

Management of Social Transformations

MOST

Discussion Paper No. 66

**Not “globaphiles” or “globaphobes”,
but “globacritics”**

by

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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

The MOST Programme

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Published by the MOST Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
1 rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France
Website <http://www.unesco.org/most>

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(SHS-2003/WS/9)

Abstract

After the Seattle protests and the integration and globalization of trade and finance, we find certain actors that have to varying degrees been excluded from these processes. This calls into question the complex citizenship identities that emerge beyond the national level, hampers the inclusive cosmopolitan identities put forward as world alternatives to globalization and accentuates the crisis of governability in the traditional democratic model. A heterogeneous collection of actors representing diverse political groups (the foremost of which are the anarchists, Trotskyists and socialists); identity-based movements for citizen affirmation, environmental protection and multicultural demands (environmentalists, ethnic and sexual minorities, etc.); rural and urban-based trade union associations; locally-based ecclesiastical organizations; human rights organizations – actors opposing the ‘globaphile’ dissemination of the neo-liberal model from two perspectives: either total repudiation and resistance to globalization (“globaphobes”), or the creation of grass-roots alternatives to counter the deleterious effects of such globalization (“globacritics”), that foreshadow deliberative democracy as a complex system of management from below. This article was presented at the Seminar held by UNESCO/MOST “Democracy, governance and associated complexities: The challenges involved in recognizing cultural pluralism”, as part of the Second World Social Forum (Porto Alegre, Brazil, 4 February 2002). Detailed information is available on the website: <http://www.unesco.org/most/wsf/english/index.shtml>.

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Introduction

After 1945, the State began to be displaced as the leading player in the world system. Little by little the multinationals invaded the state public sphere to the extent of seeking to minimize the State and strip it of its functions as regulator of all relations between the market and society. A watershed in this displacement was the oil embargo ordered by OPEC in 1973-1974, when the interests of the oil-producing countries in the international cartel clashed with those of the major oil internationals. These non-state actors, which had been favoured by “development-minded” States for almost three decades, then tabled new demands for international management that transcended the traditional sphere of the nation-state. The organization of the world system thus began to be based on market actors that demanded the increasing subordination of States – and of their influence on international relations – to private interests.

The emphasis placed on global free market relations called for strategies, foremost among which were dismantling the welfare state, opening up and liberalizing economies and the deliberate spread of liberal democracy as a world Utopia. The 1980s saw the advent of macro-economic successes, spearheaded by Mrs Thatcher in the United Kingdom and the Reagan-Bush (senior) duo in the United States. Inequalities also became more acute, in both central and peripheral countries, as the all-encompassing universalism of capital drew in emerging economies and the most dynamic sectors of the multinationals. These non-state actors took control of new public spaces, although they were neither undisputed nor definitive. Non-state actors started to emerge from civil society, albeit amid protest and resistance, although there was as yet no project.

Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, with the resounding demise of the socialism of the time, there was a triumphalist bid to proclaim the end of history and the hegemony of a single ideology, by contriving to equate the market and society with democracy. However, anti-state triumphalism left the cost of conflict management – for which the market takes no responsibility – to a notional minimal State (in terms of social regulation), which is both an interested arbiter and an administrator of interests biased in favour of speculative financial capital (a profit-maximizing State).

Although the multinationals seriously eroded the powers of the nation-state, the key player in the world system, other non-state actors have emerged from the grass-roots level and are also claiming new public spaces that formerly belonged to the nation-state, which centralized the public space. Trade unions, indigenous peoples, peasants, environmentalists, locally-based ecclesiastical groups and dispossessed groups – organized to varying degrees – are starting to achieve international prominence and to demand positions in this world public space that are now being occupied by these non-state actors operating at grass-roots level. Cases in print are the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Chiapas; Brazil’s “participatory budget” in Porto Alegre and the State of R o Grande do Sul; and the Indian state of Kerala, with its high standards in terms of quality of life and participatory local democracy.

Political transitions, combining political liberalization with democratic transition, help to bring non-state actors into contact with the transformation in political systems produced by political parties and civic organizations. In the 1990s a new wave of democratizing processes produced seminal experiences of citizen involvement, accountability, human rights, transparency and the right to information, decentralization and administrative reforms in support of local government. South Africa, the Republic of Korea, many Eastern European countries, leading metropolitan areas in Latin America (including Montevideo, Buenos Aires, S o Paulo and the Federal District of Mexico) and hundreds of national, provincial and regional governments in various parts of the world are anxious to innovate in government practices and are opening up new relations between the state and society.

While there are new links between the local and global levels, based on these new political realities opened up by the political transition process, since they influence new democratic constructs of universal scope, these realities are also limited by the national scale, since there are no alternative models corresponding to this level of government (except China, Viet Nam and Cuba, where the alternative contribution of these models is not relevant to us here). Likewise, non-state actors are emerging at other socio-political levels: at the supranational level, a regional form of civil society is emerging in association with integration processes, including the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Summit of the Peoples of the Americas (organizations that are linked with resistance to the FTAA). Another example is the proliferation of citizen associations in Europe that are calling into question the process of institutionalizing the European Union.

What happens at the international and/or world level? While the States institutionalized their international relations through the United Nations, the governments of central countries, in association with transnational business interests, busied themselves with creating institutions of supposedly world scope: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In parallel, state actors were creating a variety of organizations of world scope including the Group of Seven/Eight (G7-G8) and a great many international forums of a hegemonic nature, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or of an alternative nature, such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

From the perspective of non-state actors, the internationalization and globalization of their organizations has been highly variable. The most aggressive project of the transnationals was the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was promoted within the OECD. Various civic movements disputed it on account of its exclusiveness and froze it, even though some regional integration institutions, like NAFTA, have adopted its postulates. With regard to non-state actors such as public non-governmental organizations, two experiences stand out: those of the labour and trade union movement, which failed to rise above the corporate and sectoral interests that inspired them and the experiences of movements associated with international regimes, such as human rights (Amnesty International), the environment (Greenpeace), feminism (the Beijing Summit), rescheduling foreign debt (Jubilee 2000) or the application of a special tax on financial transactions (ATTAC Group). Furthermore, a host of ecclesiastical civil groups and different local interests are endeavouring to gain prominence in the global arena. The late twentieth century was marked by assorted efforts to achieve convergence between these non-state actors.

Two events, two non-state actors

The twenty-first century began with two major events. The first was the Seattle protests at the end of 1999, which, in addition to the wave of privatization of supranational public spheres by the transnationals, showed us a new kind of non-state actor that aspired to influence the international scene – the anti-globalizationists, or “globaphobes” (a pejorative term coined by the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, at the APEC meeting in Vancouver in early 2000). The second event, the attacks of 11 September 2001, also demonstrated criticism of the world system by non-state actors – albeit from a diametrically opposite standpoint – regarding their conception of politics, the State, war and the use of weapons, the use of violence, the role of society and the way citizenship is shaped.

On the one hand, there are groups protesting against the undesirable effects of globalization, which try to portray or re-portray politics and political issues as a new public arena requiring a complex system of democratic conflict management, accompanied by the establishment of a form of citizenship with the right to discuss and decide on its environment and on everyday practices. These groups are seeking new creative solutions to the tensions that exist between a universal

project based on equity, justice and the full assertion of human rights, while respecting differences, which at the same time oppose the homogenizing and disintegrating effects of globalization.

On the other hand there is a concept that scorns politics as a reasoned way of managing conflict, which resorts to terrorist violence to reject war as an extension of politics by other means and which, in agreement with hegemonic state actors, advocates the single ideology, the supremacy of the Church over the State and the repudiation of diversity and cultural difference as promoting forms of unity and solidarity based on respect for others.

These are two non-state actors that mark a sea change, albeit with diametrically opposed projects for the future. However, the danger lies in the United States' new National Security Strategy, now inspired by the fight against terrorism, which is incapable of differentiating between the means and ends used by these two non-state actors, which it perceives as threats. Naomi Klein (*The Nation*, 10 October 2001) warned us of these risks: "After September 11, politicians and pundits around the world instantly began spinning the terrorist attacks as part of a continuum of anti-American and anti-corporate violence ... [*New Republic* editor Peter Beinart concluded that] the anti-globalization movement is ..., in part, a movement motivated by hatred of the United States".

In any case, in the fight against terrorism we need to avoid criminalizing movements of resistance or criticism of globalization, since they foreshadow a new world which is inclusive, which seeks to synchronize the institutional sphere with that of citizens, the rule of law and responsibilities, and which calls for public accountability and promotes lifeworlds open to multiculturalism. Their aims differ from those of Islamic fundamentalists and are spurned by the market fundamentalism promoted by private non-state actors and hegemonic States.

-Philia, phobia and criticisms

Although these new non-state actors oppose the undesirable effects of globalization, they do not all do so in the same way. Some are in the protest phase with no proposals, while others are in the resistance phase, and still others are seeking an alternative to neo-liberalism. So although there is a broad mix of actors, their practices converge in that they all oppose globalization. Neither the actors nor their practices, however, are completely free of internal contradictions. It depends on the position of these actors vis-à-vis the market, the State and society, in terms of power and identity.

Castells (1999b: 28-34) provides a construct of identity as "people's source of meaning and experience", which may be useful in illustrating the differences between the principal anti-globalization proposals: 1. Legitimizing identity is introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination over social actors. Legitimizing identities generate civil societies – in Gramsci's meaning of the term: "a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors, which reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination". This identity is encompassed within the ambiguous concept of civil society, since at the same time as they prolong the dynamics of the State, these non-state actors are deeply rooted among people. They are apparatuses with a degree of institutionalization, such as trade unions, Churches, parties and various civic associations and cooperatives whose identity is shaped by the legitimated reproduction of the dominant discourse. This form of identity could therefore be equated with "globaphiles".

Next we have: 2. Resistance identity: "produced by those actors who are in a position/conditions of being devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination", whose survival is entrenched in opposition. Identity for resistance leads to the formation of a sense of community, within communes or communities which in the main share a defensive sentiment that

reverses the dominant values, including value judgments, while reinforcing the divide between excluders and excluded. Thus we see the creation of “forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance”. In anti-globalization movements, this is the most common form of identity. The common link that unites highly diverse movements with particularist demands, such as ethnically based forms of nationalism, regional communities, or movements of young people or sexual minorities, is resistance to exclusion. Without wishing to echo the original pejorative connotation, we can group these forms of identity under the category of “globaphobes”.

This concept is not meant to disparage those who oppose or resist globalization. It denotes the way in which diverse foci of resistance, usually of an anti-capitalist persuasion, can converge in different situations, such as the meetings of international organizations, the formalization or institutionalization of schemas or spheres of commercial integration, or in the meetings of leaders of the central countries. Furthermore, it is not the aim to define these forms of identity in watertight compartments, since they need to be seen in a historical context in which they can change, improve or disappear. In this way, a resistance identity may, through identification of a project, develop into a legitimizing identity that rationalizes new forms of domination, or a failed project identity can progress towards forms of resistance, among many other possible combinations.

3. According to Castells, we have a project identity: “when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure”. The subject therefore takes the form of a collective social actor sharing an original experience that imparts a sense of wholeness, or of project, to its proposal. This is the alternative-creation stage described by Xabier Gorostiaga as the period of protest with a proposal; that is, a resistance identity may turn into a project identity. Empirically speaking, we note that in the movement against neo-liberal globalization there is a growing convergence between protest and a proposal, which leads us to agree with Castells’s thought-provoking theory that “subjects, if and when constructed, are not built any longer on the basis of civil societies, which are in the process of disintegration, but as a prolongation of communal resistance”. This third form of identity could be equated with what I have called “globacritics”.

Between resistance and an alternative project of society

The three identities defined above (“globaphiles” who favour globalization, as a legitimizing identity; “globaphobes” who oppose globalization, as a resistance identity; and critics of neo-liberal globalization, as a project identity) can be synthesized into two historical orientations: they either reproduce the dominant order or transform/supersede that order. Faced with these two opposing orientations for the future, we need to qualify the label of “anti-critics” or “globaphobes” to denote proponents of a third orientation, since it can somewhat oversimplify internally complex social phenomena. We must avoid disparaging opponents of globalization or any of its manifestations, since such resistance involves a de facto criticism of the dominant process – a form of criticism that may even give rise to an alternative project in which opposition to globalization involves dismantling it. Later I attempt to identify the differences and similarities between anti-globalizationists and deglobalization proponents. In any case, we are seeing a creative convergence between “globaphobes” and “globacritics” in the creation of alternatives. This unites resistance with a project for transformation at the World Social Forum, and in various public spaces where movements of criticism and opposition to globalization converge, seeking to establish that “other possible world” to which the Porto Alegre forum refers. This cannot be established without difficulties since, even though we are seeing greater coordination between means and ends, and between groups that support these resistance struggles and those creating alternative projects,

internal differences are also emerging – although we are loath to admit it – and these differences may well continue to grow if we fail to take into account their original sources.

Although obviously we cannot separate resistance and project identities into watertight compartments, four issues can be highlighted that divide the positions of “phobes” and critics within the organizations now converging in the various international forums and between intellectuals discussing these moves to oppose globalization and create alternatives:

1. The assessment of balance between the opportunities and limitations opened up by globalization in all its ramifications separates those who agree to negotiate with world institutions or governments under conditions favourable to the social movement from radicals who deny any room for negotiation or any benefit from globalization and so attempt to prevent it at all costs. It has divided the positions of those resisting and criticizing globalization, as shown at each of the protest forums following Seattle, where some of the parties called for negotiations or discussions to clarify the dispute in question or the different appraisals of the issues at stake. We saw this at all the meetings opposed by demonstrations: neither the World Bank, nor the International Monetary Fund, nor the World Trade Organization, nor the Summit of the Americas, nor the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), convened by the World Bank in Barcelona, agreed to formal, frank and open dialogue with protesting organizations. But it also has to be acknowledged that many of these organizations are prepared only to boycott any negotiation efforts.
2. Another divisive issue is which responsibilities the State should be assigned for managing conflict and solutions, and how they relate to the links between movements and government (national and local). Indeed, side by side within the movement of criticism and resistance to neo-liberal globalization we find anti-statists of anarchist origin, political groups and NGOs that sprang up in opposition to the State, including political movements that oppose their national government, which shun the institutionalization of social movements and demands, while others – particularly those with experience of government – seek to ensure that the State neither reneges on its commitments nor shies away from resolving historical shortcomings in terms of poverty, social inequality, crime and violence, public security, quality education and the promotion of productive employment, to cite but a few.
3. There is also a divide between resistance and project identities with regard to their conception of the role of civil society in creating the non-state public space, particularly in relation to democracy and citizenship; the electoral issue; the definition of human rights; the ethnic question and the degree of separation or connection between State and society. In theory, however, despite the enormous socio-political diversity between anti-globalizationists, two concepts – deliberative democracy (in the sense proposed by Habermas, 1999) and cosmopolitan (or multicultural) citizenship (in line with the ideas of David Held, 1999) – appear to be gaining credence among opponents of the authoritarianism entailed by neo-liberal globalization.
4. The use of violence is a further divisive issue, since some of those opposing globalization, at least under its current terms, support peaceful forms of protest that nevertheless serve to apply pressure for winning negotiations, while others favour openly confronting the forces of repression. The latter seek to “teach lessons” through confrontation and to amass opposition in order to radicalize the struggle. We cannot conceal the fact that they have been infiltrated by certain central government “political intelligence” elements, although this does not justify the repressive authoritarian

measures they have used in a bid to thwart the respective protests. This has already taken its toll on the movement against neo-liberal globalization, with one death and dozens of political prisoners in the jails of countries where such mass demonstrations have taken place.

Refoundation of politics, political issues and citizenship issues

We must ask ourselves whether the forms of resistance, criticism and alternative projects to neo-liberal globalization lead: (1) to a new rapprochement to politics, seen as the public arena which is subject to the collective construction of a construct, or (2) to a new approach to political issues, seen as a system of relations between public and private and between State, market and society. We need to ask ourselves whether those criticizing or resisting neo-liberal globalization are contributing to deliberative or participatory forms of democracy. We should also ask ourselves about: (3) the impact of these shifting global identities on forms of citizenship (referred to in the plural, since they encompass social, cultural, political and civil rights aspects), and whether an inclusive cosmopolitan identity is taking shape as a result of these processes.

In particular we need to inquire about: (4) the social processes unleashed by these complex emerging citizenship identities, which impact on both the local dimension and beyond the national dimension, in a new political public space where alternatives to neo-liberal globalization are being formulated at the different political world, supranational, national and local geographical levels. This organization of levels encompasses: (5) the crisis of governability of the traditional democratic model, but also – at least in a prefigured or virtual sense – the potential of what has come to be called democratic governance.

1. Collective forming of a political construct

Despite their diversity, phobics and critics share a number of traits. According to Bourdieu (2001), many such social movements stem from a rejection of traditional forms of political protest, particularly those in which political parties play a leading role. Their libertarian ideology promotes the direct involvement of stakeholders in opposition to the monopolization of power by minorities. The second common trait is that they invent or reinvent original forms of action in order to link means to ends, using strong symbolism conveyed primarily through the media, without allowing themselves to be exploited by the media. The third common trait is that they reject neo-liberalism as the imposition of the will of dominant and multinational institutions by means of investment. The fourth trait is that these movements are at once international, and internationalist, particularist and proponents of a new global order. A further common trait is that these movements extol solidarity as a principle of action and organization. Phobics and critics combine two principles. They acquired one of these early on – the think global, act local principle, whereby networks of networks had local support for their world project. Since Seattle, however, this has been complemented by the act global, think local principle, which propels to centre stage the protests against the institutions dominating neo-liberal globalization, bearing in mind the impact of these actions on the local sphere in which such networks operate.

2. Contribution of deliberative and participatory forms of democracy

Even though the debates on participatory democracy have been confined to the space of the nation-state, the new movements contesting neo-liberal globalization introduce new day-to-day practices, culminating in organizational principles that transcend the rigid boundaries of formal, representative, delegated, procedural democracy. Mohamed Djouldem (2001) says that the multiple forms of protest against globalization establish a new world space in which we can identify common interests seeking reasonable compromises and trade-offs. These include the best way of

taking the “right” decisions, based on forms of discussion that could be characterized as deliberative and which rival institutional, national and representative democracies. Although there is no unanimous agreement on the democratic construct being established, but instead diverse interpretations of the democratic aims and implications (*enjeux*), other interpretations of the characteristics of these constructs lead to a definition of global or transnational democracy.

With regard to the “deliberative democracy” concept, we need to clarify the role played by grass-roots communities and counter-powers in constructing these new public spaces that lead to a refoundation of politics and political issues. According to Djouldem (2001), the case of the World Social Forum is emblematic at supranational level, since this arena “may be regarded as a sort of constituent assembly for this new participatory democracy with world aspirations. It marks the advent of a new form of citizenship based on a new type of political activism that is familiar with the Internet, non-partisan and politically heterogeneous”.

So movements of criticism and resistance to neo-liberal globalization can be considered to be making new contributions to what might be conceived as deliberative democracy, since the organizations and associations which are related to civil society via a multiplicity of networks link together these three levels of participatory democracy because they project the specific values and aspirations of local societies into the world arena. In return they instil a world view into local and national societies and alter the political style, giving rise to new forums for debate and airing problems (those of Porto Alegre and Quebec) and restoring the balance of power in favour of those outside the elite.

The discussion proposed in the MOST-UNESCO document used to convene the workshop on “Democracy, governance and associated complexities: The challenges involved in recognizing cultural pluralism” contains a number of important questions pertaining to deliberative democracy, including whether this concept contributes solutions to the tensions between liberty (liberal democracy favouring moderation) and equality (radical democracy favouring virtue). This is a question that has the germ of a reply in the creation of deliberative spaces by “globaphobes” and “globacritics”, insofar as their organizations constitute active criticisms of liberal and representative democracy in new “public arenas”, where they are seeking to further democracy by involving informed subjects able to demand transparency and accountability, on the basis of a new ethic of the state and non-state public sphere.

However, in terms of the process of institutionalizing political issues, this construction is highly heterogeneous, since there are no certainties either for the future or with regard to the possible avenues for transforming representative liberal democracy (the power structure, the autonomy of powers, and checks and balances), or concerning the delegation of powers and the role played by elections, political systems and competing parties along this path, or concerning the forms that favour popular sovereignty (forms of assembly or plebiscite), or concerning the immediate day-to-day practices of deliberative spaces (prior to taking decisions, when monitoring and assessing the consequences and when defining responsibilities). In any event, we agree with Djouldem (2001), “This renewal of participatory democracy calls for a redefinition of its concept, which remains vague owing to the diversity of practices, the functional dimensions attributed to it and the empirical situations it represents”.

3. Contributions to shaping an inclusive cosmopolitan identity

With the weakening of the State’s regulatory powers in the national sphere, greater supranational regulation whittling away at sovereignty and the de-territorialization stemming from the globalizing dynamic that is sweeping along public policies, the sense of national identity is gradually being lost. The State, then, no longer represents the broad interests of the population and

so we can speak of a growing process of “de-citizenization”, insofar as it is leading to the disintegration of national identities. Assies, Calderón and Salman (2001) identify three reactions to this process: “Firstly, an inert and bewildered mass akin to what Zermeño (1996) described as a “defeated society” battered by the neo-liberal onslaught. Secondly, a non-conformist group that provides the basis for new – often violent – forms of protest against globalization (*backlash politics*)”. Thirdly, “an active and visionary minority is organizing itself at local and transnational level (though not yet at national level) in the context of an alternative project for globalization and globalized citizenship inspired by a cosmopolitan ethic. The intercultural citizen”.

Cosmopolitanism does not signify the homogenization of universalist principles and values, but rather openness and input to the universal from the particular. The intrinsic contradictions of neo-liberal globalization have widened the gap between two dynamics which, according to the MOST-UNESCO document, are quite unrelated. On the one hand, the homogeneous is being imposed on the spheres of the centre and its extensions into the periphery, in the sense of ONE unchallengeable dogma, ONE way of organizing social systems and ONE hegemony of values. On the other hand, we are seeing a fragmentation of the ideology, systems, values, forms of citizenship and identities underpinning them, as a result of the concrete way in which globalization is localized – hence the term “glocalization”. The cosmopolitan ethic that underpins the intercultural citizenship project is not an indiscriminate mix of these diffuse factors, but rather a respect for differences – provided these are open to inclusion – and the fostering of diversity as a source of cultural enrichment.

As a result of this diversity, which comes into contact in global and local non-state public spaces, a horizontal form of intercultural communication has been established – insofar as cosmopolitanism is no longer identified with the centre – which is one of the outstanding contributions made by the movements of criticism and resistance to neo-liberalism, chiefly at the World Social Forum. This leads to the recognition of complex and hybrid identities (MOST-UNESCO) based on two processes: identities that are forged in the area of conflict where the global level meets the local level, which are no longer national identities and, at the other extreme, cosmopolitan identities which are acquiring the ability to handle a project; to echo Alain Touraine, words (*parole*) are winning out over violence and authoritarian imposition (*sang*).

Labarrière (2001) defines cosmopolitanism as the opportunity to go beyond the particularism of citizenship, as a political identity confined to the polis, by projecting itself into the world or cosmos, as an idea of historical universality. That is why a contemporaneous version of cosmopolitanism postulates this historical universality as the exercise of reason, facing the challenge of safeguarding the singularities being demanded, insofar as they convey their project identity – words. The tasks of the new cosmopolitan ethic which is becoming apparent in the public spaces where it is expressed go beyond merely regulating world markets, or reorganizing migratory flows, but instead take on board the aspirations and multiple human potential of a whole geographical and temporal range (tradition and change).

We can, therefore, point to substantive contributions which the movement of criticism and resistance to globalization has made to the cosmopolitan ethic, to reinforcing cultural exchanges concerning linguistic particularities and diversities, to enhancing human rights on the basis of equity and solidarity, to demanding a supranational justice consonant with the rule of law, to creating new spheres of communication and self-representation within civil society and to seeking the establishment of freely accepted international arbitration. However, cosmopolitanism can veer towards a false legitimacy of the central hegemony, which is why the term has to be used advisedly, with particular reference to the possible re-establishment of the central hegemony as a result of the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” or the statization of power in figures associated with

world or supranational government, which could undermine the creative force of deliberative democracy.

4. A new political public space with alternatives to neo-liberal globalization, formulated at the different levels of political geography

The policy established by these phobic and critical movements is singular because it is forward-looking, holding out prospects for Utopia – unlike religious fundamentalism, which proposes uchronia (that is to say, that which is not situated in time). What is more, phobics and critics set in motion other complex and hybrid processes when they propose to transfer, and possibly synchronize, some actions to all four levels of political geography:

- A. The world system, which is embodied by the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, with its slogan “Another world is possible”, or the creation of non-state public spaces suited to a climate of specific protest such as the Genoa World Social Forum, or groups working in conjunction with international regimes such as Greenpeace, in environmental matters; Amnesty International, for human rights; the ATTAC Group, which proposes alternatives to financial speculation; or feminist and sexual minority groups seeking gender equity.
- B. Groups acting in regional supranational spaces, as illustrated by the demand for a social Europe, or by the actions of the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Summit of the Peoples of the Americas in opposition to the FTAA, while they also made proposals.
- C. Thousands of groups working from this critical perspective in the spaces of nation-states, where the Zapatista National Liberation Army has made an outstanding contribution on behalf of the indigenous peoples and peasants of Mexico, associated with another vision of the global dimension, as illustrated by the Intercontinental Meetings for Humanity and against Neo-liberalism in Europe (held in Chiapas and Barcelona).
- D. In local/regional spaces, where a key feature is the democratization of local government and the action of thousands of civil organizations which are associated with these democratizing processes to varying degrees. A good example is Brazil’s “participatory budget” experience in the State of Río Grande do Sul and the municipality of Porto Alegre. This is also where we find the complex and diverse identities making gender or sectoral demands, whose action starts with the local level, even though they are not limited to this level.

5. Potential of democratic governance

There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of governability, since a critical approximation to the intrinsic functionalism of (neo-)institutional approaches (the theory of “governance”, which is reduced to good government, efficiency and the reform and rationalization of public policies, in the guise of a reform of the State) makes government rely on the results of the political practices of social, governmental and market actors. By adopting the principle that democratic governance requires a political precedent – which is not reduced to government and institutions – for the creation of complex conflict-management systems (MOST-UNESCO), we find a number of seminal proposals on which conditions would make this schema propitious on a world scale, as well as for its interaction with the local level, based on the alternatives being discussed within the movement of criticism and resistance to globalization.

According to Peter Wahl's ideas on world governance (2001), we see that phobics and critics condemn the fact that globalization eludes all forms of supranational political regulation, even though multinational business actors have tried to impose regulations biased to suit their interests, as exemplified by the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. That is why these non-state critics of neo-liberalism are proposing a series of transnational and worldwide political regulations. The schema of world governance in evidence in the movement of criticism and resistance to globalization calls for new spheres of cooperation between the political actors in the world system, such as governments and international institutions, and for making economic integration contingent upon the world market and for emphasizing national spaces. Moreover, this schema reinforces the spaces opened up by civil society by recognizing the key role of civil organizations, including NGOs, and their transnational networks, in diagnosing problems and creating solutions, which transcends the State's responsibilities, or can complement them where appropriate.

One difficulty with the schema of world governance heralded by phobics and critics is the degree of institutionalization that should accompany the workings of civil organizations. It is a debate that brings to centre stage the issue of world government, but also that of a new role for nation-states. With regard to world government, a number of authors point to a need to reform the United Nations and the various worldwide organizations in the banking, goods and services, and finance sectors, to ensure that we transcend the inter-state nature of these institutions by involving actors that represent civil society. Despite its broad scope, such a reform is insufficient to cope with the complex demands of emerging opponents of neo-liberal globalization. David Held (1999) proposes a democratic world system combining the institutional forms specific to representative liberal democracy – reorganized in line with the criteria stemming from an increasing involvement of civil society – with new government practices founded on a cosmopolitan society that stresses the multicultural dimension of citizenship.

The legitimacy of global regulation that involves state and non-state actors and values and principles conducive to a world ethic, whose reference model is sustainable development and human rights tailored to specific situations, are the cornerstones of the debate on world government. With regard to the new role of nation-states in a schema of world governance, there are broad ill-defined areas since while at the same time the theoretical construction of alternatives is returning broad powers to the nation-state by turning it into a sort of pivot between world and local political regulation (see “À la recherche d’alternatives. Un autre monde est-il possible?”, *Alternatives Sud*, Cahiers trimestriels Vol. VIII, 2001-2), the management of recent systemic crises has, from the official perspectives of international institutions, called for increasing intervention from the public authorities in order to effect the adjustments and restructuring imposed by the market's political management privileges.

The one and only ideology, which advocates a minimal State, had to be contradicted by bringing greater state intervention to bear on financial crisis management. The most recent evidence of it, following the demands tabled to governments and States hit by the stock market crisis, is the involvement of the central countries in the war on terrorism commanded by the United States. Although the World Social Forum proposes a number of forums on the institutionalization of power, for the benefit of local authorities, national and regional parliaments, and international courts and judicial authorities, there is not enough clarity regarding the challenges posed by this new role for nation-states, in a climate where the official ideology of international institutions is returning to a central state approach. Even though democratic governance does mean a return to forms of citizenship confined to the state sphere, the proposal for a cosmopolitan ethic fostering intercultural citizenship calls for an analysis of the impediments to – together perhaps with the potential of – the post-nation State sphere.

Conclusions

The convergence between project identities and resistance identities, in the proposal for an alternative world system, involves contributions to the issue of cosmopolitan and intercultural citizenship and to the issue of State and government at various socio-spatial levels (a return to the central State approach, promoting a reform of relations between market, State and society), to the issue of participatory and deliberative democracy and, lastly, to the issue of globalization as it relates to imperialism and neo-colonialism, in terms of redefining the hierarchies between the centre and the periphery.

Between criticisms and resistance to neo-liberal globalization there is a promising and fruitful refoundation of politics, political issues and citizenship issues. However, a number of strategic terms for social action still have not gained widespread acceptance, such as de-globalization as the deconstruction of neo-liberalism; negotiation and the degree of dialogue between civil anti-globalization organizations and international institutions; placing emphasis on the national level of action; the radicalism of methods of struggle and, in particular, the use of violence.

The public spheres created by phobics and critics contribute elements that help to alleviate the deficit of democratic governance and establish the public ethic as a right and responsibility (involving accountability, public management transparency and new cosmopolitan civic values). However, these innovations come up against threats and risks, including: the hijacking and distortion of demands by the media; the economicist emphasis of demands for regulating the world market that fail to take into account the complex plural dimension of the cultural identities under threat; pressure from fanatical particularisms, owing to their anti-capitalist identification and, in particular, the criminalization of movements of criticism and resistance to globalization, which threatens to deny the legitimacy of proposals emerging from these movements by demonizing them and labelling them terrorist movements.

It is up to the “globacritics”, together with “globaphobe” forms of resistance, to instigate an alternative form of globalization (“another possible” globalization) by coordinating their demands. This raises a number of questions. For instance, how can we resolve the deficit of democratic governance that is apparent, to varying degrees, at each of the four geopolitical levels (world, supranational, national and local)? How can social networks be involved in reforming the United Nations, democratizing continental blocs and countries (especially central countries, in the face of a return to central state approaches accentuated since 11 September 2001), as well as democratizing regions? How can we resolve the public ethical deficit that is corrupting social relations by shirking accountability and denying a quality education system? How can something be done about the civic deficit that deprives citizens of their rights?

The alternatives to neo-liberalism involve that deliberative democracy which springs from below to fashion cosmopolitan citizens open both to multiculturalism and to the new social agenda of justice, solidarity, gender equity and environmental sustainability.

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