 1997 to, amongst other things, “improve the capacity for sound management of the agencies and organizations in developing member countries (DMCs) engaged in development work” (http://www.adbi.org/). In that context, capacity-building and training programmes have been developed, in particular policy seminars and workshops in public sector governance (public administration reform and public expenditure management), targeted to middle- to senior-level officials from ADB member countries. More recently, the AsDB established the Asian Policy Forum, a network of research institutions in Asia. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) http://www.iadb.org has articulated a governance policy in 1996 and established an anchor department on the State, Governance and Civil Society aimed at assisting and advising the IDB’s expanding governance portfolio. The Inter-American Institute for Social Development (INDES) http://www.iadb.org/indes/ has developed a series of national and regional training programmes in the broad area of social development. Its core courses on social development are held four times a year at the INDES training centre in Washington.
International Monetary Fund

In the purview of its mandate, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) http://www.imf.org provides technical assistance in three broad areas: (i) design and implementation of fiscal and monetary policies; (ii) institution building, such as the development of central banks, treasuries, tax and customs departments, and statistical services; and (iii) drafting and review of economic and financial legislation.

The IMF Institute (http://www.imf.org/external/np/ins/english/index.htm) is responsible for training. Its mission is to provide training in macroeconomic analysis and policy for officials of the IMF’s member countries and for Fund staff. The training of officials is delivered in four languages at the IMF headquarters in Washington and in six regional training programmes world-wide. In January 2000, the IMF Institute added its first distance-learning course to its training programme – Financial Programming and Policies. It is also developing a second distance-learning course that will review macroeconomic concepts used in all IMF Institute courses.

The various training programmes are focused on public finance, and fiscal and monetary policy management, and are specifically designed for and targeted at middle and senior civil servants in the government or central bank.

Regional Organizations

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) http://www.oecd.org includes a series of organizations with specific mandates in the broad field of development and development assistance: the Development Centre on research on governance and development issues and the facilitation of informal dialogue between policy-makers, academics, the business community and civil society; the Public Management Programme (PUMA) focusing on public governance and public sector reform; and the Centre for Co-operation with Non Members (CCNM) on economic and social matters in non-member countries. In 2001, the Sahel and West Africa Club (formerly the Club du Sahel) adopted a new strategy focusing on regional integration, local governance and decentralisation. They are mainly engaged in democracy and good governance programmes, primarily concerning technical assistance in nature, including the organization of policy research projects, the review of development co-operation policies, and high-level conferences, workshops and seminars. However, training and capacity-building per se are not within the purview of the OECD mandate.

In particular the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a key forum for the co-ordination of development aid policies of its 22 member countries. The DAC Network on Good Governance and Capacity Development (GOVNET) is an international forum that brings together practitioners of development co-operation agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as experts from partner countries to share their experience, identify best practices and provide guidance to the DAC in these areas.

23 At the Joint Regional Training Centre for Latin America in Brazil; the IMF-AMF Regional Training Program in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates); the Joint Africa Institute in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; the IMF-Singapore Regional Training Institute in Singapore; the Joint China-IMF Training Program; and at the Joint Vienna Institute in Vienna, Austria (a joint training facility of the IMF, EBRD, BIS, IBRD, WTO, and OECD).
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) http://www.osce.org/odihr/ is the principal institution of the OSCE responsible for the human dimension. This means the ODIHR works to help OSCE participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and . . . to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (1992 Helsinki Document). Since its establishment in 1992 (previously known as the Office of Free Elections under the Charter of Paris of 1990), it has developed a wide range of programmes in two broad areas: (i) electoral observation and (ii) democratisation. It monitors elections and provides technical assistance and training in the field of electoral management and observation in the OSCE area (in particular to domestic observers – such as the 2001 Domestic Observation Capacity-Building Project – and national electoral management bodies). In the area of support to democratisation, it now runs programmes of assistance to develop democratic structures and to promote rule of law, civil society, democratic election processes and equality between women and men. In 2000, the ODIHR implemented more than 100 projects in over 20 countries in close co-operation with OSCE missions and field offices, other OSCE institutions, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. In 1999, it launched a grassroots initiative to encourage the development of small-scale democratisation projects. Although it regularly engages in policy research and convenes international conferences, it has not developed a learning programme in democratic governance.

The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) of the Organization of American States (OAS) http://www.upd.oas.org/ is the principal body within the General Secretariat of the OAS responsible for activities in support of democratic consolidation in the member states. The Unit was created in 1990 to provide guidance and support to the member states to strengthen their democratic institutions and procedures. It has several programmatic areas: (i) strengthening of democratic institutions (including legislative strengthening, support to decentralisation and the promotion of democratic values and practices); (ii) electoral technical assistance; (iii) information and dialogue; (iv) demining; and (v) special programmes such the co-ordination of special electoral observation missions, special post-conflict and democratic transition projects or the national programme on governance in Bolivia (PRONAGOB). It convenes high-level meetings and organizes conferences and seminars on democratic governance in the region. The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter underscores the centrality of both positive measures of support and inducement and negative measures of sanctions and membership suspension in the OAS democracy assistance strategy.

Since 1998, in co-operation with numerous renowned institutions, the UPD OAS has developed a programme of regional training courses to strengthen the knowledge of and commitment to democracy among young leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean. The UPD currently offers courses on: (i) Democratic Institutions, Values and Practices; (ii) Decentralisation and Local Governments; (iii) The Legislative Branch in Democracy; and (iv) Analysis and Negotiation of Political Conflicts. These courses are held annually in different countries within four regions: the Mercosur (member and associated countries); Central America and the Dominican Republic; the Andean Region; and the (English Speaking) Caribbean. Approximately 30 young leaders up to the age of 35, from diverse political parties, universities, non-governmental organizations, and the media, participate in each course. The methodology generally used is that of the traditional executive education (short, in situ education modules). For example, in collaboration with the University La Loja in Ecuador, the UPD organized its second regional course in the Andes on the logic of parliamentary democracy (http://www.utpl.edu.ec/cursoundino/), following the first regional course in Colombia in 2000. The course was held from 9-20 September 2001.

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(10 days) and was structured in six thematic modules.\(^25\) Two experts from the OAS and the UTPL assumed the overall co-ordination of the course and used outside experts occasionally to make presentations.

The UPD OAS and the IDB are currently establishing a Programme of Training Courses for Democratic Leaders (CALIDEM), designed as a hemispheric programme of national training courses aimed at strengthening the effective and democratic leadership. A fundamental element of the Programme is to identify, systematize, and integrate the vast amount of accumulated experiences throughout the region in education for a culture of democracy. The UPD, the executing agency, is currently convening bidding processes, ending in November 2001 and inviting national and regional institutions and organizations to present academic and financial proposals for the execution of national training courses. The programme is to run from 2001 until 2004 (http://www.upd.oas.org/cursos/calidem/).\(^26\)

The Council of Europe (CE) http://www.coe.int has the promotion of pluralist democracy, the rule of law, and human rights enshrined in its founding charter, the 1949 Treaty of London. Established in 1956, the Council of Europe Development Bank (COEDB) http://www.coebank.org provides credits and loans for social development and cohesion initiatives in Europe. In the context of the programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship (http://culture.coe.fr/edu/eng/edulist.html), the COE established the Democratic Leadership Programme for new democracies. For example, at the beginning of 1996, the COE started a specific assistance programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop human rights education. It holds annual summer schools for several hundred primary and secondary school teachers. Similarly, in June 1997, it organized a training seminar in political skills for young candidates for the local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina of September 1997 in its Youth Centre in Budapest, Hungary.

The European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity (the former North-South Centre of the Council of Europe) http://www.nscentre.org/ was established in 1990 in Lisbon, Portugal. It operates under the Directorate of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe. Its main purpose is raise the awareness on a series of challenges facing development and emergent democracies.

The International Institute for Democracy, officially an NGO housed by the Council of Europe, is a clearing-house for the dissemination of information on the current efforts of various organizations and institutions involved in promoting democracy. It conducts training seminars (an annual training seminar on European parliamentary assemblies and parliamentary practice and procedure takes place in Strasbourg) on, inter alia, budgetary procedure, the role of parliamentary committees, the public service and civil servant ethics. They are intended for staff from central and eastern European parliaments. The Institute occasionally organizes training activities in Central and Eastern European countries.

The Commonwealth pledged its commitment to democracy in 1991 (The Harare Commonwealth Declaration) and adopted a series of resolutions to respond to breaches of suspensions of democracy amongst its member states in 1995 (The Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, 1995). As a result, the Commonwealth Secretariat (http://www.thecommonwealth.org) has established a series of programmes aimed at promoting and protecting democracy, such as the monitoring of elections and the organization of technical workshops and seminars on issues critical for the prospects of democracy (inter alia on the role of opposition in 1998 or on accountability, scrutiny and oversight in

\(^{25}\) The modules included: Poder Legislativo y Democracia; Funciones Parlamentarias; El Parlamento y su Entorno; Ética y Política; La Modernización como una respuesta a la Crisis; La dimensión Parlamentaria de la Integración.

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The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC) provides funds for technical assistance projects in member countries in the fields of training and institution building, democritisation and public sector reform.

The 2000-03 work programme of the Commonwealth of Learning (COL), the distance-learning arm of the Commonwealth founded in 1987 http://www.col.org/, identifies governance and governance reform as priority areas for its training and capacity-building endeavours. The COL will not by itself deliver education and training in its four priority areas. Rather, it works through partners and associates. It develops its initiatives in response to the expressed needs of the Commonwealth’s 54 member governments.

Through grants and a range of programmes, the Commonwealth Foundation facilitates inter-country networking, training, capacity-building and information exchange (http://www.commonwealthfoundation.com/). It has recently adopted its multi-year planning covering the period 2001-03. Among the priorities identified is the Citizens and Governance Programme, an initiative resulting from the research and consultation study carried out between 1997 and 1999, the Civil Society in the New Millennium project. The objective of the Citizens and Governance Programme is to investigate the relationship between active citizenship and good governance. In the period 2001 to 2003, the programme will (a) identify a number of action and research initiatives; (b) provide advice and assistance; (c) conduct and disseminate policy-relevant research (recent research papers include Citizenship Learning, Re-framing Governance, and New Definitions of Civil Society); and (d) present to the 2003 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting a report on the lessons learned in the area of democratic governance. Specific projects include:

- Governance and Participation (Caribbean), an initiative of the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) which aims to identify best practice in civil society participation in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation and to promote citizens’ participation in governance more generally;
- An exposure/learning exchange programme on citizen engagement in governance among representatives from community-based organizations, NGOs and local government from six South Asian countries;
- The Toledo Civil Society (Belize) which is developing an initiative to establish working groups for good governance in all 74 communities of the Toledo District, and to establish mechanisms for monitoring government decision-making processes; and
- The Maori and Governance (Aotearoa/New Zealand), an initiative of Te Korowai Aroha Aotearoa (TKAA) involves a national meeting of Maori community leaders and ten local workshops for Maori, designed to provide citizenship education to Maori people; to help them assess the current means of governance in their own communities to determine whether they are meeting their needs; and to increase Maori participation in formulation of policy that impacts on their ability to exercise their own forms of governance.

The Foundation has established two strategic relationships with regional NGO bodies: Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO), a regional support organization for East and Southern Africa based in Zimbabwe (http://www.mwengo.org); and the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO, http://www.pasifika.net/piango).

The Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) http://www.francophonie.org adopted a declaration on democracy in Bamako in November 2000. The Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie (AIF) http://agence.francophonie.org/ implements a variety of programmes and projects in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, including technical assistance projects and
training activities (mainly in the form of conferences, seminars and workshops). The In 2000, the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) http://www.aupelf-uref.org/ adopted democratic governance and the rule of law as a core component of its activities and now supports research and teaching initiatives in those areas amongst its member universities. It has also developed a distance-learning programme on the rule of law co-ordinated by the Universities of Nantes and Paris-X Nanterre. The Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie (APF) conducts electoral observation missions and legislative strengthening programmes (http://www.francophonie.org/apf/)

Others

Although it does not conduct training and learning activities, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) http://www.idea.int, founded in 1995 by 22 democratic states from both the north and the south, develops learning tools and training modules in the areas of democratisation, elections, and conflict management (such as handbooks, manuals or training modules). For example, in co-operation with the United Nations and the International Foundation for Elections Systems, it established a comprehensive encyclopaedia on the Administration and Costs of Elections (ACE) http://www.aceproject.org.27 Several academic and civil society institutions are currently using this material for civic education. The Institute has also embarked upon, in collaboration with the Australian Election Commission (AEC), an ambitious project of curriculum development based on the ACE project that will be used in the professional development of electoral administrators. A trial curriculum is being piloted in East Timor in 2001.

27 Contact person: Therese Laanela, Senior Programme Officer, International IDEA. E-mail: tlaanela@idea.int, tel: 468 698 37 00 fax: 468 20 24 22.
IV - Governmental and Quasi-Governmental Organizations

In the course of the 1990s, the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance became a core objective of donor governments’ foreign and aid policies (Carothers, 1999; Burnell, 2000; Santiso, 2001c).

Bilateral Aid Agencies

Bilateral aid agencies have progressively integrated democracy and good governance in their aid policies and reformed their administrative structures accordingly. Democracy and governance now occupy an important place in the agendas of donor governments’ aid policies, which have significantly influenced and shaped the policies of multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In particular, several donors (such as Canada, the Netherlands or Denmark) have adopted a more selective approach, concentrating their aid on a limited number of countries according to the nature of their political regime and the quality of governance. The current debate on good governance, aid effectiveness and conditionality underscores the importance of good governance for enhancing development and improving the effectiveness of aid in a period of declining aid commitments (World Bank, 19998; Santiso, 2001b).

Bilateral aid agencies in general do not directly implement learning, training or capacity-building. They fund them through a number of selected partners, in particular international and domestic NGOs. Often, the tying of bilateral aid and the requirements in tendering procedures lead to the selection of national NGOs and consulting firms for the implementation of national aid budgets. Furthermore, it is to be noted that most ministries in donor countries (such as the ministries of education, justice, interior, etc.) as well as parliaments and advisory bodies have their own international co-operation policies, collaborating with their counterparts in developing countries, either on a bilateral basis or through multilateral forums.

For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) [http://www.usaid.gov/](http://www.usaid.gov/), the second largest bilateral donor in real terms in 2000 (after Japan) but the least generous in relative terms, has developed significant expertise and experience. Under the reform and reorganization of 2001, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance is one of the three pillar bureaux. To provide technical support in the field of democracy and governance to regional bureaux and country programmes, USAID established the Centre for Democracy and Governance (CDG) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994. The CDG supports and advances USAID’s democracy and governance programming world-wide, focusing on four main thematic areas: (i) the rule of law; (ii) elections and the political process; (iii) civil society; and (iv) governance. OTI focuses on the promotion of democracy and good governance in conflict-ridden and politically fragile countries (pre-, present and post-conflict societies), undertaking peace- and confidence-building activities, especially at the local, community level. Current programme countries include Colombia, East Timor, Indonesia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Nigeria, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Both the CDG and OTI concentrate on policy and strategy development, field support and technical assistance, and programme management. Training and capacity-building is generally implemented by US-based NGOs and consulting firms, some of them with special status and privilege relationships with USAID. These include the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) or the International Foundation for International Systems (IFES) (as well as significant number of private foundations such as Asia Foundation, Eurasia Foundation).
Similarly, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/), which is currently re-assessing its policies and strategies to strengthen aid effectiveness, has the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy, and good governance as well as support to civil society amongst its priorities. Its Policy Branch has a democracy and governance unit and it adopted a policy on democracy, human rights and governance in 1996. It works in partnership with NGOs such as the Commonwealth of Learning, the Institute on Governance, or the Parliamentary Centre, which implement learning and capacity-building programmes. Democratic governance is also a corporate objective of the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) [http://www.sida.se](http://www.sida.se). Sida adopted a strategy for its democracy and human rights strategy in 1993, replaced in 1997 by a wider approach to the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights. It also established a special department for democratic governance to assist the regional department in the design and implementation of democracy assistance programmes. In 1998, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs produced its own overarching democracy assistance policy. Sida sponsors a series of training programmes in Sweden (75 in 2001) financed by its International Training allocations, focusing on (i) conflict resolution; (ii) human rights; (iii) human rights of women; (iv) law and development; (v) journalism and democracy and women in journalism; (vi) parliamentary democracy; and (vii) rights of the child. These programmes adopt a standard executive-training format (in situ and short duration) and are generally implemented in partnership with NGOs, academic institutions or consultancy firms such as the Swedish NGO Foundation, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Lund University or the Swedish Institute for Public Administration.

Another example is the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom [http://www.dfid.gov.uk/](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/). Among the priorities identified by the 1997 White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, are spreading the values of civil liberties and democracy, rule of law and good governance, and fostering the growth of a vibrant and secure civil society. DFID has established an advisory Governance Department to assist regional departments and country operations. DFID funds a wide variety of capacity-building initiatives in developing countries, generally through local NGOs, as well as through British NGOs. In the field of democracy and good governance, privileged partners include the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the British Council and the Commonwealth Foundation. DFID has recently established a new distance learning initiative to train teachers, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa and currently being piloted in Rwanda and the Gambia (http://www.imfundo.org/index.htm).

### Political Foundations

In general, quasi- or non-governmental organizations and private foundations implement capacity-building programmes for democratic governance, with funding from aid agencies. The most widely known and used model is that of political foundations which mainly rely on standard executive-education programmes (in situ and of short duration) aimed at a variety of targeted audiences depending on the theme of the training (mainly mid- and senior-level policy-makers, judicial officials, parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, political party staff on civil society activities). There currently exist about 20 such democracy foundations (mainly in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Spain and Portugal) whose original aim was to support the development of affiliated political parties in democratising countries.

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30 A list of existing political foundations can be found at: [http://www.wmd.org/assfoundation/assl.html](http://www.wmd.org/assfoundation/assl.html). The party internationals, such as the Socialist International or the Liberal International also have their own co-operation programmes.
In the United States, the political foundation system was established in the mid-1980s by President Ronald Reagan and is based on the German model of Stiftungs (see below). At the helm of the system is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) http://www.ned.org. The NED is a bipartisan, private, non-profit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts. It is governed by an independent, non-partisan board of directors. The Endowment, though non-governmental, is funded primarily through annual appropriations and subject to congressional oversight. NED, in turn, acts as a grant-making foundation, distributing funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. These private organizations would include those created by the two political parties and the business community, and those in the labour movement already in existence. The NED makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and East and Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

NED’s creation was followed by the establishment of the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (later renamed the International Republican Institute, IRI), which joined the Free Trade Union Institute as the four affiliated institutions of the Endowment. The Endowment serves as the umbrella organization through which these four groups and an expanding number of other private sector groups receive funding to carry out programmes abroad.

Working with Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research, with whom the NED’s International Forum for Democratic Studies co-sponsored a research conference in 1995 on “Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies,” NED convened a meeting in Taipei in October 1997 to promote the concept of establishing new democracy foundations. Some twenty countries were represented at the meeting. This initiative led to the creation of the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) in 1999 (http://www.wmd.org/). The Movement is a “network of networks” that connects pro-democracy organizations around the world who are working on a daily basis to promote democratic values and build and strengthen democratic institutions in their respective countries.31

Co-operating with other democracy foundations, the NED is working to increase international cooperation among existing democracy foundations and to encourage all established democracies to create similar institutions. In 1993 NED convened the first of several “democracy summits” among democracy foundations in the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and Canada. In addition to general information-sharing among foundations, these “summits” provide opportunities to co-ordinate strategy and assistance for some of the most difficult places to promote democracy, including Burma, Belarus, and Serbia. Over the past few years, new foundations have been founded in France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Australia, and Spain. Ireland, Taiwan, Portugal, Italy, and Japan may soon follow suit.

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) http://www.ndi.org and the International Republic Institute (IRI) http://www.iri.org are the independent organizations, affiliated with the Democratic and Republican Parties of the United States respectively. They were created to conduct non-partisan and multi-partisan programmes to meet the broad objectives of the NED, namely: (i) to promote democratic training programmes and democratic institution-building abroad; (ii) to strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad in co-operation with indigenous democratic forces; (iii)

31 The Movement, for which NED serves as the secretariat, is directed by an international Steering Committee of distinguished democratic activists and thinkers. It has held two World Assemblies—in New Delhi in February 1999 and Sao Paulo in November, 2000. Contact person: Art Kaufman, Project Manager, World Movement for Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy. Tel: 202-293-9072, fax: 202-223-6042, e-mail: world@ned.org
to foster co-operation with those abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions, and organizations of
democratic pluralism; and (iv) to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic development in
a manner consistent with the broad concerns of the national interests of the United States and with the
specific requirements of the democratic groups that are aided.

NDI programmes focus on the following functional areas: (i) political and civic organization (in particular
political party building and training, the promotion of civic engagement, and the enhancement of women
political participation); (ii) electoral processes (including advise on electoral systems and electoral reform,
support to domestic election monitoring and international election monitoring); (iii) governance (in
particular constitutional reform, legislative strengthening, local governance, and civil-military relations). In
order to achieve its aims, it develops global, regional and national programmes throughout the world,
generally in the form of technical assistance projects using a combination of educational techniques (such
as policy research, standard executive-education programmes, as well as workshops, seminars and
conferences).

Of particular relevance in the context of this study are the NDI’s global programmes on (i) citizen
participation, and (ii) political party development. NDI programmes help strengthen civic organizations
and promote citizen participation in primarily six areas: public policy advocacy, civic education,
community organising, domestic monitoring, organizational strengthening and voter education. NDI
advocacy programmes are also concerned with strengthening the organizational and technical capacities
of civic groups. NDI frequently trains members of different local organizations as civic educators. This
training of trainers approach allows it to reach a broader audience and ensures the development of a
local capacity for civic education. Furthermore, civic education programme participants are often
recruited from existing civil society organizations. NDI’s principal approach to civic education is their
Civic Forum, which engages small groups of citizens in a series of monthly educational discussions where
knowledge of democratic principles, institutions and practices is introduced. The discussions are
organized and facilitated by local NDI staff members in partnership with existing civil society
organizations. Civic Forum complements educational discussions with printed information that is widely
distributed through the network of partner organizations. The majority of NDI’s organizational
development initiatives take the form of technical assistance that is designed to aid pre-existing civic
groups in developing their ability to conduct advocacy campaigns, work as part of coalitions, monitor
elections and government activities, or conduct legal literacy and constitutional education activities. NDI
also helps groups, through systematic training programmes, develop other organizational capacities
necessary for achieving sustainability. For instance, NDI may assist groups in developing internal
governance structures, planning and assessment strategies, management procedures, and fundraising
abilities. Occasionally NDI provides groups with sub-grants.

Depending on the expressed needs of the political parties, the stage of political transition and cultural
conditions in a particular country, NDI provides democratic political activists with the skills they require
to establish representative, accountable, transparent and effective political parties. NDI pursues its
political party development activities in conjunction with other civil society, governance and election-
related activities. It targets pro-democratic political parties with a certain degree of leverage on domestic
policy-making. The spheres of political party development include operational and structural aspects,
electoral aspects (strategic planning and election monitoring), parliamentary tactics as well as legal and
constitutional frameworks. The principal training techniques include a wide range of instruments such as
multi-party seminars and single party seminars, informal dialogue, or the training of trainers within parties.

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The **International Republic Institute** (IRI) [http://www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org) is the republican counterpart of NDI. The strategy used and activities undertaken by IRI are similar to those of NDI.

The political party foundation model adopted by the United States originated in Germany after the Second World War. German political party foundations, the *Stiftungs* (*Stiftung* is the German word for foundation), were established to help rebuild Germany’s democratic institutions destroyed a generation earlier by the Nazis and have developed a reputation for excellence in the field of democracy assistance abroad. These foundations, each aligned with one of the four German political parties, receive funding from the government. In the 1960s they began assisting their ideological counterparts abroad, and by the mid-1970s were playing an important role in both of the democratic transitions taking place on the Iberian Peninsula. The most important of them are the Friedrich Ebert, Friedrich Naumann, and Hans Seidel, Heinrich Böll, and Konrad Adenauer *Stiftungs*.

A political party foundation, the **Friedrich Ebert Stiftung** ([FES](http://www.fes.de)) is affiliated with Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). It was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany’s first democratically elected president, Friedrich Ebert, who died in that year (it was closed between 1933 and 1947). The foundation has a threefold aim: (i) furthering a democratic, pluralistic political culture by means of political education for all classes of society; (ii) facilitating access to higher education for gifted young people by providing scholarships, and (iii) contributing to international understanding and cooperation wherever possible to avert a fresh outbreak of war and conflict. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung today is a non profit-making, political public-interest institution committed to the principles and basic values of social democracy in its educational and policy-orientated work. It has a staff of 581 in its headquarters and regional offices in Germany and abroad (it has offices in 90 countries and activities in more than 100 countries) and a budget of 204 million DM. In Germany alone around 150 000 people took part in 2000 in more than 3 000 adult education courses, discussion forums and conferences.

The **Friedrich Naumann Stiftung** ([http://www.fnst.org/reda/](http://www.fnst.org/reda/)) aims to contribute to the furtherance of the principle of liberalism and freedom in human dignity in all sectors of society in the united Germany as well as together with partners abroad, provide political education and establish domestic and foreign meeting places where current political problems can be discussed. It also intends to develop principles for political action – in particular through academic projects and the public discussion of basic issues – in educational centres both in Germany and abroad, as well as through the study of history and the influences of Liberalism. Present throughout the world, it also plans and implements abroad publicly funded foundation projects.

The **Konrad Adenauer Stiftung** ([KAS](http://www.kas.de)) is related to the Christian Democratic movement. It emerged from the “Society for Christian Democratic Education Work” founded in 1956 and was named after the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964. It is guided by the same principles that inspired Adenauer’s work. Its aim is to support groups seeking to build democracy and democratic institutions around the world. It runs educational programmes and offers grants and scholarships. Through a wide network of locally-based think tanks, it undertakes research, educational assistance (mainly conferences and seminars) and technical assistance programmes in the area of democratic governance. An example of intervention based on partnership is the *Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo Latinoamericano* (CIEDLA) based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, associated with the KAS ([http://www.kas-ciedla.org.ar/](http://www.kas-ciedla.org.ar/)).

The other, more recent foundations have a much more limited international reach. Founded in 1966, the **Hans Seidel Stiftung** [http://www.hss.de](http://www.hss.de) is affiliated with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party.

In the United Kingdom, the model adopted was not that of the political party foundations of Germany or the United States but rather that of a single democracy foundation. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy ([WFD](http://www.wfd.org/)) was established in 1992 to provide assistance in building and strengthening pluralist democratic institutions overseas. It receives a grant-in-aid from the government and accounts to the Parliament through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. WFD is independent of the government in setting its priorities and programmes and works closely with all political parties in the Westminster Parliament (the three major British parties are each represented on the Board of Governors). It provides funding, technical assistance and training (mainly seminars and workshops) to strengthen political parties and other democratic institutions (such as civil society, human rights advocacy groups, parliaments, media, trade unions). It essentially focuses on Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Anglophone Africa.

The [British Council](http://www.britishcouncil.org/governance/index.htm), which has offices in 230 cities in 110 countries and territories, manages educational, research and training programmes aimed at promoting democratic governance. The Council works in partnership with both government and civil society to advance debate, knowledge and skills in the areas of governance, human rights and social inclusion, using a variety of techniques, such as e-learning tools and virtual education, as well as standard executive education instruments, such as international seminars. It has a series of particularly innovative programmes on conflict and peace, culture and development, human rights and gender equality advocacy, and diversity and social inclusion.

Of particular relevance are the programmes on (i) civil society and (ii) participation. The programme on civil society examines the role of civil society in national and international governance, focusing on the development of the capacity of NGOs in the north and south by facilitating joint initiatives on common issues in seminars and workshops. The Council is also engaged with representatives of central and local governments to develop ways of increasing participation through the inclusion of civil society on decision-making. Although participation as a concept is widely accepted and common to development rhetoric, how it works and how it enables greater equality of access to rights will take time to become established. People participate in diverse ways at different times and through different structures within their societies with varying patterns of equality and inequality. Inequality of participation remains a persistent feature of social exclusion. The Council’s programme on participation and democracy investigates and aims to foster political participation and civic engagement. The Council’s global reach enables it to undertake governance programmes (especially in the form of executive education and training) around the world.

In Sweden, the Olaf Palme International Centre ([http://www.palmecenter.org/](http://www.palmecenter.org/)), established in 1992 by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the labour movement, organizes a multitude of seminars on democracy and human rights. The Palme Centre’s development assistance projects (approx. 250-200) are primarily financed by Sida and are focused on democracy and organizational development. Until 1992-94, projects in South America and South Africa dominated the work of the centre and its member organizations, and the activities in the field of voter education, civic education and awareness-raising made an important contribution to the transition to democracy in the region. The more modest and recent Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC) ([http://www.silc.liberal.se](http://www.silc.liberal.se)) supports organizations and individuals working for democracy and human rights by organising seminars on (i) civil and political

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liberty; (ii) capacity-building for civil organizations and political parties; (iv) electoral issues; and (v) public opinion.

Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Alfred Mozer Foundation (AMF), founded in 1990 by the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) http://www.alfredmozerstichting.nl, supports social-democratic political parties and groups in Central and Eastern Europe. The AMF’s three principal programme areas focus on youth and women, party building and campaigning and the enlargement of the European Union. More recently, in April 2000, the Netherlands established a new type of political foundation where all political parties are represented. The Dutch political parties decided to set up jointly a new foundation, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD) http://www.nimd.org to support the process of democratisation in emerging democracies by strengthening political parties as the pillars of parliamentary and pluralistic democracy. It thus focuses on capacity-building and technical assistance of partner political parties and party systems.

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) http://www.idrc.ca is a public corporation created in 1970 by the Canadian government to help communities in the developing world find solutions to social, economic, and environmental problems through research and training (360 staff in its headquarters and 7 regional offices with a budget of $CAD 125 million in 1999-2000). It is essentially a development research and funding organization aimed at mobilising and strengthening the research capacity of developing countries, which has established a strong reputation in the development aid community. The Centre’s three programmatic focuses are (i) social and economic equity, (ii) information and communication technologies for development, and (iii) environment and natural resource management.

Formally established in 1988 by the Canadian Parliament, Rights & Democracy (formerly known as the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) http://www.ichrdd.ca/ is a Canadian institution with an international mandate (a democracy foundation, rather than a strictly political party foundation). In co-operation with civil society organizations and governments in Canada and abroad, Rights & Democracy initiates and supports programmes to strengthen laws and democratic institutions, particularly in developing countries. Rights & Democracy focuses its work on four thematic priorities: (i) democratic development, (ii) women’s rights, (iii) indigenous peoples’ rights and (iv) globalisation and human rights. It provides political, financial and technical support to human rights groups, indigenous peoples’ groups and democratic movements around the world.

Other political party and democracy foundations include: the Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI) http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au established in 1998 as an Australian Government initiative in 1998; The Foundation Jean Jaures (FJJ) http://www.jean-jaures.org linked to the Socialist Party in France and established in 1992; the Karl Renner Institute in Austria, the political academy of the Austrian Social Democratic http://www.renner-institut.at/; the Mario Soares Foundation in Portugal; the Pablo Iglesias Foundation in Spain; or the Robert Shuman Foundation in France; etc. These organizations provide support through exchange programmes, training (mainly seminars and workshops) and technical assistance in the field of good governance and civil society (with a regional focus on East Asia, particularly Indonesia and Papua New Guinea).

As indicated earlier, most ministries and public institutions in donor countries have their own international co-operation programmes. Although the analysis of such a wide variety of programmes falls outside the purview of this programme, special consideration should be given to public administration training institutions. Most national schools of public administration have international co-operation programmes. In addition, there are a number of international initiatives in public administration training such as, for example, the International Institute for Public Administration (IIAP) in France http://www.iiap.fr, the
European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA) in The Netherlands [http://www.eipa.nl](http://www.eipa.nl), or the Latin-American Centre for Development Administration (CLAD) in Venezuela [http://www.clad.org.ve](http://www.clad.org.ve). The International Institute for Public Administration (IIAP) in Paris, France, has established short and long term training modules in the different aspects of public administration, including democratisation and good governance, established as traditional in situ executive education training programmes. Similarly, the Latin-American Centre for Development Administration (CLAD) in Caracas, Venezuela, which provides technical assistance and organizes conferences, seminars and workshops, has established a virtual education programme on anti-corruption, based on an internet portal with reference documents and a chat-room system. The programme has a duration of four months and is structured around four modules (one each month). The course is co-ordinated by an institutional expert within the CLAD and conducted by two outside experts (one in Quito, Ecuador and one in Washington DC).
V - Non-governmental Organizations and Training Institutes

Private Foundations

The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) [http://www.ifes.org], founded in 1987, provides technical non-partisan advice and technical assistance in democracy and governance and serves as an information clearinghouse on electoral issues. It has established itself as one of the leading organizations in the field of electoral assistance and monitoring and works in close co-operation with the United States authorities (receiving an important portion of its project financing from USAID). It has 35 field offices and conducted over 75 in site technical assistance programmes and 45 election observation missions. Its thematic priorities areas are: (i) elections, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) governance, and (iv) civil society, developing both cross-regional thematic programmes and country-specific projects. For instance, IFES was involved through the entire process of Indonesia’s historic elections of 1999 and in Peru in 2000-01. Of particular relevance to this study are IFES’s initiatives in the area of civic education and community development. For example, its Democratic Development and Citizen Participation (DDCP) programme in Bolivia is aimed at enhancing popular participation in local government in 20 municipalities. Similarly, in Azerbaijan, IFES conducts civic education programmes at the local level through face-to-face meetings in municipalities around the country. This programme involves an extensive train-the-trainer component for civic leaders, preparing them to conduct citizens meetings. In the summer of 2000, IFES held a ten-day democracy summer camp for student government representatives, students, teachers, and school officials from high schools in Ukraine. Students received training in various aspects of advocacy management such as fundraising; organising committees; determining needs of the student body; setting realistic goals; and co-operating with local businesses and government officials. Similarly, the Carter Centre [http://www.cartercenter.org], founded in the early 1980s, conducts technical assistance projects in the area of elections (electoral assistance and election monitoring), conflict management and democratisation.

The Asia Foundation [http://www.asiafoundation.org/] is a private, non-profit, non-governmental organization working to advance the mutual interests of the United States and the Asia Pacific region. Utilising its 47-year presence throughout Asia and its network of 15 offices, the foundation collaborates with partners from the public and private sectors to build leadership, improve policy and regulation, and strengthen institutions to foster greater openness in the Asia Pacific region. The Asia Foundation is funded by contributions from corporations, foundations, individuals, governmental organizations in the U.S. and Asia, and an annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress. Priorities include long-term, complex issues that cross national borders, in particular effective law, governance, and citizenship. In the area of Governance, Law and Civil Society (one of the thematic programmes of the foundation), specific areas of intervention include elections, local government, the rule of law, conflict resolution, non-governmental organization support and anti-corruption efforts. For example, the foundation supports legal aid services in Vietnam, East Timor and Sri Lanka. Similarly, it is helping to build capacity in a number of Chinese non-profit organizations, and to promote inter-organization co-operation. Activities include support for staff training, information exchange, and surveys. In Sri Lanka, it uses meetings, seminars, and publications to promote a more effective public dialogue on the rule of law in co-operation with the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. Similarly, the Eurasia Foundation [http://www.eurasia.org/] is a privately managed grant-making organization dedicated to funding programmes that build democratic and free market institutions in the twelve New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.

The numerous non-profit foundations created by the philanthropist George Soros are linked together in an informal network known as the Soros Foundations Network [http://www.soros.org]. At the heart of
this network are the “national foundations”, a group of autonomous organizations operating in over 30
countries around the world, principally in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but
also in Guatemala, Haiti, and Southern Africa. All of the national foundations share the common mission
of supporting the development of open society. To this end, they operate and support an array of
initiatives concerned, inter alia, with society development, economic reform, education, legal reform and
public administration, media and communications. The Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Open
Society Institute-Budapest (OSI-Budapest) assist the national foundations by providing administrative,
financial, and technical support, as well as by establishing “network programs” to address certain issues
on a regional or network-wide basis. In 1997, the organizations of the Soros foundations network spent a
total of US$428.4 million on philanthropic activities. The largest share of these expenditures were
devoted to education.

The Open Society Institute (OSI), established in 1993, is a private operating and grant-making
foundation that seeks to promote the development and maintenance of open societies around the world
by supporting a range of programmes in the areas of educational, social, and legal reform, and by
encouraging alternative approaches to complex and often controversial issues. New York-based
programmes with an international focus include, amongst others, the Burma Project, which promotes
international awareness of the repressive military dictatorship in Burma and supports education and
training for Burmese refugees. The Open Society Institute-Budapest was established in 1993 to
develop and implement programmes in the areas of educational, social, and legal reform. Network
programmes based in Budapest include the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, which supports the
legal reform efforts of the national foundations and their affiliated law centres. In addition, it supports a
variety of other initiatives with a strong emphasis on projects in the areas of human rights, ethnic and
minority issues, civil society, and women’s issues. Of particular relevance, the Central European
University (CEU) founded in 1989 has established itself as an internationally recognised institution of
post-graduate education in social sciences and humanities.

The Ford Foundation (http://www.fordfound.org/) is a research and grant-making organization with an
established reputation of excellency. Its goals are to strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and
injustice, promote international co-operation and advance human achievement. Since our financial
resources are modest in comparison to societal needs, we focus on a limited number of problem areas
and programme strategies within our broad goals. Since its foundation in 1936 (it became an international
foundation in 1950) it has been an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization and has
provided more than $10 billion in grants and loans. One of its three core programmes focuses on Peace
and Social Justice, which includes two sub-programmes: (i) Human Rights and International Co-
operation; and (ii) Governance and Civil Society, which seeks to strengthen governmental performance
and accountability, increase citizen participation, improve policy-making and strengthen civil society and
the philanthropic sector.

There exists a multitude of international professional network and non-governmental organizations
dedicated to further specific aspects of democratic governance, such as justice and the rule of law,
legislative co-operation and strengthening, the protection and promotion of human rights, or local
governance. They include for instance Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU), the International Press Institute (IPI), the International Foundation of
Journalists (IFJ), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the University for Peace; the European
Media Institute (EMI), the International Institute of Human Rights (IIHR), the Inter-American Institute
for Human Rights (IIDH), and the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA). In general, these
institutions use a series of training instruments and technical assistance tools of a traditional nature,
including, inter alia, annual conferences, thematic seminars, technical workshops and executive-education
programmes. Some of them have developed or are developing distance-learning and e-learning programmes.

A particularly interesting international NGO engaged in the promotion of effective and active citizenship is CIVICUS (http://www.civicus.org). CIVICUS is an international alliance dedicated to strengthening citizen empowerment and civic engagement throughout the world. It does so by organising to a series of activities, including a general conference of civil society organizations (CSOs) – the World Assembly, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the provision of technical assistance to CSOs, and research programmes to enhance the understanding and workings of civil society.

Research and Training Organizations

The African Capacity-building Foundation (ACBF) (http://www.acbf-pact.org/), based in Harare, Zimbabwe, is an independent development funding institution, established in November 1991, through the collaborative efforts of three multilateral institutions (the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and United Nations Development Programme), African Governments and bilateral donors. The establishment of ACBF was a response to the severity of Africa’s capacity problem and the challenge to invest in indigenous human capital and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa.

At inception, ACBF was given the mandate to address capacity needs in the area of macroeconomic policy analysis and development management. Government capacity for economic policy analysis is accorded a high priority in ACBF’s programme agenda because of the central role that governments play in the design and implementation of economic policy. However, since June 1999, as a result of a new framework, known as the Partnership for Capacity-building in Africa (PACT), the Foundation has expanded its scope of intervention to include good governance. This will now include the public sector, the private sector, and civil society. In particular, emphasis will be on: (i) the enhancement of public sector performance and effectiveness; (ii) strengthening of public-private sector civil society interface; (iii) strengthening of growth and performance of the private sector; (iv) enhancement of effectiveness of civil society organizations; and (v) strengthening of regional institutions.

ACBF supports training at national and regional levels. The training projects are institution-based. Support is provided to training institutions and policy units for the design and implementation of training programs, which meet specific skills requirement in macroeconomic management. The training programmes comprise in-service training, work attachments, study visits, post-graduate academic courses at post-graduate diploma, master’s and doctorate levels, linkage and exchange programs, workshops, seminars, conferences, and short courses for the development of specialized skills. Currently, the Foundation supports 12 training projects. In 2000, ACBF’s mandate was further expanded to strengthen the core public sector and its interface with the private sector and the civil society in order to enhance their contributions to good governance and sustainable development. They also place emphasis on supporting regional initiatives in the area of training, policy analysis, applied policy research, negotiation and policy advocacy as well as the emergence of mechanisms, in the form of national focal points, for coordinating interventions in capacity-building at the national level. Currently, the Foundation has a project portfolio comprising 51 projects, of which 17 are training projects and 20 are policy units spanning 23 African countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As of September 2000 the Foundation had awarded 59 grants to build capacity in policy analysis and development management. The total funding commitment is presently around US$110 million.

In June 2001, ACBF organized a Workshop on Building the Capacity of the African Civil Society (http://www.acbf-pact.org/Forums/civiscap/Eindex.htm) to assess its role in the strengthening of
African civil society’s organizational capacities. The first Capacity-building Forum of ACBF will take place in October 2001 in Bamako, Mali (http://www.acbf-pact.org/Forums/PanAfrica/index.asp). It is expected that the Forum will result in a resolution confirming the centrality of capacity-building and institutional development as a development priority in Africa, declaring 2001-2010 as the decade of capacity-building in Africa.

The International Forum for Capacity-Building (IFCB) is a global initiative launched by Southern NGOs from Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America in an effort to focus on key future priorities of capacity-building, in order to enhance their effectiveness in addressing issues of poverty, marginalisation, democratization and strengthening of civil society, human rights and sustainable human development.

Capacity.org (http://www.capacity.org), an initiative of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), is an extremely useful resource website dedicated to investigating and advancing the policy and practice of capacity-building in international development co-operation. It is designed for development researchers, practitioners and decision-makers in primarily Africa and donor countries. It offers a range of services, including a virtual library and hyperlinks to related websites of organizations active in the field of capacity-building, classified also by sector of intervention.

The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), based in London, United Kingdom, provides support to organizations involved in international development. Its purpose is to improve the performance of NGOs by exploring relevant policy issues and by strengthening NGO management and organizational effectiveness, mainly through research, training and capacity-building programmes. It offers both residential and non-residential training programmes, in collaboration with its partners, CASDIN (Kazakhstan); CABUNGO (Malawi); CDRA (South Africa); CINDE (Colombia); CORATAFRICA (Kenya); Centre Interbilim (Kyrgyzstan); NGORC (Pakistan); and PRIA (India). For example, its civil society strengthening programme in Central Asia, initiated in 1994, promotes the development of civil society by working at different levels affecting the environment within which civil society organizations have to function.

The Institute on Governance (IOG) http://www.iog.ca/ is a non-profit organization with charitable status founded in 1990 in Canada to promote effective governance, in particular in the public sector and government. The IOG concentrates its work in six thematic areas: (i) aboriginal governance; (ii) accountability and performance measurement; (iii) building policy capacity; (iv) citizen participation; (v) governance and technology; and (vi) governance for non-profit and public sector boards. In each of these areas, it undertakes a diverse range of activities, including research and analysis, advisory services, professional development, conferences, workshops and study tours. Since early 1999 the Institute has also become increasingly active in the design and implementation of internet-based approaches to engaging citizens in the public policy process. Most of its work focuses on Canada itself, although it provides technical assistance and services to foreign countries, such as Latvia (1999), Jamaica (1999) or Malaysia (2000). The IOG was also instrumental for developing UNDP’s capacities for effective governance programmes in 1996-1997. Through a combination of research and learning events, the IOG explores new ways of involving citizens in public policy-making. The Institute is currently in the process of establishing a Network on Citizen Participation to raise awareness and disseminate information around citizen participation. The Network will offer a range of activities and tools, including an interactive website which will contain current information and links to relevant sources in the field.

The International Institute on Governance (IIG) http://www.iigov.org, an organization based in Barcelona, Spain, offers one of the most innovative e-learning programmes in the field of democracy and good governance, the Virtual School for Governance, implemented using the virtual campus of the Open
University of Catalonia (http://www.uoc.es). The IIG is a research and training centre on democratisation and good governance focusing on institutional and human development in Latin America. It is supported by the Catalan Government, the Open University of Catalonia, and UNDP. Since its establishment in 1995, it has become a centre of excellence on distance learning and e-learning on democratic governance in Latin America. Of special relevance to the study is the Virtual School for Governance (Escuela Virtual de Gobernanabilidad, EVG) http://www.iigov.org/iigov/evg/. The EVG has articulated different virtual executive education and postgraduate programmes, as well as short-term thematic and technical courses. These programmes are conducted in close co-operation with a network of associate universities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. As of 2001, it has five main educational programmes:

(i) a doctoral programme on the society of information as well as on human development and governance;

(ii) a programme on governance and human development covering the period 2001-03, including a master’s degree on governance and human development, a diploma on the institutional foundations of development, a diploma on governance in Latin America as well as a technical course on human development;

(iii) a programme on government and local development, the El Programa de formación en Gobierno y Desarrollo Local (PGDL) (implemented in co-operation with the Unión Ibeoamericana de Municipalistas http://www.cemci.org/uimprincipal.htm) comprising a master’s and diploma on government and local development as well as five specialisation courses;

(iv) a five-module programme on the cities and the society of information;

(v) a programme on governance and sustainable human development, the International University on Human Development (Universidad Internacional de Desarrollo Humano, UNIDH), implemented in co-operation with the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), and the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) and funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The programme is structured in 12 modules, each one co-ordinated by an external expert selected from a roster, over a three-month period. The modules include: 1) Gobernanabilidad y Desarrollo Humano; 2) Introducción al Liderazgo; 3) La Cooperación Multilateral al Desarrollo: Actores y Políticas; 4) Balance de un Siglo de Desarrollo Humano; 5) Género, Trabajo e Igualdad; 6) Introducción a la Acción Humanitaria; 7) Los Fundamentos Políticos del Desarrollo: Democracia y Estado de Derecho; 8) Los Fundamentos Económicos del Desarrollo; 9) Pobreza y Equidad en América Latina; 10) Estado y Sociedad: ¿Nuevas reglas del juego?; 11) Globalización y Derechos Humanos; 12) Justicia y Derechos Humanos en América Latina.

The EVG is a particularly innovative initiative using modern information technology tools to implement a wide variety of educational programmes. The use of such techniques enables the EVG to circumvent the constraints of time of space and reach out to a wide variety of audiences throughout Latin America, in particular middle and senior level civil servants, civil society activities and the academia. The education programmes are conducted using electronic resources in a virtual environment (mainly portals on the

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internet with the course material as well as a special internet course space in the UOC website which includes a teaching space and several interactive discussion lists).

The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, The Netherlands, [http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/](http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/) has an established track record of excellence as one of the main think-tanks on development policy management. The core purpose of the Centre is to work on institutional and management dimensions of international co-operation, particularly in the context of the co-operation between the European Union (EU) and the 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific comprising the so-called ACP Group. The recently adopted Convention of Cotonou (23 June 2001) regulates EU-ACP co-operation. In July 1997, ECDPM began its second phase of operations with a five-year endowment from the Dutch Government. The Centre was created in 1986 as an independent foundation at the service of the ACP group.

After an external review of its activities in 1995-96, the Centre adopted a new strategic framework to guide its work into the twenty-first century. At the heart of this new strategy is the Centre’s principal task to strengthen the capacities of institutions in ACP countries to manage change (particularly in the policy arena) and to benefit from international co-operation.

This strategy is based on three new programme clusters:

(i) The programme on capacity-building for international co-operation, which is an ACP-based programme that aims to strengthen the capacities of public and private actors to manage institutional change and international co-operation. The primary mechanism for the Programme is a set of “partnership” arrangements with ACP organizations in which regional ACP networks of expertise and knowledge are developed, together with products and services targeted to organizations in the regions.

(ii) The development policy dialogue programme, a joint ACP-Europe programme that aims to improve international co-operation between and among public and private actors, especially under the Cotonou Convention. Its objectives are to facilitate interactions and consultations among different actors involved in ACP-EU co-operation, to stimulate and undertake policy research on improved forms of development co-operation, and to provide policy relevant information, lessons of experience and examples of innovative practices on policy and implementation aspects of EU-ACP co-operation.

(iii) The programme on development policy information, a service programme that facilitates better access to information on development policy management and international co-operation.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) [http://www.odi.org.uk/](http://www.odi.org.uk/) is Britain’s leading independent think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues. Its mission is to inspire and inform policy and practice which lead to the reduction of poverty, the alleviation of suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods in developing countries. It is mainly a policy research institution, combining policy advice and technical assistance, working with partners in the public and private sectors, in both developing and developed countries.

Similarly, the North South Institute (NSI) [http://www.nsi-ins.ca/](http://www.nsi-ins.ca/) is a renowned independent research institute established in 1976 in Canada focused on international development. The Institute conducts research on Canada’s relations with developing countries and on a wide range of foreign policy issues.

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focuses in particular on the role and contribution of civil society to participatory development and democratic governance as well as in international development co-operation. Its main research programmes tackle issues such as increasing the effectiveness of development co-operation; ensuring development sustainability; improving global governance; and enhancing gender equality.

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) [http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/] at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom is a leading centre for research and teaching on international development. It has an important research programme on governance issues and offers training courses.

Founded in 1932 as The U.S. Experiment in International Living, World Learning (Washington DC, United States) [http://www.worldlearning.org/] is a consulting firm with both academic and practical project capabilities. It manages worldwide projects in international education, training and exchange, institutional capacity-building, democracy and governance, and societies in transition. World Learning specializes in developing the skills and potential of individuals and institutions. It mainly implements USAID-funded programmes. World Learning established its Projects in International Development and Training (PIDT) division in Washington, D.C. to manage development projects in the U.S. and overseas. PIDT specialises in developing the skills and potential of individuals and institutions around the world, including assistance to effective NGO management, democratic participation, education policy reform, sectoral development, journalism and media, and social advocacy. PIDT’s main programmes address five broad sectors, including:

(i) Democracy and Governance. This programme aims at strengthening civil society and enhancing popular participation in governance and public policy development, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Central America and Africa. These goals are achieved through various mechanisms, including leadership training for individuals in the public and private sectors, technical assistance to civil society organizations (CSOs) in emerging democracies, and collaboration with local grassroots organizations and international donors. The activities target civil society, providing technical assistance and training; building institutional capacities; developing and designing assessments, programs, and evaluations; managing grants programmes for civil society organizations; developing advocacy and public policy curricula; promoting cross-sectoral dialogue and linkages; conducting conferences, workshops, and seminars.

(ii) Institutional Capacity-Building. This programme focuses on assessing the institutional needs of small, nascent, and transitional institutions – especially NGOs – and providing them with the training and technical assistance. In addition, World Learning administers several sub-grant programmes to offer institutions the funds and resources necessary to increase their effectiveness and impact. This programme combines institutional assessments, training, technical assistance, sectoral support and grant administration.

The European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) [http://www.eadi.org] is an independent and non-profit making international non-governmental organization. It is an active network of 170 organizations with over 20 working groups addressing key issues in development research, training and information. It regularly organizes conferences, seminars and workshops and has established several focused networks amongst its constituency on democratization, governance, local governance and aid effectiveness.

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37 In co-operation with Save the Children of the United States and World Education, World Learning is the prime contractor in two USAID-funded Indefinite Quantity Contracts on Democracy and Governance: Strengthening Civil Society and Global Training for Development.
There also exists a myriad of national advocacy, research and training organizations in the field of democracy throughout the developing world, such as the Asian Centre for Democratic Governance (affiliated with the National Endowment for Democracy), the Centre for Democratic Governance (CDG) in Burkina Faso, or the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Bangladesh. Their contribution to the strengthening of democratic governance through citizen education and civic engagement is critical. However, their review and assessment is beyond the scope of this study.

Nevertheless, the two examples illustrate their contribution to democratic governance: (i) the Gorée Institute and (ii) CODESRIA. CODESRIA is the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, headquartered in Dakar, Senegal (http://www.codesria.org). It is an independent Pan African organization whose principal objectives are to facilitate research and the sharing of knowledge, through small grants and the organization of workshops and seminars. It also offers training and capacity-building programmes. Its Governance Institute, established in 1992 and organized in collaboration with Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, Senegal, is a multidisciplinary and intensive annual summer training course targeting researchers, activists and decision-makers. Each year, it focuses on a specific dimension of democratic governance such as citizenship, rights and governance (1996), the political economy of conflicts (1997), the state and taxation (1999), or democratisation and electoral processes in Africa (2001). The Gorée Institute, established in 1992 and also located in Senegal, is an independent, non-profit African service organization committed to strengthen Africa’s social capital, enhance the effectiveness of African CSOs, and promote citizen empowerment and civic engagement. It does this through research, training, and technical assistance. Its capacity-building activities take the form of standard executive-education courses, seminars and workshops (generally in situ, both in Senegal and in other African countries, and of short duration). They focus on strengthening civil societies and the modernisation of the public sectors.

38 The Gorée Institute Institute (http://www.refer.sn/sngal_et/cop/goree/lgoree.htm) was created after the ground-breaking meeting in 1987 that brought together the then exiled leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) with an internal delegation of 50 mostly white South Africans. The meeting was hosted by President DIOUF who also suggested the creation of the Institute on Goree island.
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